[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

It's obvious I can act against my desires. I may vastly prefer to have eggs and bacon for breakfast, but choose to eat porridge instead. It's true that I may choose to have porridge because of another desire i.e to eat healthily. But it seems I have the power to act against my desires even where there are no competing desires.

It does? How would you know that there are no competing desires?

So when one snooker ball hits another snooker ball, and the 2nd starts to move, this is not due to any causal innate power in the world. So my question to you is whether rejecting the existence of innate physical causal powers has any consequences for the definition of determinism?

I mean if there are no physical causal innate powers in the world, how can any physical event be inevitable? Does not determinism connote the idea of some event being made/compelled to happen?

Sorry, I don't understand this. What does cause the second snooker ball to move?

I'm guessing that you have defined a world in which the standard definition of determinism is irrelevent. In that case, you need to redefine the word. Only then can we define random in terms of it, if at all.

~~ Paul