Mental reality

[David Bailey]

Perhaps "free will" means different things to different people - I am not talking about totally unconstrained free will, I am talking about the common sense notion that there are lots of choices that we are free to make as we wish. The strict materialists have great difficulty with such a concept, because for them, our brains evolve in time according to a set of equations, plus a pure random component injected by quantum mechanics. The regularly undergo mental gymnastics to persuade themselves that this model of the brain is consistent with what we all instinctively feel - Paul is particularly good at this

My hunch is that consciousness really does contain a (constrained) free will component, so that while you can't hold your breath until you die (even assuming you wanted to), you can decide whether to make a cup of tea or coffee! Computers do follow the laws of physics, and their outputs are entirely decided by their inputs and the program they are running (assuming you do not add a true random noise generator, or dodgy hardware). Paul would claim that a sufficiently complicated computer could be conscious and experience constrained free will, just as we do - I dispute that.

David

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

But do you really want to postulate that they set up some approximation to double blind trials with enough customers to get statistical results, and then pretended that they got all their information from dreams! I find it really remarkable that those guys know about any but the most rudimentary plant cures.

David

What's wrong with supposing they just get their information from dreams?

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by anonymous

David,

Why do think you have free will?
How do you define free will?

Obviously whether or not we have free will is dependent on how one defines it. Sometimes I wonder if idea of free is just an artifact of language. Someone coined a term and now everyone either accepts it as inseparable from consciousness or a psychological illusion.

My opinion is that God doesn't control us like puppets so in that sense we do have free will. I'm not a philosopher but didn't the term "free will" originate among theologians addressing that question of how extensively God involves himself in the actions of mortals?

But after that phrase came into common usage and people developed science, we began to wonder if scientific laws control us in a deterministic way. Is it right to use the term free will in that different context? Is there a better more explanatory term?

I think that there are laws of psychology that explain behavior wether or not consciousness is purely physical so in a sense the result of decisions made through "free will" can be predicted. We are not free from laws of psychology. Some people will say this means we don't have free will.

What I am trying to point out is that the term free will is not sufficiently well defined. It can be used in different contexts which give it slightly different meanings.

I think some other people, like you, will say we are not controlled deterministically by the laws of psychology. If that is true it is not just semantics but free will must then really exist.

However, free will doesn't let us defy gravity, or live forever, or breath under water. Free will doesn't let us feel warm when submerged in ice water, or remain lucid when given narcotic drugs. Why should free will allow us to overcome biological urges? Why should free will allow us to overcome the laws of psychology?

Could an experiment be designed to prove free will exists or does not exist?

I think we do not yet know enough about consciousness to say whether or not a type of free will exists that would be independent of any type of natural law or predictive analysis.

I think what I have said elsewhere about free will might be relevant here:

Let's suppose the existence of an immaterial substantial self which has "causal" powers. If this is so a complete physical description of the Universe at time T2 might not be able to be derived by the application of any physical laws from a complete physical description of the universe at time T1. In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things.

Now this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states. Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.

[DysonSphere]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I think the resulting theories will be equivalent, not identical. I don't think they will make different predictions. It would be fun to turn out to be wrong, though.

Me fears as much. If you're right we can never know, I mean really KNOW. Not even an afterlife could confirm either view, I'd have to talk to god himself AND HOW SHOULD HE KNOW! ARRRGHHHHHHHH!

I'll just have to be content with Occams choice, and only time will tell us which he picks.

So yeah, that my worthless two cents...

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by anonymous

What I am trying to point out is that the term free will is not sufficiently well defined. It can be used in different contexts which give it slightly different meanings.

I will add to this and say that libertarian free will, specificially, is an incoherent concept. Unfortunately, libertarian free will is the only kind that is interesting.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

Perhaps "free will" means different things to different people - I am not talking about totally unconstrained free will, I am talking about the common sense notion that there are lots of choices that we are free to make as we wish. The strict materialists have great difficulty with such a concept, because for them, our brains evolve in time according to a set of equations, plus a pure random component injected by quantum mechanics. The regularly undergo mental gymnastics to persuade themselves that this model of the brain is consistent with what we all instinctively feel - Paul is particularly good at this

Oh, please, spare me. It makes no difference to me whether it's consistent with what we feel, because I don't think that what we feel necessarily has anything to do with what is actually going on. If you're talking about the idea that the feeling of will evolved as a survival mechanism, then I await a good argument against this concept.

