Dr Steve Novella and The (Pseudo?)Skeptics' Guide to the Universe

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

Ian,

You need to remember that when maths/science type people talk about proofs, they are unbelievably picky about what counts. For example, before Fermat's Last Theorem was proved, they had demonstrated that the 'n' in
x^n+y^n=z^n (n>2 all variables integer) could not be less than some huge number in the billions. This did not count as a proof - even though for all practical purposes they already knew the answer.

That pickiness is good, but unfortunately it means that verbal arguments are very hard to prove because people endlessly pick over the definitions. In my view, in consciousness theory, physicalists forget that just because they can forestall a proof by being ultra-cautious, they would do well to see the writing on the wall. They are making the same sort of mistake as if a mathematician in the 1980's (i.e. before the theorem was proved) had begun a whole branch of research that absolutely depended on the assumption that Fermat's Last Theorem was false!

David

David,

It seems to me that my argument constitutes a proof. It is possible I am misunderstanding something, but I've thought about this pretty deeply and I don't think I have. If physicalists can forestall my proof I would be delighted to hear their comments. Paul certainly hasn't. Indeed there is absolutely no indication whatsoever that he even understands it -- therefore a fortiori he has failed to forestall my proof.

And as for the comment left on my blog, that certainly fails to achieve anything. Possibly the author is getting confused when I use the word "follow" thinking that I am stating that physical processes are governed by physical laws rather than merely described. But my use of the word "follow" was quite deliberate. I intended it to be neutral between these 2 possibilities.

[Interesting Ian]

Ian
I've had a comment left on my blog regarding the free will essay:

They have rejected no such thing!

Ah, it must be this Robin on the thread that Paul started over on the jref:

More than that, we recognize the argument itself.

It was, as I remember, a particular handy little argument proving consecutively that materialism was false and that epiphenomenalism was false.

Now proving that libertarian free will is true. I wonder what it will prove next?

If he's talking about reductive materialism then my argument certainly doesn't prove it false. Indeed I simply take it as a given reductive materialism is false. I say:

From Blog
Thus, assuming that the neuronal processes underlying consciousness are distinct from consciousness itself, then the seemingly inevitable conclusion is that it is these physical processes rather than consciousness per se which is responsible for our thoughts and behaviour.

The highlighted part is an explicit rejection of reductive materialism.

However, as I explained to Paul, even if we assume that reductive materialism is intelligible (which I have argued elesewhere is not) and characterises reality, we still necessarily have to conclude that consciousness must have at least some limited causal efficacy (and if I recall correctly Paul agreed with this).

Secondly in no shape or form am I claiming that "libertarian free will" is true. I don't understand what libertarian free will even means and no-one has ever defined it to my satisfaction. I really think we should leave libertarian and compatibilist free will well alone, they just sow confusion.

[Interesting Ian]

Ah, yet another "refutation" of my proof over on the jref thread!

blobru
Not sure if this “dead horse” is quite dog food yet but it is dog’s breakfast:

InterestingIan: according to science consciousness is a physical event.

Here he claims that I'm saying that, according to science, materialism is correct! There I was on the jref for years, over thousands of posts, banging on about the fact that science and materialism shouldn't be conflated, and here is this guy claiming that I agree with this myself!

Not an auspicious start by "blobru".

blobru
Call it event A. The thought “I think I am conscious” is also a physical event. Call it event B. B != A. Therefore, B might happen without A: “I think I am conscious but I am not conscious.” Absurdity.

If this is paraphrasing my argument he's doing it very badly.

The problem here is I don't agree with event A. Event A needs to be "all mental processes follow physical laws". This will include "event B" (I think I am conscious).

But then B is simply an instance of A. So this B! = A (I am assuming "!" means doesn't) is untrue. Certainly I am not saying it.

Indeed if A, then a thought like B must necessarily be an instance of A.

So this isn't looking very promising for blobru's refutation of my proof. He simply keeps getting everything wrong. Is it worth continuing? Let's see . . .

blobru

UnbearableBeing: however, just because B != A doesn’t mean B is not a subset of A.

I'm not sure what he means by UnbearableBeing, but it certainly seems appropriate to describe himself thus!

Of course B is a subset of A. That is to say that if one thinks oneself is conscious (B), then this is a result or instance of the fact that all mental processes follow physical laws (A).

In this case it is: “I think I am conscious” (corresponding to a physical state in the brain) is a subset of consciousness (corresponding to a class of physical states in the brain including “I think I am conscious”).

Yes obviously any particular thought eg “I think I am conscious” is a subset of all possible thoughts feeling, or general mentality.

How any of this amounts to a refutation of my proof is quite beyond me.

I forget exactly what this fallacy’s called – “apples and oranges”, maybe “apples and fruit” – category mistake – placing different levels of descriptor on par.

I think the fallacy is simply the fact you are not paying attention to what I'm actually saying. As I state in my blog there is not one materialist/skeptic who even understands my proof, never mind refute it. Nothing has changed in that department as of yet.

Edited to add: Would you like to paste this post over to the jref Paul so that the UnbearableBeing may read my response? Or are you not allowed to do that since I am banned from there? If so just post a link.

Thanks.

[Interesting Ian]

Another argument from Robin.

And this in this step Ian seems to be saying that a premise implies the logical possibility of something because it does not rule out the logical possibility of it.

I'm saying no such thing. I stipulate that consciousness and the underlying physical substratum are distinct. Thus the underlying physical substratum does not logically entail consciousness -- otherwise this would simply be reductive materialism which I rule out at the outset. In other words we only have a natural necessity here.

But if they are distinct (no logically entailment from one to the other), then it necessarily follows that there are possible worlds where the physical substratum does not naturally necessitate consciousness -- that is to say it is logically possible for all the underlying physical activity involved in thinking one is conscious is going on, and yet for one not to be conscious.

So:

1. Every prime number is an odd number
2. Every prime number has exactly two factors
3. Under (2) it is a logical impossibility that the number 27 is prime
4. Under (1) it is at least a logical possibility that the number 27 is prime
5. By contradiction (1) is false and at least one prime number is not odd.

I have no idea of his reasoning here. What on earth is (1) supposed to be contradicting? No matter, there does not seem to be any relevance to my argument here.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

You agree with David that no proof will ever be possible in any aspect of philosophy whatsoever.

I think it's quite unlikely.

I am maintaining that I have proved that necessarily consciousness cannot be entirely causally inefficacious.

But you haven't.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

They have rejected no such thing!

I'm not sure what she is talking about, but scientists need not assume that everything follows natural laws. They just have to assume that they can't observe the things which do not.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

It seems to me that my argument constitutes a proof. It is possible I am misunderstanding something, but I've thought about this pretty deeply and I don't think I have. If physicalists can forestall my proof I would be delighted to hear their comments. Paul certainly hasn't. Indeed there is absolutely no indication whatsoever that he even understands it -- therefore a fortiori he has failed to forestall my proof.

You are correct, I do not understand your proof. That could be due to my stupidity, but it could also be due to the proof being sloppily written.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I note that you haven't addressed my questions in post #466. You proof remains unrefuted simply because you refuse to address questions about it.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I'm not sure what she is talking about, but scientists need not assume that everything follows natural laws. They just have to assume that they can't observe the things which do not.

~~ Paul

We assume that everything which is physical does.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I think it's quite unlikely.


But you haven't.

~~ Paul

I'll just have to take that on faith then won't I since no one has even understood my argument so far as I can see, never mind refute it.