[Interesting Ian]

Unknown Author
Libertarians might respond that we usually have a reason to do and not to do something, and which reason we follow is caused purely by "something" in us, something that is not a reason, nor anything else like desires or knowledge or circumstances. But if the ultimate reason for my doing something is not a reason, then rational action is impossible, for no rational calculation can then be the cause of what I do.

Nonsense. To repeat myself X,Y and Z may all be causes of A. But they all need to be present before A occurs. Likewise reasons for action might very well need to be present. But it still requires the decision of the self to act upon those reasons.

What the author doesn't appear to understand is that one can make an arbitrary (albeit not random) choice. If I'm driving along in a car, and I am lost, and I come to a T junction, I can decide to turn either left or right. Reasons and desires may not come into it, so according to the author it would then be impossible for me to choose. Nope, impossible for an android perhaps, but not me. Of course, to reiterate if I decide to turn left one can always claim that deep down I desired this course of action, but then, as explained before, that's not really saying anything.

Only something purely non-rational is the ultimate necessary cause on this theory, something uncaused by our knowledge, our reason, even our character. That would be terrible if it were true---far from rescuing responsibility, it destroys it.

Complete nonsense. Reasons, desires as well as the decision of the self are all vital ingredients of ones actions. They all cause ones actions in the same way that X, Y and Z all have to occur and all cause A to happen. The conceivability of acting against ones desires and interests and reasons need not imply that I would ever actually do so. If I spotted a £50 in the street I would pick it up and put it in my pocket. I would never ever not do so. So reasons and desires very much dictate my behaviour. But to my mind it is absurd to say that it is impossible that I would not pick it up. Impossible for a robot, but not for people.

Why Libertarian Free Will Eliminates Responsibility

Imagine two parallel universes, identical in every detail, and imagine a man in each universe, identical in their character and knowledge and desires and everything else, standing in totally identical circumstances. Now imagine that one of these men chooses to kill his wife, but the other man chooses not to. What could possibly explain this?

It would not happen. They would choose the same. Or at least it could only happen if some random element was introduced into one or both Universes.

Since the two situations and the two men are identical in every respect, there can be no cause whatsoever for either man's choice. This is what libertarian theory entails.

{shrugs} In that case I don't subscribe to Libitarianism.

Er, mszlazak? No point in me addressing the rest now it's transpired I'm not a libertarian is there?

Anyway, I agree entirely about the 2 Universes. So I'll miss all that out.

Here's the deal. "I" am defined by my knowledge, abilities, character, values, and desires.

Absolutely not. He's presupposing the correctness of the materialist metaphysic.

Libertarians, instead, want "me" to be defined by something other than these things.

So I agree with Libertarians on this issue but not the 2 Universes thought experiment (unless this author is attacking a strawman).

But if you were to take them all away, there would be no "me," so this approach is absurd. Without knowledge, abilities, values, desires, reasoning, a character, there would be no person at all,

Absolute nonsense. To quote my essay on my website (near the end):

It seems to me that we have this concept of the self which in one sense changes, but yet without changing what we essentially are. To elucidate; although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states.

But how can this be? If my adult self has radically different interests, intelligence and, broadly speaking, an apparently quite different personality from when I was a child, then how can it be argued I am still one and the very same person? I suggest the puzzlement here is simply a failure to recognize a distinction between consciousness and that which is the subject of such conscious experiences. Or to put it another way: I propose experiences are had by an experiencer (self). Thus there is no difficulty in supposing that experiences can differ quite radically in nature and yet be had by the very same experiencer or self. The opponents of such a view are implicitly supposing that a person is simply the sum of various conscious experiences rather than the author of such experiences. This notion of a self I propose is known in philosophical parlance as a substantial self.

So the key word here is "I" (or "he" or a "person" or whatever) and what it means. Libertarians defines it as some unexplainable, unidentifiable thing that excludes all memories, desires, virtues, values, traits, even reason. This is a rather illogical conception of human identity, and one any reasonable person can easily reject.

On the contrary -- it is momumentally counter intuitive. Read my essay to see why.