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Originally Posted by David My point is that Paul accepts that any material system can in principle be simulated on a computer. Therefore, he accepts that a computer program can be conscious. |
Not quite. It is possible that human consciousness requires some interaction between the brain and the external world, as Chalmers claims. If that is true, then the computer would need a particular architecture in order to have the same interaction. So not any old computer could be conscious.
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However, my point is that a computer program together with its input can be thought of as simply checking some mathematical relationship (albeit perhaps a very complex one) - a theorem if you like. Therefore it is reasonable to ask in the consciousness (together with qualia, of course) is associated with the checking program, or with the theorem itself! The theorem - like all theorems - is true for all time, which seems an odd place for consciousness to reside (remember this is the ultra-materialist model of consciousness).
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This is a reasonable question, although I don't see why it's a paradox.
~~ Paul