[Interesting Ian]

Unknown Author

One can define libertarian free will as "given a choice nothing determines which choice is made".

I disagree with this. *I* determine which choice is made.

Nothing guarantees that a particular choice will be made, not even reasons or values or knowledge.

Not true, I may have made my mind up about something.

What this means is that though we will always choose according to some desire that we possess, which particular desire of the many we have that wins out is not determined in advance by anything but "us" (in some obscure sense of the word).

How is the concept of the self obscure?

So even if I want most of all not to raise my hand, I might raise it anyway, presumably as long as I have any minuscule desire to do it. Of course, this seems counter-intuitive right from the start. If the strongest desire in me is to stay still, how can I be caused to raise my hand by a weaker force?

But this just flies in the face of our experience. One might be starving -- thus one desires very much indeed to consume food. Yet we know through our immediate experience that we can deny ourselves.

So what would this author say about that? The only thing he could say is that in fact denying myself food -- contrary to appearances -- is actually my greatest desire! In which case I say that's fine. But in that case one is not really saying anything of any substance. Because whatever we do is by definition our greatest desire. However it doesn't constitute any difficulty for the notion that a desire can arise spontaneously, unpredictable from the previous physical state of the world or even ones prior psychological state.

"Suppose some person," a libertarian asks, "freely performed some act...say raising an arm in order to vote". The libertarian says that this person "exerted [his] power as a first mover (an initiator of change) to bring about" the motion to vote. But what about the request to vote in the first place? Actually being in a circumstance that calls for a vote is itself a necessary condition for raising a hand to vote. Correct. But this does not mean that the circumstances will be a sufficient cause of the action, and the libertarian's point is that something else is necessary, which is unrelated to anything in or outside us. But this thing is not our reason or our knowledge or our character or our desires, or anything at all really.

This "thing" is our self which is distinct from our reason, character, desires or whatever.

And that creates a problem.

What problem??

For,
instance, the premise that this person brought about [the choice] for the sake of some reason, which entails another necessary cause-the reason-without which the hand would never be raised. And this reason will certainly correspond to a brain state, and a chain of causation can be followed as we examine the path of all the calculations and knowledge that are in turn necessary causes of that reason arising in our brain. So the libertarian is forced to reject even the obvious theory that reasons cause us to act.

This is just complete nonsense!

There's some confusion about the notion of causation. Claiming that X causes Y is naive. In reality often there's a network of cause and effect so that many factors have to be present (necessary conditions) before X causes Y. It may be the case that A, B and C have to happen, or be in place, in addition to X happening before Y occurs. We can still say X causes Y, but equally we could say any of the others causes Y too (or at least have to be present before Y happen).

So reasons do indeed cause us to act, but nevertheless the willingness of the self to act upon that reason also has to be present.

What libertarians must contend is that despite the necessity of all these causes, the sum of them all (having a reason and a strong enough desire, as well as the requisite knowledge and the necessary circumstances) will still not be sufficient to cause an action. In other words, though such things must be in place, something "else" is required, which is neither a reason nor a desire nor knowledge of any kind nor anything about the surrounding circumstances. And this is the problem. It is hard to see what this "something" can be.

It may be hard for you perhaps, but it certainly isn't for me. This ""something"" is simply the self.

If I have a desire to actually shoot someone, a desire that is sufficient to override all other desires which urge me against it---a necessary cause of any willful choice to shoot---why would I not shoot? If some libertarians appeal to moral shame or guilt or fear, then they are appealing to a desire. But that is a cause, and that cannot be his special "something." Likewise, if they appeal to my character, knowledge of God or moral laws, to reasons not to shoot, or any such thing, then they are still appealing to causes. So what is left that could "cause" me not to shoot? What these libertarians are saying, in effect, that there is some uncaused power in me that can cause me not to shoot---for no reason whatever.

These are just competing desires. As pointed out before, the decision whether I shoot or not can always be defined as the greatest desire. But if so this is just a trivial truth. The point is that it seems I can decide to shoot, but spontaneously, at the very last second, decide not to. And it is the self which finally decides whether to shoot or not. The self which is quite distinct from ones character, ones intelligence, ones memories, ones interests etc.

I'll need to respond to the rest in a separate post since there seems to be a limit to the amount of text one can post.