Decoherence Is Enough In Quantum Theory After All. Consciousness UnEncountered.

[mszlazak]

The following are distilled from emails I received from Guido Bacciagaluppi at the University of Sydney.

Objections, like Stapp's (i.e, http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/bp.PDF or his book Mindful Universe) or Rosenblum's and Kuttner's (Quantum Enigma), that state decoherence does not give rise to a basis in the strict sense of a complete set of orthogonal states is correct but not important. There is no need then for consciousness to play the role some people think it needs to in QM. Decoherence and a proper interpretation of the wave function is all that's required. [e.g, Each of the current interpretations of quantum mechanics has its pros and cons, but if you are prepared to accept either many-worlds or the Bohm theory as good candidates for the solution of the measurement problem, then decoherence plays an important role in both these proposed solutions. In the case of many-worlds, it appears that it provides the key to which decomposition or decompositions of the universal wave function define the many worlds of the interpretation. In the case of the Bohm theory it guarantees that the result of a measurement, once it has been obtained, is not undone (or that Schroedinger's cat, once it is dead, does not resuscitate).]


There are two reasons, one mathematical and one philosophical. The mathematical reason is that one does not need a basis (i.e. a complete set of orthogonal vectors) in order to define probabilities, one can work also with more general objects, so-called POV measures. See e.g. in the book by A. Peres, Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), on pp. 282-289. Also, see links below to papers by Wallace where Wallace also remarks on why one should expect worlds to be merely vaguely defined.

The philosophical reason is that the best proposal so far for understanding probabilities in many-worlds is in terms of subjective probabilities (see again for instance David Wallace's papers). If that is the correct way to do it, then the fact that at the objective level of the wave function there might (possibly) be only an inexact correlate to the probabilities is not very worrying.

It is interesting to note that Daniel Dennett's writing on functionalism play a significant role in Wallace's work. Either of these two papers are about worlds and about decoherence in many-worlds (one of them is more accessible than the other):

PhilSci Archive - Everett and Structure

PhilSci Archive - Worlds in the Everett Interpretation

And probably this one for the issue of probabilities in many-worlds. This, however, is mainly a technical paper. Guido was not sure what to recommend as a review of these very recent developments:

PhilSci Archive - Quantum Probability from Subjective Likelihood: improving on Deutsch's proof of the probability rule

I found this recent paper by Wallace on the state of play on the measurement problem in QM.

The Quantum Measurement Problem: State of Play

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[drew hempel]

This is an interesting issue raised and thanks for the new reference "Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods" (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998) but the author Asher Peres makes the same problem that underlines science as a whole.

Peres tries to separate math from physics while at the same time acknowledging that the math comes from music yet Peres does not have a proper understanding of the music.

To wit:

"A classical acoustic signal with intensity f(t) also cannot have both precise timing and precise pitch....This is a general property of Fourier transforms, quite independent of the underlying physics. Yet, approximate values for time and frequency are certainly compatible, as every musician knows (see page 214). Likewise, in quantum theory, we can have approximate values for both position and wavelength...."

Peres footnotes the above with:

"Do not attempt to quantize Eq. (10.98) into a time-energy uncertainty relation! Time is not an operator in quantum mechanics -- nor is it a dynamical variable in classical mechanics. It is a c-number, a mere numerical parameter. The measurement of time will be discussed in the last chapter of this book."

So clearly the POV quantum statistics used relies on the above "approximate values" yet the author has made some terribly wrong assumptions -- based on a misunderstanding of the roots of math.

Also since Peres refers this issue to the final chapter of the book I think it's safe to say that it's the most important issue for quantum mechanics.

So we go to the final chapter that Peres refers us to and find:

"Formally, the Poisson bracket (in classical mechanics) or commutator (in quantum theory) of t with any dynamical variable is always zero." (p. 406)

And so reveals Peres error -- the underlying SYMMETRY of the Brahmin phonetic-number ratio system.

I address this issue in chapter 4 of my blogbook -- Mothership Landing and math professor Joe Mazur stated it's "very valuable." Also the "time-frequency uncertainty principle" kicks off my book.

Nonwestern music relies on time as a dynamic of complimentary opposites -- in violation of the commutative principle (i.e. the conversion of uncertainty principle back into logarithmic-based mathematics).

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by drew hempel

This is an interesting issue raised and thanks for the new reference "Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods" (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998) but the author Asher Peres makes the same problem that underlines science as a whole.

