Challenge to debunkers: Can you prove hallucinations are generated inside brain :-)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

Free-will, in the sense of having moral choice, is either complatible with determinism or it's not. If it's not then this leads you to the irrational position that your actions are independent of your desires, feeling or beliefs! It's only through determinism that you can have a free-will worth having. You'll have to resolve is if materialism, naturalism or mechanism is adequate to fully explain consciousness. I think they are!

mszlazak I asked you a question regarding determinism in the other thread which you never responded to:

You said that if determinism is not true that would mean you couldn't run the exact same processes exactly the same way over and over again. And above you say that should determinism not be true then our actions would not correspond to desires, feeling or beliefs.

So it must follow that the definition of determinism is simply not random. And therefore indeterminism means intrinsically random (rather than apparently random).

You agree then that the metaphysical truth of independent agency -- that is to say, although subject to various influences, it is my self per se which decides upon a course of action -- is wholly in accord with determinism? Note that the metaphysical truth of independent agency need not necessarily entail that ones actions could not in principle be predictable.

(as an aside I did, until comparatively recently, believe that all my actions could in principle be predicted by a sufficiently knowledgeable being. However, after reading about Newcomb's paradox, I decided that this leads to a logical paradox. Hence I now believe that one can make an entirely arbitrary -- albeit not random -- choice to behave in a given way).

But if determinism is wholly compatible with free will as everyone understands this concept, why then is there a debate about it?

[Tor]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

Tor, for the most part you're just repeating and elaborating what I've said about Stapp! Yes, the "Self" is removed and replaced with the "self" and before humans or even primitive life we get the "micro-self" of dust and dirt to get mind-dust, etc. I wonder how mind-dust understands about orthonormal basis and helps pick them out? Nothing from QT really deals with the problems of consciousness, it just makes things worse, and Stapp's book is really about updating Whiteheads process philosophy so it's compatible with QT!

First off, I don't endorse everything Stapp says. As he introduces process 0, one possibility to account for this process 0 is via the Whiteheadian philosophy.

I'm not a big fan of this myself, but everything until he tries to describe where process 0 comes from, is independent of Whiteheadian philosophy. And this first part is the major part of his book! The chapter Whiteheadian Quantum Ontology comes at the end of his book and is only 15 pages!
To say that his book really is about updating Whiteheads process philosophy to be compatible with QT is just plain wrong. It's a small part at the end and not the major point he makes.

Stapp also says this about the Whiteheadian approach:

This putative understanding of the way nature works is only an outline, the details of which can be filled in when new more incisive data that need to be accommodated become available. The theory is not implied by the currently available empirical data....

It is this later Whiteheadian part that you refer to when you talk about mind-dust.

This statement is independent of Whitehead and is the one I feel more comfortable with:

The proposal is not that every quantum event need be associated with a reality of exactly the kind that populate our human streams of consciousness. It is rather that every quantum event is associated with an element that cannot be adequately conceptualized in terms of the precepts of classical physics, but that resides in a realm of realities that are not describable in terms of the concepts of classical physics, but that include our conscious thoughts, ideas, and feelings.

Originally Posted by mszlazak

In addition, the section I quoted on the "Bafflement of Leibniz's Mill" should start making you question this consciousness/QT stuff.

Well, I'm not embracing the emergence idea here, so no problem for me. I see process 0 as something that exists in a mental realm that is part of our natural universe. To me, the quantum description shows that the universe is more like "a great thought" anyway.

Originally Posted by mszlazak

Two other issues.

Free-will, in the sense of having moral choice, is either complatible with determinism or it's not. If it's not then this leads you to the irrational position that your actions are independent of your desires, feeling or beliefs! It's only through determinism that you can have a free-will worth having. You'll have to resolve is if materialism, naturalism or mechanism is adequate to fully explain consciousness. I think they are!

To me free-will is incompatible with determinism. Maybe there is something that gives us certain desires, but how and in what way we chose to act on this is our free choice.

