Decoherence Is Enough In Quantum Theory After All. Consciousness UnEncountered.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

Cognitive scientists have failed to locate a causal mechanism between mind and brain which has led philosophers like David Chalmers to come to just that conclusion (consciousness as a fundamental aspect of reality).

Surely a premature conclusion. We've only been studying the brain in any detail for 50 years.

If we are to accept that consciousness is fundamental (like mass, space, time, charge etc.) and not reducible to simpler physical properties, than the many worlds hypothesis is certainly not the simplest and most likely option, as is hoped by materialists.

Okay, so list the properties of the mindon, or whatever you want to call the carrier of consciousness. I want to see how the list of properties conveys a fundamental unit of consciousness. I want to read the list and go aha! that's why consciousness feels the way it does.

~~ Paul

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

Yes, so what if minds/brains split?

Mszlazak, I don't think the mind = the brain. Until science provides sufficient evidence to the contrary, I am totally free to hypothesize the brain is a filter of the mind, one may call that dualism or a type of idealism that evolves or splits into many.

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Mszlazak, I don't think the mind = the brain. Until science provides sufficient evidence to the contrary, I am totally free to hypothesize the brain is a filter of the mind, one may call that dualism or a type of idealism that evolves or splits into many.

That misses the point! Everett's approach does not need mind != brain and is consistent with mind=brain. I thought you might have wanted to criticize it on the issue of transtemporal identity, the issue of "self" given branching events in the future.

----------------

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by David Bailey
Cognitive scientists have failed to locate a causal mechanism between mind and brain which has led philosophers like David Chalmers to come to just that conclusion (consciousness as a fundamental aspect of reality).

If we are to accept that consciousness is fundamental (like mass, space, time, charge etc.) and not reducible to simpler physical properties, than the many worlds hypothesis is certainly not the simplest and most likely option, as is hoped by materialists.

Originally Posted by DysonSphere

"To me, that has the quality of a fictitious mathematical extrapolation rather than reality."

My thoughts exactly.

If we are to accept that consciousness is fundamental (like mass, space, time, charge etc.) and not reducible to simpler physical properties, than the many worlds hypothesis is certainly not the simplest and most likely option, as is hoped by materialists.

Cognitive scientists have failed to locate a causal mechanism between mind and brain which has led philosophers like David Chalmers to come to just that conclusion (consciousness as a fundamental aspect of reality).

Its not much of a leap to suggest that matter and consciousness are ultimately one and the same. It is easy to see how mass, space, motion, time and charge are ultimately the same phenomena and the realization of such phenomena is completely subjective, hence consciousness.

Can you say something exists if it has nothing to exist too? When I say this table exists I mean that I can touch it and see it and if these sensation are a fundamental aspect of the world then subjective awareness IS mass, space, time etc.

This line of thinking nicely interprets the supposed strangeness of the quantum world. No need to resort to an infinite number of unverifiable parallel realities.

David and Dyson, here is some sage advise from a wise man, you're notions aren't even testable and he ends by suggesting that "you just let go." I say that there are no good reasons to credit your hunches about mind and consciousness so "get over it and move on."

A Clever Robot
By Daniel Dennett

Suppose Steve Pinker contracts a terrible progressive brain disease that destroys his nervous system from the outside in--he starts going numb and then deaf and blind and unable to control his muscles. But then neuroscience comes to the rescue, replacing each portion of his nervous system as it disintegrates with a suitably interfaced prosthesis made of silicon and wire.

Thanks to their success on the Easy Problems of consciousness, the scientists meticulously provide artificial substitutes for all Steve's brain processes, so to all outward appearances he is saved from terrible oblivion and death. Moreover, he expresses his satisfaction with his restored feeling and sight and continues speaking and writing with humor and eloquence, delighting his friends and frustrating his critics.

But can we really be sure that he is expressing his satisfaction? His body may be just "expressing" his satisfaction. Although it appears to all observers that Steve believes he's alive and well, loves his family and is only slightly distracted by the residual pain of his many surgeries, there seems to be a possibility that the apparently animate body standing before us only "believes" it is alive, only "loves" his family and is distracted not by real pain but by "pain," the bogus kind that lacks the je ne sais quoi of genuine pain.

The trouble with this hypothesis is that it declares its own untestability at the outset. There is nothing Steve could do or say under any circumstances that would provide the slightest grounds for either dismissing or confirming the reality of his experience. There could not be an objective test that distinguished a clever robot from a really conscious person.

Now you have a choice: you can cling to the Hard Problem, or you can shake your head in wonder and dismiss it. We've learned to do this before: it still seems as if the sun goes around the earth, but we know better. It's not all that hard, actually, now that we've made so much progress on the Easy Problems. Just let go.

-----------

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

That misses the point! Everett's approach does not need mind != brain and is consistent with mind=brain. I thought you might have wanted to criticize it on the issue of transtemporal identity, the issue of "self" given branching events in the future.

Materialists have double standards I think. They dismiss dualism on the grounds there can be no external interaction with the physical world due to the law of conservation of energy within a closed system.

However *if* every time a universe splits, matter doubles and energy doubles that would be violation of the conservation of energy. But they will argue 'no', it is a closed system. But it is gets even more hypocritical argument because David Deutsch claims 'But on microscopic scales, quantum mechanics becomes dominant and the universes are far from independent. Universes that are very alike are close together in the multiverse and affect each other strongly, though only in subtle, indirect ways — a phenomenon known as quantum interference.

