Response to Skeptics' Guide Host, Dr. Steven Novella (Podcast)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by skidoo

Please go back a few posts and re-read the thread. Repeating this stuff is getting tiresome.

Which post precisely do you provide evidence which supports the production theory (consciousness is a product of the brain), but which is at tension with transmission theory (consciousness is not a product of the brain, but nevertheless is "filtered" by the brain)?

I would appreciate it if you could specify the post where you provide this evidence. Better still, just paste it in when you reply to this post.

Failure to comply with my request will unfortunately have the consequence of making me doubt the existence of this alleged evidence.

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

But it's an extremely complex subject and it seems to me that people continually are using all these terms in a very loose and ambiguous manner.

Ian,

Thanks for clarifying, I think I will avoid the terms monism, dualism and idealism altogether! And just stick to 'brain as a filter of consciousness, not the source of consciousness' which could point to dualism or idealism but not to materialism.

However .... so I understand others common use, I assume basically the terms are .....

Materialism = Matter creates mind
Idealism = Mind creates matter
Descartes Dualism = Mind and Matter are fundamentally separate entities.

None of these seem adequate to me , there surely must be at least one other possibility .... that being mind and matter are composed of something fundamentally deeper than either mind or matter. So can be viewed as either a dualism or monism, depending upon perspective. I feel 'interactive dualism' belongs more in here but perhaps that is the wrong term.

Perhaps for conscious life to evolve requires at some point a sense of idealism, dualism and materialism ...of course they cannot logically all be simultaneously true but understanding the meaning of only 'one' (everything/idealism/monism) means little without a sense of two or more (dualism - individuality) or a sense of nothing (materialism - no real consciousness).

In conclusion .... it is probably simpler for me to avoid traditional terminology. I don't quite need it, even if others tend to use these terms.

Cheers

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Ian,

Thanks for clarifying, I think I will avoid the terms monism, dualism and idealism altogether! And just stick to 'brain as a filter of consciousness, not the source of consciousness' which could point to dualism or idealism but not to materialism.

Yes - I like the filter of consciousness approach! In my view, because a physical explanation seems so hard, the subject has become somewhat infested with philosophical abstractions!

David

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

Yes - I like the filter of consciousness approach! In my view, because a physical explanation seems so hard, the subject has become somewhat infested with philosophical abstractions!

David

David from reading many of your posts, I think I can say we often share a similar viewpoint on the current state of debate over consciousness, psi etc. ... and also on on avoiding the baggage that often goes with old terms. Not that I mind the old terms which can be useful too but constantly having to define what is meant and not meant when using these loaded terms gets tiresome

[skidoo]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

Which post precisely do you provide evidence which supports the production theory (consciousness is a product of the brain),

Several posts. Go back and look for the ones that quote the claims posited by Dr. Novella. "If mind is a product of of the brain, then...." E.g., break the brain, break the mind. The list goes on.

but which is at tension with transmission theory (consciousness is not a product of the brain, but nevertheless is "filtered" by the brain)?

See, this is the point you people continue to ignore, as if you've got your fingers plugged in your ears. I never said the evidence is "at tension" with this transmission theory. It's not "at tension" with a million other theories I could pull randomly out of my posterior. That's not how science works.

ALL of the evidence (aforementioned and more) supports a wholly materialist view of consciousness, with no need for any transmissions, be those transmissions from flatulent ponies or any other source. NONE of the evidence falsifies a **single** materialist claim. And there is NO evidence supporting a single (the single?) dualist claim. There is simply no need for that hypothesis (c.f. the Laplace/Napoleon dialog I paraphrased a few posts back).

Failure to comply with my request will unfortunately have the consequence of making me doubt the existence of this alleged evidence.

Oh that would be a shame.

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by skidoo

ALL of the evidence (aforementioned and more) supports a wholly materialist view of consciousness

Any theory needs to be falsifiable, out of curiosity what experiment could falsify the materialist view of consciousness? How would it be done?

And there is NO evidence supporting a single (the single?) dualist claim.

