Challenge to debunkers: Can you prove hallucinations are generated inside brain :-)

[Interesting Ian]

Unknown Author
Libertarians might respond that we usually have a reason to do and not to do something, and which reason we follow is caused purely by "something" in us, something that is not a reason, nor anything else like desires or knowledge or circumstances. But if the ultimate reason for my doing something is not a reason, then rational action is impossible, for no rational calculation can then be the cause of what I do.

Nonsense. To repeat myself X,Y and Z may all be causes of A. But they all need to be present before A occurs. Likewise reasons for action might very well need to be present. But it still requires the decision of the self to act upon those reasons.

What the author doesn't appear to understand is that one can make an arbitrary (albeit not random) choice. If I'm driving along in a car, and I am lost, and I come to a T junction, I can decide to turn either left or right. Reasons and desires may not come into it, so according to the author it would then be impossible for me to choose. Nope, impossible for an android perhaps, but not me. Of course, to reiterate if I decide to turn left one can always claim that deep down I desired this course of action, but then, as explained before, that's not really saying anything.

Only something purely non-rational is the ultimate necessary cause on this theory, something uncaused by our knowledge, our reason, even our character. That would be terrible if it were true---far from rescuing responsibility, it destroys it.

Complete nonsense. Reasons, desires as well as the decision of the self are all vital ingredients of ones actions. They all cause ones actions in the same way that X, Y and Z all have to occur and all cause A to happen. The conceivability of acting against ones desires and interests and reasons need not imply that I would ever actually do so. If I spotted a £50 in the street I would pick it up and put it in my pocket. I would never ever not do so. So reasons and desires very much dictate my behaviour. But to my mind it is absurd to say that it is impossible that I would not pick it up. Impossible for a robot, but not for people.

Why Libertarian Free Will Eliminates Responsibility

Imagine two parallel universes, identical in every detail, and imagine a man in each universe, identical in their character and knowledge and desires and everything else, standing in totally identical circumstances. Now imagine that one of these men chooses to kill his wife, but the other man chooses not to. What could possibly explain this?

It would not happen. They would choose the same. Or at least it could only happen if some random element was introduced into one or both Universes.

Since the two situations and the two men are identical in every respect, there can be no cause whatsoever for either man's choice. This is what libertarian theory entails.

{shrugs} In that case I don't subscribe to Libitarianism.

Er, mszlazak? No point in me addressing the rest now it's transpired I'm not a libertarian is there?

Anyway, I agree entirely about the 2 Universes. So I'll miss all that out.

Here's the deal. "I" am defined by my knowledge, abilities, character, values, and desires.

Absolutely not. He's presupposing the correctness of the materialist metaphysic.

Libertarians, instead, want "me" to be defined by something other than these things.

So I agree with Libertarians on this issue but not the 2 Universes thought experiment (unless this author is attacking a strawman).

But if you were to take them all away, there would be no "me," so this approach is absurd. Without knowledge, abilities, values, desires, reasoning, a character, there would be no person at all,

Absolute nonsense. To quote my essay on my website (near the end):

It seems to me that we have this concept of the self which in one sense changes, but yet without changing what we essentially are. To elucidate; although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states.

But how can this be? If my adult self has radically different interests, intelligence and, broadly speaking, an apparently quite different personality from when I was a child, then how can it be argued I am still one and the very same person? I suggest the puzzlement here is simply a failure to recognize a distinction between consciousness and that which is the subject of such conscious experiences. Or to put it another way: I propose experiences are had by an experiencer (self). Thus there is no difficulty in supposing that experiences can differ quite radically in nature and yet be had by the very same experiencer or self. The opponents of such a view are implicitly supposing that a person is simply the sum of various conscious experiences rather than the author of such experiences. This notion of a self I propose is known in philosophical parlance as a substantial self.

So the key word here is "I" (or "he" or a "person" or whatever) and what it means. Libertarians defines it as some unexplainable, unidentifiable thing that excludes all memories, desires, virtues, values, traits, even reason. This is a rather illogical conception of human identity, and one any reasonable person can easily reject.

On the contrary -- it is momumentally counter intuitive. Read my essay to see why.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

What the author doesn't appear to understand is that one can make an arbitrary (albeit not random) choice.

What is an "arbitrary" choice?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

What is an "arbitrary" choice?

~~ Paul

A choice not influenced by reasons or desires. In the thought experiment I can turn left or right. But I have no idea which way will take me home. So I make an arbitrary choice to turn left. I make an arbitrary choice there and then, and therefore it would seem that prior physical states of the Universe, and indeed prior psychological states did not dictate or even influence my choice.

And come to think of it this is yet further proof that we are not physical. Any physical thing, a robot or whatever, just follows physical laws or algorithms. It could not make an arbitrary choice.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

Well you did respond. But honestly, besides agreeing that libertarianism is absurd, I don't think you could give a good response even if you wanted to.

