94. Dr. Jeffrey Long?s Near-Death Experience Research a ?Game Changer? for Science (P

[P_Synthesis]

Originally Posted by Ian

But I'm talking about mainstream science . . . Those who subscribe to the mainstream view reject anything magical like psi or anything which cannot be given conventional explanations.

No they don't, not necessarily. That's the materialist viewpoint but not all mainstream scientists are materialists.

That's why I recommend the book I linked to. Again, it surveys people in elite scientific positions in academia for their views on these questions. It is a scientific study on the sociology of parapsychological views in mainstream science.

The answers don't correspond with what you are thinking -- there is a big mix of views present. In other words this is yet another example of research providing results that at first sight are counter-intuitive.

The polarizing nature of skepticism tends to hide these subtleties.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by FastEddieB

IOW, NO paper or thesis can ever, in principle, say anything about consciousness???

Well consciousness is not reducible. So you can't derive it's existence. And if it's not causally efficacious as current science holds, then it doesn't figure in a complete scientific description of reality. If brains produce consciousness then this is a brute fact not susceptible to further analysis. Consciousness is a fundamental existent. However, in principle the causal effects of consciousness might be accommodated.

What do you have in mind that they could say about consciousness?

[alextsakiris]

Originally Posted by Lyander

Just by way of an aside, I'd like to thank Alex for the time, effort and money he has spent in bringing to people these podcasts and discussions. Not only that, his obvious bonhomie to all regardless of their views is very much appreciated.


Thank you Alex.

wow... thanks for the kind words... and you're very welcome.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Lyander

With respect to your reductio, Ian, I don't think you've pulled it off.

I take it you're talking about my essay on my blog? Not one single person I am aware of has understood it as of yet. This is why I haven't bothered writing any more essays!

If I read correctly, you would agree to the following rendition:

1. Science asserts that everything is due to physical processes and/or laws.

2. According to science , therefore , all thought and behaviour are due to physical processes and/or laws.

3. I have an incorrigible belief of being conscious. This can only result from my being conscious.

4. Therefore my belief in my consciousness cannot be the result of any physical process or law.

It cannot be the result of anything apart from my consciousness.

If consciousness is an object of the brains awareness like a rock in its field of vision then why can't consciousness be made aware of itself from the brain?

This is a highly obscure sentence. As far as I can ascertain you appear to be asking the very question that I have addressed in my essay!

Let's put it this way. First of all I take it as a given that although consciousness is produced by the brain it nevertheless is distinct from the brain. That is to say consciousness is not the very same thing as any physical events.


(As an aside, for those who nevertheless insist that consciousness is the very same thing as brain processes I say this in the comments section:

"But if consciousness is not distinct from physical events in the brain it also means that mental causation is not distinct from physical causation. That is to say that mental causation is one and the very same thing as physical causation.

Thus since presumably materialists do not deny the existence of physical causation, then necessarily they believe in mental causation which is all I mean by "free will"".)

So let's suppose brains produce consciousness and that mental events follow physical events in the brain. This means my certainty in the reality of my own consciousness is purely due to such physical events rather than my own consciousness.

Now since these physical events and the consciousness they produce are distinct, this means that these physical events do not logically entail my consciousness. Thus it is at least logically possible that these physical events could occur without any accompanying consciousness.

Thus in some logically possible world of philosophical zombies these physical events in my brain cause me to be completely certain of my own consciousness. However this is unintelligible since I cannot be certain of my own consciousness if I am not in fact conscious. Indeed I can't be certain of anything since I am not conscious!

So we get an reduction ad absurdum. We have to reject the initial premise that my certainty in the reality of my own consciousness is purely due to such physical events rather than my own consciousness.

And how does it follow that thoughts in consciousness are a product of consciousness?

As I said the thought that I know I am conscious has to be due to my consciousness.

Ephiphenomenalism doesn't require anything of consciousness in respect of thought or behaviour. It all happens in the brain and consciousness just receives the input about those things and itself, and there's no corresponding input from consciousness into the brain and therefore thoughts, beliefs, and behaviour.

Yes exactly. But I have logically demonstrated that there is at least in that one instance some input from consciousness. Therefore it is impossible for epiphenomenalism to be true.

Also, when you look at the "I" , you end up in infiinite regress. Who's aware of the I and who's being aware of that second "I" and so on- homunculi all the way down? Believing in an "I" runs into absurdity.

