Getting back to the homunculus problem, in the the book
Irreducible Mind, the following opinion is expressed:
Quote:
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no homunculus problem is posed by the structure of our conscious experience itself. The efforts of Dennett (1991) and others to claim that there is such a problem, and to use that to ridicule any residue of dualism, rely upon the deeply flawed metaphor of the “Cartesian theater,” a place where mental contents get displayed and I pop in separately to view them. Descartes himself, James, and Searle, among others, all have this right; conscious experience comes to us whole and undivided, with the qualitative feels, phenomenological content, unity, and subjective point of view all built-in, intrinsic features. I and my experience cannot be separated in this way. (IM, p. 44)
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Hmmmm . .yes . . . come to think of it I agree with that. Incidentally I got that from an extended
review of this book (click PDF).