Quote:
Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos 
I'm using the standard definition: A deterministic process is one whose outcome is causally inevitable as a consequence of preceding events. This is clearly inconsistent with the idea of libertarian free will.
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The problem is that I subscribe to a Humean analysis of
physical causality (although I don't subscribe to a Humean analysis of mental causality).
So when one snooker ball hits another snooker ball, and the 2nd starts to move, this is not due to any causal innate power in the world. So my question to you is whether rejecting the existence of innate physical causal powers has any consequences for the definition of determinism?
I mean if there are no physical causal innate powers in the world, how can any physical event be inevitable? Does not determinism connote the idea of some event being
made/
compelled to happen?