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Originally Posted by David Bailey Q1. Is the computer program consciously aware in the same way as the original brain? If the answer to this is no, what is the essential difference, and can it be rectified? |
Assuming we can really simulate the entire state of affairs of the brain, then I would say yes.
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Q2. If the program is run again with the same inputs, does it suffer all over again, or are the two simulations somehow equivalent?
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It suffers all over again. I don't know what it means to say they are equivalent.
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Q3. Is it every time the program is run, or every time someone proves this theorem, or maybe these experiences are completely de-localised over space-time, as with any other theorem?
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I don't understand this question. What does it mean for the computer to feel pain when someone proves the theorem?
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My point is that computer is really just a very specialised theorem prover. It repeats a transformation from input to output that is already completely defined once the program has been defined. It is merely a tool for reproducing that transformation. Looked at in that light, does it really make sense to credit the system with emotions, or qualia of any sort?
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That depends entirely on what you think qualia are.
Now my question to you: If you think that a mind cannot be simulated on a computer with appropriate random inputs, then I believe you are saying that a mind is more than some combination of deterministic and random events. Could you please describe the third thing that is included? If it is easier, you can describe the third thing that is involved in libertarian free will.
~~ Paul