Mental reality

[Mike]

The link to the summary of the 2007 Survial of Death Conference. The thrust of this meeting was the issue of building theories regarding survival of death. I think Paul in another thread spoke of the need for a "theory of dead people" to be constructed. It looks like the scholars at this conference are hoping to accomplish that.

Esalen CTR: Summary of 2007"Survival of Bodily Death" Conference

[davidsmith73]

Originally Posted by DysonSphere

This is idealism so the mental and physical are one. Consciousness is a necessary for there to be physical properties and there are specific physical requirements for consciousness to supervene ie a brain or something similiar. So, in a sense this universe is the only one conceivable.

Bit of a hit and run post but I found a relevant and interesting David Chalmers paper which can be found here:

http://consc.net/papers/nature.pdf

Particularly relevant is the "Type-F Monism" section. Here's a little extract:

"This view holds the promise of integrating phenomenal and physical properties very tightly in the natural world. Here, nature consists of entities with intrinsic (proto)phenomenal qualities standing in causal relations within a spacetime manifold. Physics as we know it emerges from the relations between these entities, whereas consciousness as we know it emerges from their intrinsic nature. As a bonus, this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws. The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature. And the view acknowledges a clear causal role for consciousness in the physical world: (proto)phenomenal properties serve as the ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation."

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by davidsmith

Bit of a hit and run post but I found a relevant and interesting David Chalmers paper which can be found here:

I've printed it and will read it soon. I see the silly Knowledge Argument is still there. I also see that he addresses the probability argument against epiphenomenalism.

~~ Paul

[DysonSphere]

Originally Posted by davidsmith73

Bit of a hit and run post but I found a relevant and interesting David Chalmers paper which can be found here:

http://consc.net/papers/nature.pdf

Particularly relevant is the "Type-F Monism" section.

Type-F monism is what I dubbed Idealist Epi-phenomenalism.

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I see the silly Knowledge Argument is still there.
~~ Paul

The only thing silly is Dan Dennett's reply to it.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Dyson

The only thing silly is Dan Dennett's reply to it.

Sorry, the Knowledge Argument is broken. Let's start a thread about it.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

"nature consists of entities with intrinsic (proto)phenomenal qualities standing in causal relations within a spacetime manifold." - that would make a great start to a Science Fiction novel

Seriously, before you go down that route, you have to ask yourself if it seems likely that consciousness is present in all matter.

In a way, I think there is an analogy with early chemistry here. Discovering that elements do not transmute was valuable - even though it was ultimately realised that they can in the right circumstances. So maybe we don't want to worry if the "phenomenal qualities" are attached to the fundamental particles of physics or not - we are so far away from answering such a question.

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There's an analogy to early biology, too. Whatever happened to elan vital?

~~ Paul

[davidsmith73]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

"nature consists of entities with intrinsic (proto)phenomenal qualities standing in causal relations within a spacetime manifold." - that would make a great start to a Science Fiction novel

Seriously, before you go down that route, you have to ask yourself if it seems likely that consciousness is present in all matter.

In a way, I think there is an analogy with early chemistry here. Discovering that elements do not transmute was valuable - even though it was ultimately realised that they can in the right circumstances. So maybe we don't want to worry if the "phenomenal qualities" are attached to the fundamental particles of physics or not - we are so far away from answering such a question.

David

I don't think that is quite what Chalmers is saying. Phenomenal qualities would not be "attached to" fundamental particles and such like. They would constitute the fundamental, intrinsic (I would say "non-relational") part of causal relationships that identify anything physical. As such, you can't have physical things without phenomenal qualities. Physical things would be "constructed" from the relations between them. Unless I've completely misunderstood...

Anyway, must dash. See everyone in the new year!

[DysonSphere]

Originally Posted by davidsmith73

I don't think that is quite what Chalmers is saying. Phenomenal qualities would not be "attached to" fundamental particles and such like. They would constitute the fundamental, intrinsic (I would say "non-relational") part of causal relationships that identify anything physical. As such, you can't have physical things without phenomenal qualities. Physical things would be "constructed" from the relations between them. Unless I've completely misunderstood...

No you didn't misunderstand, thats right.

[Jozen-Bo]

I recall encountering some very interesting information on this subject. I will have to track it down this evening and provide its input. Interesting subject, Thanks!

Jozen