So materialists always state. There's precious little justification for such wild claims though. But first of all let me say that this is irrelevant to my proof since my argument does not rest upon the existence of selves.

But anyway. The I or self is the author of ones conscious experiences. The self is the mental substance required in order to make one lot of conscious experiences properly belong to a specific person. And conscious experiences only exist by virtue of a self. Or in other words experiences require an experiencer.

But experiencers or selves do not likewise require another self or experiencer in order to exist. Why on earth should they?

Perhaps you could spell out the "absurdity"?

[alextsakiris]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

(As an aside, for those who nevertheless insist that consciousness is the very same thing as brain processes I say this in the comments section:

"But if consciousness is not distinct from physical events in the brain it also means that mental causation is not distinct from physical causation. That is to say that mental causation is one and the very same thing as physical causation.

Thus since presumably materialists do not deny the existence of physical causation, then necessarily they believe in mental causation which is all I mean by "free will"".)

You're a lot more than interesting Brilliant!

[Lyander]

To identify mental causation with physical causation doesn't not entail or prove that there is free will. To say that there is mental causation does not demonstrate free will. To identify mental causation with free will is like identifying a carrot with a rock. And I can't see where you've proved that there is mental causation.

To be aware that you are conscious and then turn around and say that would be impossible unless you were conscious doesn't really say anything about consciousness or demonstrate its causal nature. Why not just posit a feedback mechanism in an aroused brain? The brain can objectify its thinking process- period.

In as far as you identify mental causation with physical causation in the brain you have still left begging whether or not this is self causal. As far as science knows there are quantum events and causal chains in the world. None of these support the notion of free will.

You say that there is no reason to believe that we fall into infinite regress if we posit an "I". We most certainly do. Why? Because you posit the "I" as the thing in the body that makes sense of the sensory world around us you then leav the question begging as to how this "I" does it, and the answer your forced into is another "I" and so on - infinite regress. You created the problem in the first place by saying that there was an "I" independent of the brain. The "I" is an incoherent concept.

In as far as this thread is concerned the above argument in respect of th "I" , should it hold, would inform us that when we die, the brain dies and that's the end. There is no "I" that leaves the body.

However, this does not reflect my personal wishes in respect of survival after death. I hope someone does demonstrate the "I" and that it continues after the body has ceased to function. Those wishes are what keep me glued to Alex's podcasts and the various researchers who seek to demonstrate what seems impossible from our current paradigm.

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Lyander

You say that there is no reason to believe that we fall into infinite regress if we posit an "I". We most certainly do. Why? Because you posit the "I" as the thing in the body that makes sense of the sensory world around us you then leav the question begging as to how this "I" does it, and the answer your forced into is another "I" and so on - infinite regress. You created the problem in the first place by saying that there was an "I" independent of the brain. The "I" is an incoherent concept.

I think you get into a sort of infinite regress (which bottoms out at the atomic level) if you stick to physical explanations, because physical explanations of consciousness always boil down to information processing and signal transmission. It seems impossible to get a physical description of the end process when 'I' see an image that I like, or hear a piece of music, etc.

The infinite regress is not there if you get away from totally physical explanations because the 'I' doesn't consist of physical components that can be disassembled.

I don't think being aware of being conscious is the point here. The point is that there seems to be no way to envisage creating an artifact that is aware. Yes, you can make a computer that is aware of the room temperature (say), but that is really only a convenient turn of phrase - it isn't using the word 'aware' in the same sense.

To my mind, there are a whole set of words that are used in an analogical way when referring to computers (your feedback loop sounds utterly computer-like), and which should not be confused with the meaning as applied to conscious beings. Words such as aware, intelligent, knows, likes, wants, refuses, tries, etc.

It is exactly this distinction that the philosopher David Chalmers is referring to with his idea of qualia.

David

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Lyander

To identify mental causation with physical causation doesn't not entail or prove that there is free will. To say that there is mental causation does not demonstrate free will. To identify mental causation with free will is like identifying a carrot with a rock. And I can't see where you've proved that there is mental causation.

You're very fond of making assertions, but contrariwise seemingly loath to produce any actual arguments. First of all my proof of mental causation is both in my essay and in my last post. How many differing ways do you want me to put it? It might be helpful at this stage to specify what actual problem you have with it rather than merely asserting you don't understand it or don't like it!