Originally Posted by mszlazak

Second, if you believe that paranormal experiments and case studies show the effects they intend to show and then think these somehow solve the problems of consciousness/mind/brain then think again! Remember that these experiments and reports are all third person data (third person data includes verbal reports)! Now go back and ponder testablity and what is not testable when it comes to the issues of mind and consciousness!

---------------------------

I do think there is sufficient data to question the materialistic view of mind/consciousness/brain. The science done by people like Dean Radin passes my criteria of good science. As to case-studies/field studies, they are not as "hard" as laboratory tests. But if the number of cases that are collected get very high, and the quality of these case reports is very high, then one should take these seriously also.
One analogy is the case reports of ball lightning. Because someone actually took the case reports seriously, this phenomena is now starting to get reproduced in the lab.

I think I'll jump out of this discussion now. I've made my point and I'm not trying to convince anyone to come to the same conclusion as I have, although I do think there are good reasons to go in that direction. I believe people have truly free choices to do and think whatever they like

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

You said that if determinism is not true that would mean you couldn't run the exact same processes exactly the same way over and over again. And above you say that should determinism not be true then our actions would not correspond to desires, feeling or beliefs.

Actually, I should have said something like, if one could go back in time and view things without influencing them then entirely deterministic processes would rerun themselves exactly. Alternatively, if deterministic processes have no memory and you ran them again as they were run before then they could be rerun exactly and sequentially over and over again.

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

... indeterminism means intrinsically random (rather than apparently random).

Yes, uninfluenced by anything.

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

... although subject to various influences, it is my self per se which decides upon a course of action -- is wholly in accord with determinism?

Yes and I'm also talking about a "self" not a "Self".

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

But if determinism is wholly compatible with free will as everyone understands this concept, why then is there a debate about it?

It depends on what one wants from "free-will." If you want moral choice then the majority of philosophers are compatibilists. The other libertarian notion of free-will is spill-over from the free-will of theologians, folk-psychology and employment. Folk-psychology wants a free-will that survives bodily death, theologians want a free-will that deals with the problems of a perfect God and an imperfect world, and for some philosophers free-will debates gives them another thing to write about so it helps justify their job.

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by Tor

First off, I don't endorse everything Stapp says. As he introduces process 0, one possibility to account for this process 0 is via the Whiteheadian philosophy.

I'm not a big fan of this myself, but everything until he tries to describe where process 0 comes from, is independent of Whiteheadian philosophy. And this first part is the major part of his book! The chapter Whiteheadian Quantum Ontology comes at the end of his book and is only 15 pages!
To say that his book really is about updating Whiteheads process philosophy to be compatible with QT is just plain wrong. It's a small part at the end and not the major point he makes.

Stapp also says this about the Whiteheadian approach:



It is this later Whiteheadian part that you refer to when you talk about mind-dust.

This statement is independent of Whitehead and is the one I feel more comfortable with:






Well, I'm not embracing the emergence idea here, so no problem for me. I see process 0 as something that exists in a mental realm that is part of our natural universe. To me, the quantum description shows that the universe is more like "a great thought" anyway.




To me free-will is incompatible with determinism. Maybe there is something that gives us certain desires, but how and in what way we chose to act on this is our free choice.



I do think there is sufficient data to question the materialistic view of mind/consciousness/brain. The science done by people like Dean Radin passes my criteria of good science. As to case-studies/field studies, they are not as "hard" as laboratory tests. But if the number of cases that are collected get very high, and the quality of these case reports is very high, then one should take these seriously also.
One analogy is the case reports of ball lightning. Because someone actually took the case reports seriously, this phenomena is now starting to get reproduced in the lab.

