[davidsmith73]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Why doesn't relative simplicity matter? Are you going to proclaim a computer as a fundamental existent as glibly as you'd proclaim an electron?

I think we are talking past one another. I never proclaimed either a computer or an electron is a fundamental existent. I defined a fundamental existent as an entity that is not composed of any additional constituent parts. You were the one who proposed that qualia were fundamental existents. I'm still waiting for you to either agree with my definition or give some indication as to what your definition of 'fundamental existent' is. Then we can proceed to work out whether more complex cognitive relationships can emerge from 'quale-interactions', or whether this would involve the apparantly insurpassable problems that you imply.

Presumably a simple quale-on with a few attributes and interaction laws is not enough to produce full-blown human consciousness. So there is still this supposed "hard problem" of getting from quale-on to consciousness.

If by 'full-blown human consciousness' you mean complex cognitive relationships then there is no hard problem to discuss. The hard problem is how to get phenomenal consciousness from quantitative relationships. Phenomenal consciousness refers to the same thing as qualia. So asking how we get from qualia to consciousness is not a statement about the hard problem.

You can get rid of the hard problem only if you propose full-blown human consciousness as the fundamental existent.

How are you defining full-blown human consciousness?

If we propose a complete quale as a fundamental existent, then I object to its level of complexity. In particular, it would have include memories, emotions, and all the other things that contribute to the quale. My entire brain would have to be part of the fundamental existent.

This is the bit of your argument where I'm really lost. Could you elaborate?