Also I am aware that many people (mainly materialists) reject the notion that mental causation amounts to free will. So the question I would ask you and them is what would constitute free will in your view? Nothing external to me makes me behave as I do. It is my self which does the choosing, and I can choose as I will regardless of the past history of the Universe eg I could have chosen not to respond to you since you haven't provided any arguments, but chose to anyway.

To be aware that you are conscious and then turn around and say that would be impossible unless you were conscious doesn't really say anything about consciousness or demonstrate its causal nature.

If to be actually conscious is necessary in order to have the awareness that one is conscious, then that is sufficient. Because the corollary of that is that brain events all by their own aren't sufficient.

Why not just posit a feedback mechanism in an aroused brain? The brain can objectify its thinking process- period.

Because I've provided a logical proof that the brain all by itself is insufficient to provide me with an incorrigible certitude of my own consciousness.

In as far as you identify mental causation with physical causation in the brain

I don't do any such thing! I think reductive materialism is false by definition.

you have still left begging whether or not this is self causal. As far as science knows there are quantum events and causal chains in the world. None of these support the notion of free will.

As far as I am aware reductive materialists believe in free will, otherwise they would be epiphenomenalists. In which case their position is rendered incoherent as I demonstrate in my essay. I desire to move my body in a particular way and it responds. We can rescue free will by identifying that desire with some physical event which plays a crucial role in the subsequent movement of my body.

You say that there is no reason to believe that we fall into infinite regress if we posit an "I". We most certainly do. Why? Because you posit the "I" as the thing in the body that makes sense of the sensory world around us you then leav the question begging as to how this "I" does it,

May I ask what on earth is the problem with supposing that the I has the innate capacity to do this? Or in other words what is it about the I which makes you believe it doesn't have this capacity? Do you believe that this would contravene some physical laws? Which physical laws precisely?

And if there is no I or self to make sense of the world around us, what does make sense of the world? (and please don't say the brain. That which is non-conscious cannot by definition make any sense of anything. And even waiving aside this objection, why would this be any less problematic than the I?)

and the answer your forced into is another "I" and so on - infinite regress.

What nonsense. If you think that then produce an argument. Don't merely keep asserting it.

You created the problem in the first place by saying that there was an "I" independent of the brain. The "I" is an incoherent concept.

First of all, as I keep saying, my essay makes no reference to a self (unless you're thinking about the other essay on my blog regarding transmission/filter theory?).

But anyway, the self or "I" (as you like to put it) is certainly not incoherent. Actually I would argue the very reverse is true. It is incoherent to suppose there are not selves. This is hinted at by the fact that our language is peppered with words such as I, me, you, self etc.

If there were not you and me i.e if we are not in fact 2 different selves, then how could we talk about your conscious experiences and my conscious experiences? By definition we couldn't -- there are just conscious experiences. The self or I is the necessary metaphysical glue to make a group of conscious experiences be had by an individual. We couldn't start to make sense of the world without selves.

(I'll leave your last point to another post)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Lyander

In as far as this thread is concerned the above argument in respect of th "I" , should it hold, would inform us that when we die, the brain dies and that's the end. There is no "I" that leaves the body.

However, this does not reflect my personal wishes in respect of survival after death. I hope someone does demonstrate the "I" and that it continues after the body has ceased to function. Those wishes are what keep me glued to Alex's podcasts and the various researchers who seek to demonstrate what seems impossible from our current paradigm.

"Life after death" does imply a self. If as you claim the self is indeed incoherent then there can be no prospect of a self surviving the death of our bodies! Indeed if there is no self we don't even survive from one second to the next since there is nothing that persists.

This makes all the evidence for a "life after death" completely irrelevant. So why are you interested in Alex's podcasts since the concept of a self is incoherent?? You have a logical proof that the self is incoherent so all evidence for a life after death amounts to nothing. (or at least I assume you have this proof, otherwise that would make your claim that the self is incoherent a completely empty one!).

So don't be shy. Let's see your proof that the self is incoherent

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

I find it fascinating that in the face of all reason, and all evidence, you're so convinced that your entire view of reality is correct.

I'm not completely convinced. But I'd argue that your "reason" is just emotion and the evidence is being misinterpreted.

~~ Paul