Theism is not the only alternative to materialism

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

It is perhaps only outside the realm of current understanding of physics.


This sounds like 'oneness', a single universal consciousness? Idealism?

I am not convinced by any religious interpretation I have read. To me eastern religion has a problem in that the concept of 'oneness' is contrary to evolution that requires interaction between separate things. A sense of 'one', means little without a sense of 'two' or 'nothing'.

Religion always seems to me to be the product of centuries of political manoeuvring - not in any way divinely inspired. It is worth reading Richard Dawkin's book "The God Delusion" to really face up to the muddled and arbitrary nature of religious belief. I say that, even though I don't agree with Dawkin's more general materialist agenda.

If our consciousness becomes 'one' surely that means loss of freewill and individuality? Yet these are surely two key elements of our current consciousness? 'One' with nothing to interact with means evolution stops? And therefore nothing ever had purpose, just like materialism? .... It seems more coherent to hypothesize that not just physical bodies evolve but individualized minds may be evolving invisibly to our material senses (as suggested in the NDE) The physical brain evolved to filter out that which reduces individuality forcing the splitting (birth) of a new individualized consciousness from a prior one (as suggested by reincarnation with memories of past being filtered out by brain too)

However both Eastern and Western religions keep enforcing the concept that a single perfect mind called God created all lifeforms. Yet in nature we see the evolution from ruthless world of creatures committing murder against fellow creatures in order to survive. Does that sound he work of perfect all knowing universal creator?

I agree very much - the idea of one God (loving or otherwise) just doesn't seem to fit reality. Some people seem to link a tentative belief in Ψ with a belief in God - well I guess you need a non-materialist reality for the concept of God to make sense, but that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition.

Regarding reincarnation, if it really happens, successive lives might resemble a succession of dreams, with periods of hyper-wakefulness in between - after all, that is the way consciousness seems to work.

Certainly I don't like the idea that consciousness is just outside the realm of (an expanded) science for ever. With that approach, science would never have got off the ground in the first place.

David

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Larry Boy

Interesting argument there, Ian. But I guess that a materialist could say that since consciousness is caused by physical events, so is your belief that you're conscious.

An interesting argument, but it's standing out there in the cold freezing its nuts off! LOL

Yes of course the materialist would say that. Let's suppose that my complete conviction that I am conscious is brought about by a physical chain of cause and effect, and not consciousness per se (i.e phenomenological consciousness). Therefore it is logically possible to be convinced of ones own consciousness even though you are not. But this is an absurdity.

However you should note that the reductive materialist would presumably think the sentence:

"Let's suppose that my complete conviction that I am conscious is brought about by a physical chain of cause and effect, and not consciousness per se (i.e phenomenological consciousness)".

is nonsensical. This is because the reductive materialist conflates physical causation with mental causation. In other words the physical events leading to the conviction that one is conscious also necessarily means one is conscious.

But then the reductive materialist is conceding that we have free will. Thus my argument is not directed against them.

[DysonSphere]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

No this cannot possibly be the case I'm afraid. I have a proof demonstrating otherwise. And besides, I bet you don't have any arguments which support this.

Would you mind sharing your proof with us? The fact that the brain is so closely correlated with behavior is the evidence I offer.

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

I have absolutely no idea what the issue of mental causation, or free will, has to do with an enduring self.

Because if you're definition of free-will (as mental causation) is false, then there is no enduring self within physical cause and effect relations. An enduring self is one that does not change btw.

[DysonSphere]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

I am not convinced by any religious interpretation I have read. To me eastern religion has a problem in that the concept of 'oneness' is contrary to evolution that requires interaction between separate things.

The concept of "oneness" isn't a concept. I'm talking about nirvana, which is an experience that cannot be described in ordinary language but yes "oneness", idealism and such is what I'm talking about. I don't see how that contradicts the theory of evolution?

Originally Posted by Open Mind

A sense of 'one', means little without a sense of 'two' or 'nothing'.

This is precisely why the experience cannot be understood by use of ordinary language or any language for that matter.

Originally Posted by Open Mind

If our consciousness becomes 'one' surely that means loss of freewill and individuality? Yet these are surely two key elements of our current consciousness? 'One' with nothing to interact with means evolution stops? And therefore nothing ever had purpose, just like materialism?