I think I'll jump out of this discussion now. I've made my point and I'm not trying to convince anyone to come to the same conclusion as I have, although I do think there are good reasons to go in that direction. I believe people have truly free choices to do and think whatever they like

Again Tor, you're repeating what I've said about Stapp's book. The majority is about the measurement problem in QT, other speculation on QT and his speculations. He then uses some fallacious arguments from William James and ones from determinism and "free-will" which he thinks requires a conscious "Self", giving him process 0. There really is "no meat" here to the issues that need addressing.

He then needs to make his approach general and can't do that without Whitehead but this essentially means the "Self" he starts with goes away. You do point out that the mind-dust "micro-self's" isn't what he wants and I can see why, hence my remark about their knowings of QT basis issues.

I guess, this means that these knowings aren't needed because they were not around in the distant past or that QT is incomplete. Stapp should have just written less about some things and more on other things.

As to the parapsychology experiments of people like Dean Radin. I am assuming just for the sake of argument that they show the existence of psi even though I don't believe they do. My point is that the data from these experiments are third-person data and if you believe the qualia theory of subjective experiences then by definition they are not something science can ever test for. Parapsychology isn't all that relevent. There is more but this should be enough to get you started.

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[David Bailey]

Mszlazak,

Don't you ever worry that the mere fact that you need to use so much sophisticated hair-splitting to justify the concept that consciousness might be explicable in physical terms (even though that has not been achieved yet) is telling you something?

Even if you manage to persuade someone of your arguments, you don't have anything close to a proof that consciousness actually is physical unless/until someone can create it artificially. Why put all your intellectual eggs in one basket, and not even consider the dualist alternative?

David

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

Mszlazak,

Don't you ever worry that the mere fact that you need to use so much sophisticated hair-splitting to justify the concept that consciousness might be explicable in physical terms (even though that has not been achieved yet) is telling you something?

Even if you manage to persuade someone of your arguments, you don't have anything close to a proof that consciousness actually is physical unless/until someone can create it artificially. Why put all your intellectual eggs in one basket, and not even consider the dualist alternative?

David

Poor David, it's to bad you can't make-up a better come back than this.

------

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

Poor David, it's to bad you can't make-up a better come back than this.

------

Well I gave you a very detailed argument about why computer programs (which you seem to accept could embody full consciousness) should be thought of as theorems - not things localised in time - and as far as I know, you have never responded - so what do you expect!

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

Hello Paul. May I rest in peace indeed!

Hey ho, Ian! Glad to see you active at this forum. I hope things are going well in your life.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Greetings Paul, I remember you from Randi's forum years ago, good to see you here.

Greetings, Open Mind.

I don't think these traditional terms are necessarily that meaningful. Let me hypothesize the brain/body is evolving via physical natural selection, much as we understand it. Lets say consciousness in general is evolving through a type of splitting of consciousness (into minds) by the brain filtering out telepathy/past memory leading to a new sense of individuality by linking/forming new memories. Let's say upon physical death, telepathy and access to past memory can increase but the person retains their sense of individuality due to memories unique to one's own earth experience.

Are my memories stored in my brain or in the metamind? Sounds like the brain, but then there would have to be some sort of upload upon death.

I think the biggest problem is the lack of any evidence whatsoever of the transceiver and filter in my brain. You have to postulate that it happens invisibly at the quantum level or some such, which is just so hokey.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Hey ho, Ian! Glad to see you active at this forum. I hope things are going well in your life.

~~ Paul

Yes I'm fine thank you Paul! . . . . well . . . apart from the completely baffling things that skeptics and materialists utter. Your post is a case in point.

Are my memories stored in my brain or in the metamind? Sounds like the brain, but then there would have to be some sort of upload upon death.

I think the biggest problem is the lack of any evidence whatsoever of the transceiver and filter in my brain. You have to postulate that it happens invisibly at the quantum level or some such, which is just so hokey.

I really don't know where to start with this. It's so completely confused and wrong headed from start to finish! So I won't bother starting with it -- I'll let Open Mind respond . Actually it'll be interesting to see if he says the same things as I would.