-----------------

Well I did give a good respond -- indeed an excellent one. Where's the profuse thanks??

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

Unknown Author


I disagree with this. *I* determine which choice is made.



Not true, I may have made my mind up about something.



How is the concept of the self obscure?



But this just flies in the face of our experience. One might be starving -- thus one desires very much indeed to consume food. Yet we know through our immediate experience that we can deny ourselves.

So what would this author say about that? The only thing he could say is that in fact denying myself food -- contrary to appearances -- is actually my greatest desire! In which case I say that's fine. But in that case one is not really saying anything of any substance. Because whatever we do is by definition our greatest desire. However it doesn't constitute any difficulty for the notion that a desire can arise spontaneously, unpredictable from the previous physical state of the world or even ones prior psychological state.




This "thing" is our self which is distinct from our reason, character, desires or whatever.



What problem??



This is just complete nonsense!

There's some confusion about the notion of causation. Claiming that X causes Y is naive. In reality often there's a network of cause and effect so that many factors have to be present (necessary conditions) before X causes Y. It may be the case that A, B and C have to happen, or be in place, in addition to X happening before Y occurs. We can still say X causes Y, but equally we could say any of the others causes Y too (or at least have to be present before Y happen).

So reasons do indeed cause us to act, but nevertheless the willingness of the self to act upon that reason also has to be present.




It may be hard for you perhaps, but it certainly isn't for me. This ""something"" is simply the self.



These are just competing desires. As pointed out before, the decision whether I shoot or not can always be defined as the greatest desire. But if so this is just a trivial truth. The point is that it seems I can decide to shoot, but spontaneously, at the very last second, decide not to. And it is the self which finally decides whether to shoot or not. The self which is quite distinct from ones character, ones intelligence, ones memories, ones interests etc.

I'll need to respond to the rest in a separate post since there seems to be a limit to the amount of text one can post.

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

Nonsense. To repeat myself X,Y and Z may all be causes of A. But they all need to be present before A occurs. Likewise reasons for action might very well need to be present. But it still requires the decision of the self to act upon those reasons.

What the author doesn't appear to understand is that one can make an arbitrary (albeit not random) choice. If I'm driving along in a car, and I am lost, and I come to a T junction, I can decide to turn either left or right. Reasons and desires may not come into it, so according to the author it would then be impossible for me to choose. Nope, impossible for an android perhaps, but not me. Of course, to reiterate if I decide to turn left one can always claim that deep down I desired this course of action, but then, as explained before, that's not really saying anything.



Complete nonsense. Reasons, desires as well as the decision of the self are all vital ingredients of ones actions. They all cause ones actions in the same way that X, Y and Z all have to occur and all cause A to happen. The conceivability of acting against ones desires and interests and reasons need not imply that I would ever actually do so. If I spotted a £50 in the street I would pick it up and put it in my pocket. I would never ever not do so. So reasons and desires very much dictate my behaviour. But to my mind it is absurd to say that it is impossible that I would not pick it up. Impossible for a robot, but not for people.




It would not happen. They would choose the same. Or at least it could only happen if some random element was introduced into one or both Universes.



{shrugs} In that case I don't subscribe to Libitarianism.

Er, mszlazak? No point in me addressing the rest now it's transpired I'm not a libertarian is there?

Anyway, I agree entirely about the 2 Universes. So I'll miss all that out.



Absolutely not. He's presupposing the correctness of the materialist metaphysic.



So I agree with Libertarians on this issue but not the 2 Universes thought experiment (unless this author is attacking a strawman).



Absolute nonsense. To quote my essay on my website (near the end):

It seems to me that we have this concept of the self which in one sense changes, but yet without changing what we essentially are. To elucidate; although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states.

But how can this be? If my adult self has radically different interests, intelligence and, broadly speaking, an apparently quite different personality from when I was a child, then how can it be argued I am still one and the very same person? I suggest the puzzlement here is simply a failure to recognize a distinction between consciousness and that which is the subject of such conscious experiences. Or to put it another way: I propose experiences are had by an experiencer (self). Thus there is no difficulty in supposing that experiences can differ quite radically in nature and yet be had by the very same experiencer or self. The opponents of such a view are implicitly supposing that a person is simply the sum of various conscious experiences rather than the author of such experiences. This notion of a self I propose is known in philosophical parlance as a substantial self.



On the contrary -- it is momumentally counter intuitive. Read my essay to see why.

Briefly until I come back later to this thread.

Ian your remarks are contradictory and I'm starting to suspect that you really are not a libertarian but a determinist that hasn't realized it yet.

-----------

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

A choice not influenced by reasons or desires. In the thought experiment I can turn left or right. But I have no idea which way will take me home. So I make an arbitrary choice to turn left. I make an arbitrary choice there and then, and therefore it would seem that prior physical states of the Universe, and indeed prior psychological states did not dictate or even influence my choice.