Peres tries to separate math from physics while at the same time acknowledging that the math comes from music yet Peres does not have a proper understanding of the music.

To wit:

"A classical acoustic signal with intensity f(t) also cannot have both precise timing and precise pitch....This is a general property of Fourier transforms, quite independent of the underlying physics. Yet, approximate values for time and frequency are certainly compatible, as every musician knows (see page 214). Likewise, in quantum theory, we can have approximate values for both position and wavelength...."

Peres footnotes the above with:

"Do not attempt to quantize Eq. (10.98) into a time-energy uncertainty relation! Time is not an operator in quantum mechanics -- nor is it a dynamical variable in classical mechanics. It is a c-number, a mere numerical parameter. The measurement of time will be discussed in the last chapter of this book."

So clearly the POV quantum statistics used relies on the above "approximate values" yet the author has made some terribly wrong assumptions -- based on a misunderstanding of the roots of math.

Also since Peres refers this issue to the final chapter of the book I think it's safe to say that it's the most important issue for quantum mechanics.

So we go to the final chapter that Peres refers us to and find:

"Formally, the Poisson bracket (in classical mechanics) or commutator (in quantum theory) of t with any dynamical variable is always zero." (p. 406)

And so reveals Peres error -- the underlying SYMMETRY of the Brahmin phonetic-number ratio system.

I address this issue in chapter 4 of my blogbook -- Mothership Landing and math professor Joe Mazur stated it's "very valuable." Also the "time-frequency uncertainty principle" kicks off my book.

Nonwestern music relies on time as a dynamic of complimentary opposites -- in violation of the commutative principle (i.e. the conversion of uncertainty principle back into logarithmic-based mathematics).

I don't know what the heck all this is suppose mean with regards to POV stuff??

-----------

[DysonSphere]

Decoherence is subject to what I think are some fatal criticisms. The decoherence interpretation tries to neutralize the strangeness of QM by suggesting that quantum systems lose information as it interacts with its environment causing the appearance of a wave-function collapse.

The problem is that you cannot "lose" information to the environment because the universe as a whole has no environment. This is to put it rather simply but to say that the decoherence interpretation is not subject to criticism is simply untrue.

The problem with the many worlds hypothesis (and all interpretations of QM) is that is it unfalsifiable. The theory supposes that there are an infinite number of parallel universes, which completely undermines the principle of parsimony.

The observer seems to be play a crucial role in QM because measuring a quantum system appears to decide its properties. But of course that is exactly what is trying to be refuted by the many worlds hypothesis and decoherence.

Consciousness re-encountered.

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by DysonSphere

Decoherence is subject to what I think are some fatal criticisms. The decoherence interpretation tries to neutralize the strangeness of QM by suggesting that quantum systems lose information as it interacts with its environment causing the appearance of a wave-function collapse.

The problem is that you cannot "lose" information to the environment because the universe as a whole has no environment. This is to put it rather simply but to say that the decoherence interpretation is not subject to criticism is simply untrue.

The problem with the many worlds hypothesis (and all interpretations of QM) is that is it unfalsifiable. The theory supposes that there are an infinite number of parallel universes, which completely undermines the principle of parsimony.

The observer seems to be play a crucial role in QM because measuring a quantum system appears to decide its properties. But of course that is exactly what is trying to be refuted by the many worlds hypothesis and decoherence.

Consciousness re-encountered.

My understanding is that what you've said is now days considered incorrect or irrelevent.

My understanding is that the main criticism of decoherence had to do with the basis problem, assignment of probabilities and some indefiniteness issues. If I'm reading the papers I cited correctly, POV's removes the basis problem and assignment of probabilities, and functionalism removes concerns of macroscopic indefiniteness.

According to my reading of the papers I cited, the claim that Everett's many-worlds interpretation undermines the principle of parsimony appears totally wrong and just the opposite when compared to it's competitors. It's the combining of the elegent "bare quantum formalism" with the mess that is the "quantum algorithm" that creates the measurement problem and all these other interpretations.

I will have to go back to these papers to see if the issue of falsifiability is even brought up but Max Tegmark, on his web site, said this was not the case and gave examples or reasons why not. Here is one of his papers which brings up the falsifiability issue: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/...707.2593v1.pdf

Consciousness UnEncountered

-------------------------

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

According to my reading of the papers I cited, the claim that Everett's many-worlds interpretation undermines the principle of parsimony appears totally wrong and just the opposite when compared to it's competitors.

