1 Million Dollar Challenge To Materialists – Prove A Computer Can Experience A Dream!

[davidsmith73]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

But a quale is nowhere near as simple as any of the other fundamental existents.

Then you are not treating qualia as a fundamental existant after all, which makes your initial statement meaningless. By definition, a fundamental existent cannot be reduced into additional constituent parts - it's fundamental. Therefore, relative simplicity of different fundamental existents is not an issue. Unless you had another meaning of 'fundamental existent' in mind?

On the other hand, if you are going to propose a very simple quale-on from which full-blown human consciousness emerges by complex interactions with the rest of physical existence, then I withdraw my objection and replace it with the following:

Why do you feel any more comfortable with human consciousness emerging from a very simple quale-on than you do with it emerging from the known particles and laws?

Because the latter creates the hard problem. The former doesn't.

What attributes would that simple quale-on have that could give us human consciousness without all the hand-wringing that we get when we think about "materialistic consciousness"?

Hang on, you're proposal was that quale is a fundamental existent. Fundamental existents create higher-order entites by forming relationships between other fundamental existents. There is no intrinsic property of the fundamental existent that is bequeathed to it's higher-order construct. The properties of the higher-order construct are to be found in the relationships between the fundamental existents. So, in this case, when you talk about 'human consciousness' that 'emerges' from 'quale interactions' you must be talking about human consciousness in terms of the plethora of cognitive relationships that give rise to concepts such as memory or self reflection. We mustn't confuse this discussion with over-liberal use of the word consciousness. From now on, I reserve the right to talk about consciousness only in terms of it's fundamental meaning, i.e., qualia!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

Equally 'we' would like a proof that there is another way!

What's equal about it? Saying "simply no way" rules out a possibility. I'm not ruling out anything.

More generally, I think your obsession with proof is rather biased because you seem to argue that you will assume pure materialism unless others can prove you wrong - which is unreasonable if you cannot prove that materialism can produce consciousness - which, of course, you can't!

I'm not assuming materialism. I'm just assuming that the brain is sufficient to produce consciousness until someone gives me an argument other than "Well, any fool knows that the brain can't produce consciousness." And that's all anyone has managing to say so far.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by davidsmith

Then you are not treating qualia as a fundamental existant after all, which makes your initial statement meaningless. By definition, a fundamental existent cannot be reduced into additional constituent parts - it's fundamental. Therefore, relative simplicity of different fundamental existents is not an issue. Unless you had another meaning of 'fundamental existent' in mind?

Why doesn't relative simplicity matter? Are you going to proclaim a computer as a fundamental existent as glibly as you'd proclaim an electron?

Originally Posted by davidsmith

Because the latter creates the hard problem. The former doesn't.

Yes, it does. Presumably a simple quale-on with a few attributes and interaction laws is not enough to produce full-blown human consciousness. So there is still this supposed "hard problem" of getting from quale-on to consciousness. You can get rid of the hard problem only if you propose full-blown human consciousness as the fundamental existent.

Hang on, you're proposal was that quale is a fundamental existent. Fundamental existents create higher-order entites by forming relationships between other fundamental existents. There is no intrinsic property of the fundamental existent that is bequeathed to it's higher-order construct. The properties of the higher-order construct are to be found in the relationships between the fundamental existents. So, in this case, when you talk about 'human consciousness' that 'emerges' from 'quale interactions' you must be talking about human consciousness in terms of the plethora of cognitive relationships that give rise to concepts such as memory or self reflection. We mustn't confuse this discussion with over-liberal use of the word consciousness. From now on, I reserve the right to talk about consciousness only in terms of it's fundamental meaning, i.e., qualia!

So qualia are all there is to consciousness? Well that right there sheds some light on why we sometimes talk past one another.

If we propose a complete quale as a fundamental existent, then I object to its level of complexity. In particular, it would have include memories, emotions, and all the other things that contribute to the quale. My entire brain would have to be part of the fundamental existent.

If we propose a much simpler quale-on as the fundamental existent, then we still have a hard problem of consciousness.

Really, proclaiming consciousness as some sort of an all-of-a-piece, indivisible entity is a most egregious god of the gaps proposal.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Expert on mathematics and physics ... Roger Penrose devoted most of a book arguing that it does not seem possible.

And spawned the Lucas-Penrose fallacy in the process.