Not directly via lab based parapsychology (because one can argue a super-psi hypothesis - i.e. psi as a brain function) however if one also accepts evidence of erratic stronger psi occurrences in field based research then the most parsimonious explanation is the mind and the brain are not the same thing. But there is no way that hard skeptics are going to accept the empirical evidence in psychical research when the won't even accept the tightly controlled scientific evidence in parapsychology.

Field based, empirical evidence can always be claimed fraudulent by hard skeptics, it is almost like being in a court of law, with a case of multiple, simultaneous, credible witnesses to an event and the hard skeptic just complains 'this is impossible, it cannot occur, it is not scientific evidence - it must be repeatable' And the hard skeptic is indeed correct, it is not scientific evidence in the strictest sense but the non-present hard skeptic is still foolish for confidently dismissing empirical evidence on a-priori grounds.

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by skidoo

That's not how science works.

Skidoo - I tend to see red when I see remarks like that - a lot of us are or were 'scientists' and I suspect you might be amazed how real science works! It is often far less clean than you seem to think.

Why don't we debate this in a grown-up manner and forget equine intestinal gas.

Do you really want to understand the reason why Open Mind, Ian, and myself express the doubts about a purely physicalist theory of consciousness? If you do, then stop just quoting other people, and try to debate the problem itself. I am sure others will help you to understand why we favour a non-material explanation of consciousness, and it is important that you do understand why, if you are to sensibly argue another point of view. Here is my attempt at a brief explanation!

The essential problem is that it is 'easy' to see how physical matter obeying the ordinary laws of physics can create motion (as in a car), create heat, process TV signals, or indeed compute. I have put that word 'easy' in quotes, because in reality there is a lot of complexity in there, but no real show stoppers.

Now we come to what David Chalmers refers to as the 'hard problem'. This is the question as to how you get a piece of physical matter to feel something, such as pain, pleasure, the sensation of red, satisfaction, etc. These experiences are often known as qualia.

I don't know what your technical background is, but suppose you wanted to create a circuit or a computer program that could experience one of those qualia, how would you go about it? Perhaps you choose 'satisfaction' and you decide to write a program that will feel satisfaction when something or other happens. Maybe as a first attempt, you make the program wait until conditions are right, and then it prints out "Wow - I feel really satisfied!".

Immediately you have done that, you know it is a sham. You could have printed anything, and there is no internal feeling to go with the message. So you try to elaborate your program - but what the hell do you do to persuade yourself that your program actually feels something?

Maybe you come to the conclusion that a computer program can't be conscious, but some other hardware could. Fine - but you will find it is equally tough to specify what properties you need in that hardware for it to feel satisfied (on indeed anything else).

This is the problem that we are grappling with here. Simply quoting other people only gets you so far - you actually have to engage in the problem!

David

[skidoo]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

Skidoo - I tend to see red when I see remarks like that - a lot of us are or were 'scientists' and I suspect you might be amazed how real science works! It is often far less clean than you seem to think.

I've never asserted that it's "clean." Science is not clean. And saying that I don't understand how "real science" works without actually supporting your contention is just a hollow lob.

Why don't we debate this in a grown-up manner and forget equine intestinal gas.

In a "grown-up mannner?" My rainbow-farting pony analogy is perfectly accurate, and perfectly appropriate, which is why no one on this thread has been able to undermine it logically. Applying this silly jab to your side: Denying the evidence and sticking your fingers in your ears does not constitute a "grown-up" argument.

Do you really want to understand the reason why Open Mind, Ian, and myself express the doubts about a purely physicalist theory of consciousness? If you do, then stop just quoting other people,

This is so disingenuous. I'm clearly not "just quoting other people." I have argued logically and reasonably with plenty of my own material in support of my position. Nevertheless, true is true, whatever the source.

and try to debate the problem itself. I am sure others will help you to understand why we favour a non-material explanation of consciousness, and it is important that you do understand why, if you are to sensibly argue another point of view. Here is my attempt at a brief explanation!

Say what? I've presented the evidence. You guys have tried to rebut it, with no success. Simple.

