Challenge to debunkers: Can you prove hallucinations are generated inside brain :-)

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

He said that indeterminism means not influenced by anything. So if an event is not influenced by anything, this means it's random.

That is not the same as saying "determinism means not random."

It would be the same if we all agreed on what random means, but we don't. What we do appear to agree on is what deterministic means, so that's the place to start from. Everything else is nondeterministic, or, in mathematical terms, random. You'd think that would be the end of the story, but libertarians have some interesting thoughts on what random means and whether there are various kinds of randomness and whether we can sneak some causality into it. Otherwise there ain't no place for free will.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

That is not the same as saying "determinism means not random."

He's said quite a few things which taken together entail that he believes that determinism means not random.

It would be the same if we all agreed on what random means, but we don't. What we do appear to agree on is what deterministic means,

I've never understood what determinism means. What does it mean if it's not defined as being not random??

I do on the other hand understand what random means -- at least I have some sort of vague idea.

so that's the place to start from. Everything else is nondeterministic, or, in mathematical terms, random. You'd think that would be the end of the story, but libertarians have some interesting thoughts on what random means and whether there are various kinds of randomness and whether we can sneak some causality into it. Otherwise there ain't no place for free will.

You are saying that a process is either random or deterministic? If that is the case, since free will is clearly not random (eg my limbs do not flail around in a haphazard manner but appear to be purposeful), then it follows that free will is compatible with determinism, yes?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

I've never understood what determinism means. What does it mean if it's not defined as being not random??

I do on the other hand understand what random means -- at least I have some sort of vague idea.

Well now, this is interesting. I have rather the opposite reaction.

You are saying that a process is either random or deterministic? If that is the case, since free will is clearly not random (eg my limbs do not flail around in a haphazard manner but appear to be purposeful), then it follows that free will is compatible with determinism, yes?

That depends entirely on your definition of free will. As far as I can tell from every definition of libertarian free will I've seen, it is incompatible with decisions being wholly deterministic and random, and so requires a third mechanism or factor or input or whatever you want to call it.

In other words, let me rewrite your statement:

You are saying that a process is either random or deterministic? If that is the case, since free will is clearly not deterministic (or it would not be free in the sense desired), then it follows that free will is compatible with randomness, yes?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

since free will is clearly not deterministic (or it would not be free in the sense desired), then it follows that free will is compatible with randomness, yes?

~~ Paul

But if determinism simply has the negative definition of not random, then clearly free will is compatible with determinism.

Obviously your definition of determinism is different otherwise free will could not possibly be incompatible with it. So what is your definition of determinism?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

But if determinism simply has the negative definition of not random, then clearly free will is compatible with determinism.

Again, it depends on your definition of free will. You could also say that green sauteed love is not random, so it must be compatible with determinism. But then when you realize that green sauteed love is incoherent, the point becomes moot. Or, you could end up defining free decisions to be equivalent to random decisions.

Obviously your definition of determinism is different otherwise free will could not possibly be incompatible with it. So what is your definition of determinism?

I'm using the standard definition: A deterministic process is one whose outcome is causally inevitable as a consequence of preceding events. This is clearly inconsistent with the idea of libertarian free will.

The question is: What is your definition of libertarian free will?

~~ Paul

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

Depends on what is meant by "inevitable". If I went back in time to some famous historical event, and suppose hypothetically that my presence had no effect on the environment whatsoever, then I would know what these historical people would say and behave. And likewise if someone traveled from the future and surreptitiously observed us, she would know how we would behave. Does that make my behaviour inevitable? Surely only in the most shallow insignificant sense.

Incompatibilists believe the cornerstone I previously posted. If a behaviour is inevitable, then there is nothing we can do to change it. I agree with you that this claim relies on a deviant understanding of inevitability. To say that something is inevitable is to say that it is unavoidable, and whether or not some event is avoidable is alway relative to an agent (i.e, an intentional system): (un)avoidable by whom? Nothing is inevitable or unavoidable absolutely.

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

Yes that what I believe in. But according to how you define determinism this definition of free will is not incompatible with it.

This means your type of agent causes events independent of that agents desires and beliefs. What explains why you decided to open the fridge, if not your beliefs and desires at the time? It's mysterious!

This view is incompabtible with determinism and everything else science tells us about the world.

A jolly silly mysterians view!

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[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

This means your type of agent causes events independent of that agents desires and beliefs. What explains why you decided to open the fridge, if not your beliefs and desires at the time? It's mysterious!

This view is incompabtible with determinism and everything else science tells us about the world.

A jolly silly mysterians view!

----------------------

It's obvious I can act against my desires. I may vastly prefer to have eggs and bacon for breakfast, but choose to eat porridge instead. It's true that I may choose to have porridge because of another desire i.e to eat healthily. But it seems I have the power to act against my desires even where there are no competing desires.

It's interesting you think this is incompatible with determinism. If so then determinism cannot be defined as not random.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I'm using the standard definition: A deterministic process is one whose outcome is causally inevitable as a consequence of preceding events. This is clearly inconsistent with the idea of libertarian free will.

The problem is that I subscribe to a Humean analysis of physical causality (although I don't subscribe to a Humean analysis of mental causality).


So when one snooker ball hits another snooker ball, and the 2nd starts to move, this is not due to any causal innate power in the world. So my question to you is whether rejecting the existence of innate physical causal powers has any consequences for the definition of determinism?

I mean if there are no physical causal innate powers in the world, how can any physical event be inevitable? Does not determinism connote the idea of some event being made/compelled to happen?

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

It's obvious I can act against my desires. I may vastly prefer to have eggs and bacon for breakfast, but choose to eat porridge instead. It's true that I may choose to have porridge because of another desire i.e to eat healthily. But it seems I have the power to act against my desires even where there are no competing desires.

It's interesting you think this is incompatible with determinism. If so then determinism cannot be defined as not random.

Are you sure there are no other over-riding desires. I bet there are.

It's incompatible because it's not determined by anything and justs happens mysteriously.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

It's obvious I can act against my desires. I may vastly prefer to have eggs and bacon for breakfast, but choose to eat porridge instead. It's true that I may choose to have porridge because of another desire i.e to eat healthily. But it seems I have the power to act against my desires even where there are no competing desires.

It does? How would you know that there are no competing desires?

So when one snooker ball hits another snooker ball, and the 2nd starts to move, this is not due to any causal innate power in the world. So my question to you is whether rejecting the existence of innate physical causal powers has any consequences for the definition of determinism?

I mean if there are no physical causal innate powers in the world, how can any physical event be inevitable? Does not determinism connote the idea of some event being made/compelled to happen?

Sorry, I don't understand this. What does cause the second snooker ball to move?

I'm guessing that you have defined a world in which the standard definition of determinism is irrelevent. In that case, you need to redefine the word. Only then can we define random in terms of it, if at all.

~~ Paul