However materialists prefer to listen to those selling the idea to public computers will become consciousness and we are just machines with the illusion of consciousness ... people like Daniel Dennett, Marvin Minski, Steven Pinker who are all also CSIcop fellows, how do they know psi doesn't exist when none of them have conducted research on it? Any chance they were influenced by Randi's challenge? (Randi was a co-founder of CSIcop)

You're mixing consciousness and psi again. Those people are commenting on consciousness, not psi.

Read physicists Henri Stapp, Roger Penrose (who don't actually agree) but give different models on the link between consciousness and QM. Nobel Laureate physicist Brian Josephson also is working on a model.

I don't see how any of their models actually help. In particular, Penrose never made a proposal about how QM squirming about in microtubules actually produces consciousness. I doubt Josephson's Mind-Matter Unification Project is going to get anywhere. Stapp does a lot of hand-waving, although I'd give him the greatest chance of pulling something off.

Nevertheless, quantum theories of consciousness suffer from the same difficulties as neural or computational theories. Quantum phenomena have some remarkable functional properties, such as non-determinism and non-locality. It is natural to speculate that these properties may play some role in the explanation of cognitive functions, such as random choice and the integration of information, and this hypothesis cannot be ruled out a priori. But when it comes to the explanation of experience, quantum processes are in the same boat as any other. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is entirely unanswered. ---David Chalmers


~~ Paul

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

What's equal about it? Saying "simply no way" rules out a possibility. I'm not ruling out anything.

You are arguing consciousness magically pops out from an unknown complexity, therefore you have to agree with my statement 'simply no way'

[davidsmith73]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Why doesn't relative simplicity matter? Are you going to proclaim a computer as a fundamental existent as glibly as you'd proclaim an electron?

I think we are talking past one another. I never proclaimed either a computer or an electron is a fundamental existent. I defined a fundamental existent as an entity that is not composed of any additional constituent parts. You were the one who proposed that qualia were fundamental existents. I'm still waiting for you to either agree with my definition or give some indication as to what your definition of 'fundamental existent' is. Then we can proceed to work out whether more complex cognitive relationships can emerge from 'quale-interactions', or whether this would involve the apparantly insurpassable problems that you imply.

Presumably a simple quale-on with a few attributes and interaction laws is not enough to produce full-blown human consciousness. So there is still this supposed "hard problem" of getting from quale-on to consciousness.

If by 'full-blown human consciousness' you mean complex cognitive relationships then there is no hard problem to discuss. The hard problem is how to get phenomenal consciousness from quantitative relationships. Phenomenal consciousness refers to the same thing as qualia. So asking how we get from qualia to consciousness is not a statement about the hard problem.

You can get rid of the hard problem only if you propose full-blown human consciousness as the fundamental existent.

How are you defining full-blown human consciousness?

If we propose a complete quale as a fundamental existent, then I object to its level of complexity. In particular, it would have include memories, emotions, and all the other things that contribute to the quale. My entire brain would have to be part of the fundamental existent.

This is the bit of your argument where I'm really lost. Could you elaborate?

[P_Synthesis]

Originally Posted by Paul

Really, proclaiming consciousness as some sort of an all-of-a-piece, indivisible entity is a most egregious god of the gaps proposal.

I know what you are saying but I can pretty much guarantee you that if science ever does get a theoretical handle on this, it will see consciousness ultimately that way. My problem here is that I have experience which I can't directly transfer to you, but I do experience this 'all of piece' idea and you have to understand that every single person who gets anywhere with meditation starts to see it as well. That's not science, I know, it's anecdotal -- I'm suggesting it's worth paying attention to it if you want to know where to look.

If only I could directly transfer my experience over to you! But I can't. I can see the way your mind is working, but you are physically orientating everything you say. For example, you are imagining that the 'quale-on', as a basic particle, would be 'small' because it is simple. But the actual quale-on is not small, it is infinite and unbounded. That the ground of consciousness is indeed an 'all-of-a-piece indivisible entity' is the observation of everyone who has come into any kind of contact with it, it seems to me. What's egregious about it?

I suppose that, as hearsay, this does not interest you... you are absolutely correct that the average human quale is massively complex and not a basic unit. But why, when you do look at the basic unit, is the experience (not assumption) of Plato or Buddha and of many meditators necessarily 'egregious'? Since you can't define consciousness, for example, what do you imagine could bound it if it did hypothetically have an existence independently of matter?

