Quote:
Originally Posted by Rudism 
I hear this metaphor a lot, but it doesn't really work. The TV has a mechanism for receiving and decoding the external information which, when removed or disabled, renders the rest of the components completely useless. You could experimentally verify this with a simple test--unplugging the cable, or blocking the signals with some kind of shielding. This is not analogous to the brain--there is no evidence of any kind of external signal, but there is tons of evidence supporting a more materialistic view.
For example, if memories are stored outside of the brain, why does damage to the hippocampus affect our ability to form memories? Why are scientists able to develop drugs that can target and remove specific individual memories ( see here for an example)? If the self and consciousness are external to the brain, then why does damage to the prefrontal cortex so drastically change people's personality and awarenesses?
The configuration of the brain is obviously extremely important in how we perceive the world, how we perceive ourselves, and how we behave--so where's the evidence that there's outside information involved in any of this?
I would like to see a TV that, when you damage a certain circuit, starts showing more violent programming. Or a TV where removing a component results in actors showing up in the wrong shows, or causing the plots to become noticeably more disjointed and confused. |
If this happened this would be evidence that the TV set is the origin of the content it shows -- so this is why it doesn't happen. And to conclude that the brain generates consciousness we would have to have analogous similar effects. But such analogous similar effects are not a change in personality, or the inability to recall memories. Rather it should be a
literal change in the self, or the creation of a whole range of memories
ex nihilo.
So for example, if we take a case such as
Phineas Gage it is not sufficient for him merely to undergo a personality change in order to conclude the brain generates consciousness. He would need to
literally become a different self. The former would be analogous to the picture distorting on a TV set when you tinker with the innards of the set, the latter would be analogous to the TV set displaying more violent content when you tinker with the innards of the set.
Did Phineas Gage literally become a different self? Well as far as I know he never claimed he did. Indeed we would suppose that the personality changes he underwent is simply a more extreme version of the personality changes we undergo after consuming a fair quantity of alcohol. We may feel more extrovert, more cantankerous etc, but we would vehemently deny we have literally become different selves.
The mistake you make and all other materialists make is to equate the self with ones personality. But in order to attack my position you should not impose your own interpretation of the self. Ones personality, intelligence, memories, thoughts, emotions etc, are merely the
properties of the self. They do not
constitute the self.
Here is what I wrote before on this issue:
Imagine if you will 2 very intelligent people from the early 18th century who, by some means or other, are miraculously transported to our present day. Imagine further they encounter a television set showing a film. After being suitably astounded, and after tinkering around with its internal components and finding that tinkering with particular components effects the picture quality in particular characteristic ways, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the film must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so. The other person, however, will rightly point out that although he grants that the picture itself is generated by these internal components, it cannot be the case that the actual contents of the movie, the actual storyline with its depiction of various emotions and so on, can be generated by just these internal components. This is because there is nothing about the physical processes within the TV set which could conceivably lead to the generation ex nihilo of such a storyline.
So with a television set the state of its internal components will affect the quality of the picture, but this does not entail that the storyline depicted by the picture is affected too. Indeed no matter how poor the picture quality might get e.g. a snowy picture, ghosting etc, a given film will continue to show the same events.
I want to suggest that some useful insights into trying to understand a possible relationship of the self to its brain might be gained from consideration of this television set metaphor. A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brain's processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self.
Thus the suggestion here is that just as the storyline of a film does not have its origin in the television set's internal components, neither might the self have its source or origin in the brain. Rather it conceivably could be the case that the self's existence is ontologically self-subsistent and is 'filtered' by the brain. What I mean by 'filtered' is that although the self does not change as the state of our brains change so as to become a literally different self, the self's mind states do change. That is to say differing particular mind states change according to the particular physical configuration of the brain. Thus the various mental states we experience during our lives are a result of both the self - accounting for the feeling of a persistent self and the more general dispositions of selfhood - and also the particular physical configuration of the brain the self is 'filtered' by. The feeling of a persistent enduring self remains intact, but, due to the change in mind states, our moods, interests and intelligence will vary. This then will account for the correlation between brain states and mind states.
I think this corresponds very nicely with our intuitive notions we have regarding the self. After all, the self is the essential you. To elucidate: although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states. Thus I (that is the self) might, for example, be in a good mood or a bad mood. But my self is not to be equated by such given mind states. Rather I experience being in a good mood, or a bad mood, or indeed any other mental state. The I or the self is that which endures, but which can experience various mental states such as differing moods.
Note that this notion of a literal same self is difficult to maintain if we suppose that the self is actually generated by the brain. For example, if we happen to be materialists - by far the most common group to hold self is generated by the brain - we must maintain that any 'self' must simply be equated with the brain, or more precisely with the processes taking place within it. Given that brain states are in a constant state of change, it would certainly seem that, in a literal sense, the self must also be in a constant state of change. Be clear as to what this means. It means that there can be no unchanging enduring self, i.e. substantial self, under materialism. Our selves are quite literally equated with our mind states. Within this scenario it might be difficult to avoid concluding our sense of self is effectively an illusion. Indeed this is precisely what many philosophical materialists maintain.