Oh, please. You have absolutely no idea whatsoever how it is you made that choice when you got to the intersection. Just because no desire popped into your conscious mind at the time does not mean that it was a random choice.

And come to think of it this is yet further proof that we are not physical. Any physical thing, a robot or whatever, just follows physical laws or algorithms. It could not make an arbitrary choice.

What it appears to prove is that you somehow believe that all your nonarbitrary decisions are fully conscious. No one believes that.

~~ Paul

[Elysiumfire]

Hi There,

Coming somewhat late to this thread's topic, I would like to - somewhat belatedly, add a few comments and observations of mine own.

When discussing 'hallucination/s', one must ask of him/herself what is meant by hallucination/s? One must not take it on self-evidency that all readers to one's postings assume the same meaning and context of the word as oneself. It is better to state a general claim of definition from the outset, lest the reader's own bias prejudices one's intended definition...thus:

Hallucinate:verb experience a seemingly real perception of something not actually present.

— DERIVATIVES hallucination noun hallucinator noun hallucinatory adjective.

— ORIGIN Latin hallucinari ‘go astray in thought’, from Greek alussein ‘be uneasy or distraught’.

Source...online Oxford Dictionary resource.

A hallucination is a perception in the absence of a stimulus.

Wikipedia

Hallucination. False perception of reality (e.g., hearing voices that aren't there or seeing people who do not exist) [auditory (hearing); visual (sight); olfactory (smell); tactile (touch); and taste].

Psychology Dictionary...AllPsych Online

These are just a few definitions on the word and its meaning, there are many more. All these definitions tend to point to a claim of brain dsyfunction, or a form of error-correction occurring in the brain in the sense of filling in the gaps where no stimulus has been received. If the haullucination experience (and let us note, that during the experience we may not be aware that we are hallucinating) is to be viewed as partly due to brain error-correction mechanism, then what part of the haullucination are we talking about? Are we positing that a third of what we are haullucinating is down to error-correction? Or perhaps, a half? Or maybe two-thirds? Or the whole experience? Are we to put dreams on a par with say...a desert mirage?

When I look out of my apartment window and look across the valley, I can see the hill on whose summit in 1652 George Fox had his vision of a "...large multitude to be gathered..." (It is commonly thought that he saw a mirage of St. Pauls Cathedral in the distance. However, St. Pauls is in London, some 350 miles away, so I have my doubts on this). What was it that served the stimulus of his vision? It is this issue of stimulus that lies at the very heart of hallucinations, and the way the modular structure of the brain works in interpreting the stimuli.

Now the problem for the materialist and the behavourist arises when they state that the brain does this, or the brain does that. It becomes inescapable logic that they are ultimately assuming some autonomous 'computer-like' program in-built into the very fabric of the brain's matter that kicks in whenever the brain detects a lack of stimuli in the stream of information it is receiving, and in order to gain some sembalance of meaningful whole-ness to what the informational-stimulus portends to amount to, it dips into memory in order to fill-in the blanks. This way of thinking opens up a whole can of worms that ultimatley loops back on itself, and moves away, quite logically, from a materialist and behavourist's position. In fact, such thinking carries overtones of intelligent design, certainly not that of Darwinian randomness.

Fortunately, there is a way out for the materialist, but not for the behavourist. We can say that the brain as a whole does nothing in particular, but that our attention must needs be drawn to the inner workings and activity going on within its structure, not because of it, but in spite of it...the brain, in the last analysis, is merely the medium by which the electrical and chemical activities go about their autonomous business. Basically, when it is stated that the brain detects a particular hormone level too low, it then signals for its production or secretion from some gland in the endocrine system, it is in fact an error of statement. What actually occurs, is that the low-level of the hormone allows build up of some other chemical catalyst, and it is the build up of this other chemical which acts as the both the signal and trigger for the hormone to be released into the bloodstream. The brain as a whole had nothing to do with it. The inner-working of the brain has nothing to do with the brain, it does not regulate what is occurring within it, that is done through a system of self-regulatory counterbalancing measures between the chemicals: ergo, the brain, per ser, neither hallucinates nor partakes in anything of error-correction. Quite simply...the brain does not do any processing of any kind.

I'll come back to this later...just to let you assimilate what I have thus written.

Best wishes

[David Bailey]

Elysiumfire,

You rightly point out that the orthodox view of the brain amounts to brain as computer. Even if the 'computer' has as input a few real numbers corresponding to the concentrations of various hormones!

I have tried to pursue this concept in another thread because I feel that this clarifies materialist claims (and in my view errors). Either a materialist accepts the equivalence of brain and computer - in which case the consequences are crisp to define and interesting, or they are left floundering about trying to define why a computer is not equivalent to a brain.

Added to all this, is the dismal results of years of AI research.

David