So we do see there can indeed be interactions between different worlds, therefore a dualism can indeed exist and evolve.

'Everything in our universe — including you and me, every atom and every galaxy — has counterparts in these other universes. Some counterparts are in the same places as they are in our universe, while others are in different places. Some have different shapes, or are arranged in different ways; some are so different that they are not worth calling counterparts. There are even universes in which a given object in our universe has no counterpart — including universes in which I was never born and you wrote this article instead.

Hey that sounds like Santa Claus really exists in one of those too.

Mszlazak, if you really believe the Many Worlds Interpretation, I ask you the question, if you die in this universe, do your counterparts die in all the other universes simultaneously?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Materialists have double standards I think. They dismiss dualism on the grounds there can be no external interaction with the physical world due to the law of conservation of energy within a closed system.

Interesting, I've never heard this argument before. I dismiss dualism because no one can seem to give a coherent explanation for how the two existents interact. Maybe energy conservation or thermodynamics is the reason.

Mszlazak, if you really believe the Many Worlds Interpretation, I ask you the question, if you die in this universe, do your counterparts die in all the other universes simultaneously?

Do people actually "believe" these interpretations before there is evidence for one or the other? I figure they are just nice talking points until more evidence becomes available.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

A Clever Robot
By Daniel Dennett

Suppose Steve Pinker contracts a terrible progressive brain disease that destroys his nervous system from the outside in--he starts going numb and then deaf and blind and unable to control his muscles. But then neuroscience comes to the rescue, replacing each portion of his nervous system as it disintegrates with a suitably interfaced prosthesis made of silicon and wire.

Thanks to their success on the Easy Problems of consciousness, the scientists meticulously provide artificial substitutes for all Steve's brain processes, so to all outward appearances he is saved from terrible oblivion and death. Moreover, he expresses his satisfaction with his restored feeling and sight and continues speaking and writing with humor and eloquence, delighting his friends and frustrating his critics.

But can we really be sure that he is expressing his satisfaction? His body may be just "expressing" his satisfaction. Although it appears to all observers that Steve believes he's alive and well, loves his family and is only slightly distracted by the residual pain of his many surgeries, there seems to be a possibility that the apparently animate body standing before us only "believes" it is alive, only "loves" his family and is distracted not by real pain but by "pain," the bogus kind that lacks the je ne sais quoi of genuine pain.

The trouble with this hypothesis is that it declares its own untestability at the outset. There is nothing Steve could do or say under any circumstances that would provide the slightest grounds for either dismissing or confirming the reality of his experience. There could not be an objective test that distinguished a clever robot from a really conscious person.

Now you have a choice: you can cling to the Hard Problem, or you can shake your head in wonder and dismiss it. We've learned to do this before: it still seems as if the sun goes around the earth, but we know better. It's not all that hard, actually, now that we've made so much progress on the Easy"[/size]

If the brain merely acts as a "filter" to the self, then why could not some artificial brain which has exactly the same causal roles as the real brain also not act as a filter to the self?

So we can agree with Dennet that gradually replacing ones brain with artificial substitutes made of silicon and wire will have no effect on a person whatsoever, and yet this is completely consistent with the notion that the self is non-physical and may even survive the death of ones body.

Note though that this situation is different from building an artificial brain from the ground up. In this latter case they may not be a self available to be filtered by this artificial brain.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

Note though that this situation is different from building an artificial brain from the ground up. In this latter case they may not be a self available to be filtered by this artificial brain.

What if I build the artifical brain, quickly yank out the brain of a person, and stuff in the artificial one. How long have I got before the self gets confused and doesn't connect to the artificial brain? It's kind of like changing batteries in a device with a capacitor.

And what if I build an artificial brain and then just wait for awhile? Will the self of a recently deceased person reincarnate in it?

What if I take the brain out of a person and move it over to the other side of the room. Does the self get confused?

What if I split the brain of a person? Any chance of two selves connecting up?

Which particular piece of the brain can I remove to disconnect the self?

I know you're an idealist, but I swear this sounds dualistic. These brains are not material things, but just figments of mental stuff. This idea of connecting and disconnecting sounds incoherent.

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

What if I build the artifical brain, quickly yank out the brain of a person, and stuff in the artificial one. How long have I got before the self gets confused and doesn't connect to the artificial brain? It's kind of like changing batteries in a device with a capacitor.

And what if I build an artificial brain and then just wait for awhile? Will the self of a recently deceased person reincarnate in it?

What if I take the brain out of a person and move it over to the other side of the room. Does the self get confused?

What if I split the brain of a person? Any chance of two selves connecting up?

Which particular piece of the brain can I remove to disconnect the self?

I know you're an idealist, but I swear this sounds dualistic. These brains are not material things, but just figments of mental stuff. This idea of connecting and disconnecting sounds incoherent.

~~ Paul

Hell I don't know. Why do you expect me to know all the answers to life the Universe and everything? You're not actually specifying any problems with my hypothesis as such.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

Hell I don't know. Why do you expect me to know all the answers to life the Universe and everything? You're not actually specifying any problems with my hypothesis as such.
Reply With Quote

As long as we agree that lack of answers to certain questions does not automatically eliminate the metaphysic, I'm good.

Although I think this one is a toughie for you: Which particular piece of the brain can I remove to disconnect the self?

~~ Paul