My hunch is that consciousness really does contain a (constrained) free will component, so that while you can't hold your breath until you die (even assuming you wanted to), you can decide whether to make a cup of tea or coffee!

Could you explain how this constrained free will works in terms of determinism, randomness, and whatever third component you're imagining?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

Let's suppose the existence of an immaterial substantial self which has "causal" powers. If this is so a complete physical description of the Universe at time T2 might not be able to be derived by the application of any physical laws from a complete physical description of the universe at time T1. In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things.

Two questions:

• Other than by deterministic and random processes, how does this immaterial causal power operate?
  
• How does the immaterial causal power interact with the material universe?

I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on.

In other words, I did not make a random choice because, at the same instant, I redefined myself to want that choice? What does that mean?

If this is going to make any sense at all, you have to explain how it is that I can make a nondeterministic (= random) choice and still consider it to be a choice made by my self. Either that, or you have to explain how there is logical room in nondeterministism (= randomness) for something that is not random.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Dyson

I'll just have to be content with Occams choice, and only time will tell us which he picks.

Unless you can come up with an experiment that can decide, I'm afraid this is the case. And, unfortunately, if there is no afterlife, you will never know.

Frustrating, ain't it?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Two questions:

• Other than by deterministic and random processes, how does this immaterial causal power operate?
  
• How does the immaterial causal power interact with the material universe?

In other words, I did not make a random choice because, at the same instant, I redefined myself to want that choice? What does that mean?

If this is going to make any sense at all, you have to explain how it is that I can make a nondeterministic (= random) choice and still consider it to be a choice made by my self. Either that, or you have to explain how there is logical room in nondeterministism (= randomness) for something that is not random.

~~ Paul

I find it astounding that skeptics have so much difficulty in understanding the most simple things. I did not say the self makes a random choice. Our actions are the result of what we choose to do. Mental causality is a basic existent not susceptible to further analysis -- just like many other people consider physical causality to be a basic existent not susceptible to further analysis. In order to reconcile it with a causally closed world then QM must provide a solution. If the skeptics are right that it is impossible for QM to provide a solution, then necessarily the physical world cannot be closed.

I've provided a proof in the other thread that epiphenomenalism is incoherent and therefore necessarily mental causation must exist. You claim in that thread you agree that epiphenomenalism is incoherent! So what precisely is your problem now?

As for your "libertarian free will" I have no idea what it means. How does it differ from the normal free will that everyone who is sane believes in?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

I find it astounding that skeptics have so much difficulty in understanding the most simple things.

... over and over and over again. I wonder why?

I did not say the self makes a random choice. Our actions are the result of what we choose to do. Mental causality is a basic existent not susceptible to further analysis -- just like many other people consider physical causality to be a basic existent not susceptible to further analysis.

Then you have no reason to suppose that mental causality is not deterministic. You know, just because something is "not susceptible to further analysis" does not mean that it gets to be illogical.

I've provided a proof in the other thread that epiphenomenalism is incoherent and therefore necessarily mental causation must exist. You claim in that thread you agree that epiphenomenalism is incoherent! So what precisely is your problem now?

The problem is with the definition of mental, as usual.

As for your "libertarian free will" I have no idea what it means. How does it differ from the normal free will that everyone who is sane believes in?

From Wikipedia:

Libertarianism is a philosophical position in metaphysics with respect to free will and determinism. It entails the belief that human beings possess free will, that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that determinism is false. Although not held by the majority of contemporary philosophers, ...

Is that the sort of free will all the sane people are talking about? The other kind is compatibilist free will, where we simply require that I can make a decision that is free from coercion, brainwashing, physical threat, and so forth. A decision compatible with determinism.

~~ Paul