If you are one with everything there is no duality and any talk of free-will or a self becomes incoherent. I don't see how materialism or idealism imply meaninglessness.

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Does that sound he work of perfect all knowing universal creator?

I'm not talking about a creator of any sort.

Originally Posted by Open Mind

IMHO since it is not proven long term memory or tacit memory are stored in brain, there is no reason yet to assume loss of individuality upon brain death...

This is precisely what occurs at brain death according to NDErs.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Paul I ask you, if choice is just an useful illusion, how did it evolve via natural selection? How can the notion of conscious choice (i.e. freewill) be a useful evolutionary advantage, if it is an illusion?

I have no idea what conscious choice has to do with free will.

Choice is not an illusion. We make real choices. The illusion, if there is one, is that the conscious feeling of making the choice is what caused the choice to be made. And even if this is an illusion, that choice certainly feeds into subsequent choices.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

Yes of course the materialist would say that. Let's suppose that my complete conviction that I am conscious is brought about by a physical chain of cause and effect, and not consciousness per se (i.e phenomenological consciousness).

But if that chain of cause and effect is consciousness, then my conviction is brought about by consciousness per se. Furthermore, if "complete conviction" is a type of thought, and thought requires phenomenological consciousness (as you have stated elsewhere), then what you have just said is:

Let's suppose that my phenomenological conscious thought that I am conscious is brought about by a physical chain of cause and effect, and not phenomenological consciousness,

which is a self-contradictory premise.

You need to more carefully distinguish what you mean by "consciousness" vs. "consciousness per se."

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by DysonSphere

Would you mind sharing your proof with us? The fact that the brain is so closely correlated with behavior is the evidence I offer.



Because if you're definition of free-will (as mental causation) is false, then there is no enduring self within physical cause and effect relations. An enduring self is one that does not change btw.

The proof of the existence of at least a limited mental causation may be found here. Absolutely no-one agrees with it though, so I imagine that you won't either.

Let's suppose there is always a correlation between specific mental states and specific neuronal states of the brain. This is clearly compatible with a number of positions on the mind/brain interface, yes? It would not for example be incompatible with interactive dualism. So I'm not sure where you're going with this.

As for the enduring self, I wrote about this in my other essay on my blog here

I argue here that should mental states simply follow physical states of the brain, then there cannot be an enduring self. Thus if there is no mental causation, there cannot be an enduring self. So I agree with you on this.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

But if that chain of cause and effect is consciousness, then my conviction is brought about by consciousness per se.

As I've said about a quadrillion times already, I'm not interested in this. My entire argument assumes that consciousness is distinct from the physical substratum. If this is incorrect, you still cannot escape the conclusion that we must necessarily have a limited free will.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

But if that chain of cause and effect is consciousness, then my conviction is brought about by consciousness per se. Furthermore, if "complete conviction" is a type of thought, and thought requires phenomenological consciousness (as you have stated elsewhere), then what you have just said is:

Let's suppose that my phenomenological conscious thought that I am conscious is brought about by a physical chain of cause and effect, and not phenomenological consciousness,

which is a self-contradictory premise.

You need to more carefully distinguish what you mean by "consciousness" vs. "consciousness per se."

~~ Paul

You must try to understand my argument relies on the premise that physical events are distinct from mental events, and likewise physical causation is distinct from mental causation. If you do not, and mental causation simply is physical causation, and physical causation exists. Then necessarily mental causation exists too. So you can't escape the fact that free will necessarily exists.

But I wasn't interested in putting this in that particular essay because by definition reductive materialism is false. I'll explain that in another essay.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I have no idea what conscious choice has to do with free will.

Choice is not an illusion. We make real choices. The illusion, if there is one, is that the conscious feeling of making the choice is what caused the choice to be made. And even if this is an illusion, that choice certainly feeds into subsequent choices.

~~ Paul

There isn't 2 things here, the conscious feeling of making a choice and the choice itself. They are one and the same thing.

The choice is a mental event. What we have here is mental causation. If free will amounts to more than mental causation could you elaborate on this?