The essential problem is that it is 'easy' to see how physical matter obeying the ordinary laws of physics can create motion (as in a car), create heat, process TV signals, or indeed compute. I have put that word 'easy' in quotes, because in reality there is a lot of complexity in there, but no real show stoppers.

Now we come to what David Chalmers refers to as the 'hard problem'. This is the question as to how you get a piece of physical matter to feel something, such as pain, pleasure, the sensation of red, satisfaction, etc. These experiences are often known as qualia.

Yes, and the question of qualia is a total red herring in the context of discussions about materialism versus dualism. My internal experience of the color white is irrelevant to the question of whether I'm conscious or not. It is simply beyond our tools, at present.

I don't know what your technical background is, but suppose you wanted to create a circuit or a computer program that could experience one of those qualia, how would you go about it? Perhaps you choose 'satisfaction' and you decide to write a program that will feel satisfaction when something or other happens. Maybe as a first attempt, you make the program wait until conditions are right, and then it prints out "Wow - I feel really satisfied!".

Immediately you have done that, you know it is a sham.

It's not a sham. It's pattern recognition and communication. Which humans (coincidentally) are good at as well.

You could have printed anything, and there is no internal feeling to go with the message.

No "internal feeling?" How do you know? How do you know what **I** mean when **I** say I'm satisfied? You don't.

So you try to elaborate your program - but what the hell do you do to persuade yourself that your program actually feels something?

I don't care if the program actually feels something. Just as I don't care (or make a false pretense of knowing) what you actually feel.

Maybe you come to the conclusion that a computer program can't be conscious, but some other hardware could. Fine - but you will find it is equally tough to specify what properties you need in that hardware for it to feel satisfied (on indeed anything else).

Again, the qualia are irrelevant to the question of consciousness. For all I know, solipsism is the correct interpretation of reality. The important thing is that there is no reason to suspect any non-physical agent is responsible for the phenomenon of consciousness. Is a jellyfish conscious? Is a myna bird? A dog? An ape? Consciousness is clearly a continuum of **physical** capabilities.

This is the problem that we are grappling with here.

This is a self-centered perspective. "The machine can't possibly **feel** what I feel!" Do you not see that what you're attempting to do---without any evidence beyond your subjective experience---is personify a mere epiphenomenon?

Simply quoting other people only gets you so far - you actually have to engage in the problem!

Give me a break. Here's a quote for you.

[DysonSphere]

"When we look at all the evidence we can conclude that when you damage the brain you damage the mind, when you change the brain you change the mind, and there are no mental phenomena separate from brain phenomena - within the limits of our tools to detect such things."- Steven Novella

Novella is no philosopher. The fact that when you change the brain, you change the mind, does not undermine the dualist position, which is a position Novella seems unable to characterize properly. Not that he actually tried. Also, I don't where he gets off saying, "there are no mental phenomena separate from brain phenomena", I guess I'll just take his word for it.

Now that its clear Novella doesn't know what hes talking about then I think you should actually start making some sense skidoo.

[skidoo]

Originally Posted by DysonSphere

"When we look at all the evidence we can conclude that when you damage the brain you damage the mind, when you change the brain you change the mind, and there are no mental phenomena separate from brain phenomena - within the limits of our tools to detect such things."- Steven Novella

Novella is no philosopher. The fact that when you change the brain, you change the mind, does not undermine the dualist position, which is a position Novella seems unable to characterize properly.

Novella never says that this fact undermines dualism (unless by undermines you mean erodes). This is not positive evidence against dualism; it is not falsification of dualism. It is merely one of many claims made by the materialist position. And like **all** of these claims, it is supported by the evidence. No claim of the dualist hypothesis (whatever its specific stripes) is supported by **any** evidence.

Not that he actually tried. Also, I don't where he gets off saying, "there are no mental phenomena separate from brain phenomena", I guess I'll just take his word for it.

If you have evidence to the contrary, I'm sure Randi's million and a Nobel prize are waiting for you.

Now that its clear Novella doesn't know what hes talking about then I think you should actually start making some sense skidoo.

Nice.