Many Worlds Theory is surely the ultimate violation of Occams Razor, an infinite amount of entities bursting into existence at every moment, each a whole universe. It is so ironic that reductionist materialists violate 'Do not introduce additional entities (including a universes of entities) beyond the minimum number required to explain a phenomenon' ...one wonders if the main logic behind multiple worlds theory is to remove anything resembling a consciousness and return to a classical logic system that otherwise collapses.

The long standing paranormal claim in eastern religion, western religion, new age beliefs and spiritualism ....... is often one of many worlds existing apart from our own. Materialism by adopting many worlds theory has now joined them!

the best proposal so far for understanding probabilities in many-worlds is in terms of subjective probabilities (see again for instance David Wallace's papers). If that is the correct way to do it, then the fact that at the objective level of the wave function there might (possibly) be only an inexact correlate to the probabilities is not very worrying.

But do you see where this might be going? As soon as you enter 'subjective probablilities' , 'inexact corrolations of probablities' one may argue that a instead of physical worlds splitting, minds are splliting. Consciousness Re-encountered!

So why not a have tweaked a combination of those two theories, one hinting at consciousness (Copenhagen) , the other suggesting multiple worlds (MWT) so that instead of physical like worlds splitting, one proposes that minds and consciousness are (subjectively or objectively) splitting then we have a natural selection / evolutionary system that goes, far beyond our material reality. We can speculate that the brain evolved to filter out these other realities as 'interference' and that psychic phenomena is a weak effect due to the brain evolving to filter these outas an evolutionary disadvantage.

Perhaps one day people will indeed invent 'consciousness' on a computer but it might be on a quantum computer and with it is also lost the current paradigm of materialism and physical reality. We are all tempted to laugh at the idiocy of old religious ideas viewing our earth planet as the centre of the universe, perhaps future generations will laugh at our current paradigm of viewing our materialistic laws as the laws of all universes.....

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Many Worlds Theory is surely the ultimate violation of Occams Razor, an infinite amount of entities bursting into existence at every moment, each a whole universe. It is so ironic that reductionist materialists violate 'Do not introduce additional entities (including a universes of entities) beyond the minimum number required to explain a phenomenon' ...one wonders if the main logic behind multiple worlds theory is to remove anything resembling a consciousness and return to a classical logic system that otherwise collapses.

I disagree; it's simpler. It requires only a mechanism to poof worlds into existence. A single world theory requires that plus an additional mechanism to prevent other worlds from poofing into existence.

By "entities," Occam meant different sorts of entities.

The long standing paranormal claim in eastern religion, western religion, new age beliefs and spiritualism ....... is often one of many worlds existing apart from our own. Materialism by adopting many worlds theory has now joined them!

Materialism? Don't you mean science? Surely you're not equating the two in your mind.

~~ Paul

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

But do you see where this might be going? As soon as you enter 'subjective probablilities' , 'inexact corrolations of probablities' one may argue that a instead of physical worlds splitting, minds are splliting.

Yes, so what if minds/brains split?

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[David Bailey]

I think it is important to remember just how many 'worlds' are postulated by many worlds QM. As I understand it, every quantum choice of every particle in the universe multiplies the total number of universes (not worlds) that exist, and this process has been going on ever since the big bang!

To me, that has the quality of a fictitious mathematical extrapolation rather than reality.

Now maybe in some modified QM, 'worlds' could also coalesce again - that might make more sense, and maybe even be testable.

David

[DysonSphere]

"To me, that has the quality of a fictitious mathematical extrapolation rather than reality."

My thoughts exactly.

If we are to accept that consciousness is fundamental (like mass, space, time, charge etc.) and not reducible to simpler physical properties, than the many worlds hypothesis is certainly not the simplest and most likely option, as is hoped by materialists.

Cognitive scientists have failed to locate a causal mechanism between mind and brain which has led philosophers like David Chalmers to come to just that conclusion (consciousness as a fundamental aspect of reality).

Its not much of a leap to suggest that matter and consciousness are ultimately one and the same. It is easy to see how mass, space, motion, time and charge are ultimately the same phenomena and the realization of such phenomena is completely subjective, hence consciousness.

Can you say something exists if it has nothing to exist too? When I say this table exists I mean that I can touch it and see it and if these sensation are a fundamental aspect of the world then subjective awareness IS mass, space, time etc.

This line of thinking nicely interprets the supposed strangeness of the quantum world. No need to resort to an infinite number of unverifiable parallel realities.