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

And spawned the Lucas-Penrose fallacy in the process.

Penrose still stands by his viewpoint, in 2009

'In my view the conscious brain does not act according to classical physics. It doesn’t even act according to conventional quantum mechanics. It acts according to a theory we don’t yet have.' Roger Penrose

You're mixing consciousness and psi again. Those people are commenting on consciousness, not psi.

I would argue that a classical/turing computer shielded from local signalling cannot demonstrate ESP phenomena .....therefore those CSIcop fellows claiming a computer can be conscious and humans are just brains functioning on classical mechanics are are wrong if humans (shielded in parapsychology labs) can produce ESP, which seems to be the case.

But when it comes to the explanation of experience, quantum processes are in the same boat as any other. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is entirely unanswered. ---David Chalmers

I think Chalmer's viewpoint is compatible with Stapp. Josephson, etc. ... and as seen clearly from above quote Penrose thinks explaining consciousness requires more than quantum mechanics too.

[Miguel]

Originally Posted by P_Synthesis

I know what you are saying but I can pretty much guarantee you that if science ever does get a theoretical handle on this, it will see consciousness ultimately that way. My problem here is that I have experience which I can't directly transfer to you, but I do experience this 'all of piece' idea and you have to understand that every single person who gets anywhere with meditation starts to see it as well. That's not science, I know, it's anecdotal -- I'm suggesting it's worth paying attention to it if you want to know where to look.

Why do you think that all meditaters start to see it that way?

Have you ever heard of split-brain-syndrome? How do you explain it if consciousness is all one piece?

If only I could directly transfer my experience over to you! But I can't. I can see the way your mind is working, but you are physically orientating everything you say. For example, you are imagining that the 'quale-on', as a basic particle, would be 'small' because it is simple. But the actual quale-on is not small, it is infinite and unbounded. That the ground of consciousness is indeed an 'all-of-a-piece indivisible entity' is the observation of everyone who has come into any kind of contact with it, it seems to me. What's egregious about it?

Why should we trust the intutions of these people? We know that human intuition is wrong on many things. Take illusions of any kind or look at what modern physics teaches us and how it is different from what anyone intuits.

[P_Synthesis]

@Miguel, think you came in without picking up thread of what I was saying, but...

Why do you think that all meditaters start to see it that way?

I said anyone who gets anywhere with meditation. It's probably too general of me -- let's say the most celebrated spiritual experiencers tend to affirm what I'm saying. It doesn't go to 'scientific proof', it goes against the idea that a unified ground of consciousness is an egregious idea equivalent to consciousness being manufactured by fairies at the bottom of tux0's garden, something which no-one has ever seriously suggested so far as I know, let alone committed, serious and seminal philosophers of any kind.

Have you ever heard of split-brain-syndrome? How do you explain it if consciousness is all one piece?

You misunderstand what I'm saying. I'm not referring to the whole of human consciousness as necessarily unified (on the contrary, human consciousness is normally not particularly unified, and one reason for practicing meditation is to unify it) -- I'm saying the ground of consciousness is unified or all-one-thing. That would include the ground of human consciousness but most are not aware of the ground of their own consciousness IMO.

The basic building block of consciousness, which Paul was calling the 'quale-on' is unlimited in extent and everything partakes of it. That certainly is 'just my perception' -- along with many throughout history as I say -- but I fail to see why it should be 'egregious' in and of itself. There's nothing about it that goes against reason.

Why should we trust the intutions of these people? We know that human intuition is wrong on many things. Take illusions of any kind or look at what modern physics teaches us and how it is different from what anyone intuits.

I'm not saying 'we should trust the intuitions of these people'. If your perception (a better word than intuition) is different, then it is different. What I'm saying is I don't see where the epithet 'egregious' gets us anywhere. Plotinus or Lao Tzu or Buddha or any of their many followers and predecessors say things about the ground of consciousness that -- although not necessarily true in any particular human experience, and not provable in spite of any human experience -- are not egregious pieces of invention but coherent and lucid, not especially contrary to known science that I can see, and confirmed regularly by people who go deeply into the subject of meditation.

I don't say you have to agree with them, nor that they prove anything from the scientific viewpoint; I just ask why the dismissal as 'egregious' given that we are not talking about rank fools here nor about things that lack anecdotal confirmation -- fairies as the source of all consciousness is not a theory with this kind of serious weight behind it.