Is physicalism / materialism a dangerous belief?

[DysonSphere]

In other words science is in error in its supposition that it is not consciousness in and of itself which is responsible for the complete certainty of our own consciousness.- Ian

Ok.

Moreover, if it is consciousness per se which plays a direct role in our conviction of our own consciousness, then presumably consciousness also plays a direct role in many, if not all, of our beliefs and hence behaviour.- Ian

Here is the problem. Sure, you can be aware of having a belief and how it may influence your behavior but do you choose the belief? That is the question which you haven't addressed.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Dyson

This is absurd. Consciousness can exist and be epi-phenomenal. In fact I favor that theory because an individuals sense of individuality and therefore their sense of free-will is constructed by the left portions of the brain. The simple fact is, is that when those portions of the brain are damaged there is no longer any sense of a defined bodily awareness.

How can consciousness be an epiphenomenon and yet we are having this conversation about consciousness?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

I have no idea what you mean when you state consciousness is part of the physically closed world.

I think you agreed before with the hypothesis that saying consciousness is the same thing as a physical process does not (at least to you) mean that consciousness doesn't exist. Rather something like a pain is both a physical process as externally perceived, and qualia as internally experienced. So something like a pain (and all other conscious events) has 2 different types of property -- that which is amenable to a 3rd person description, and the subjective property.

Yes, but those "qualia as internally experienced" are simply a result of a physical process in the brain. Thus consciousness is part of the physically closed world.

The externally perceived pain is that which is quantifiable. It is these publicly accessible quantifiable events which science deems to be causally efficacious. Therefore the innwardly experieced qualia plays no causal role.

Of course they do. Otherwise we could not speak of them.

However bafflingly you disagree with this. So you must either be saying one of 2 things:

a) The quantifiable events of the externally perceived pain are not sufficient by themselves to provide a complete causal explanation for our reaction to the pain -- the inner experience itself plays at least a partial role. This option seems to flat out deny that the physical world is closed.

Why? The inner experience is just an inner behavior that is more difficult to quantify objectively. But this does make it immaterial, nor does it mean we won't be able to quantify it someday.

For some reason, you have elevated the experiences going on in your head to a status that requires them to be ontologically different. I do not understand this. I find this particularly odd since you cannot enumerate exactly which of the things going on in your head are of this different nature.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

For some reason, you have elevated the experiences going on in your head to a status that requires them to be ontologically different. I do not understand this. I find this particularly odd since you cannot enumerate exactly which of the things going on in your head are of this different nature.

~~ Paul

Equally, you cannot specify what configuration of matter is required to produce consciousness (and please don't say a human head!). We are all blundering about in the dark (which is what makes the subject interesting), but one side - i.e. the physicalists - have persuaded themselves there is no real problem to solve. Some academics on 'your' side go much further that you, and make out that consciousness is just an illusion. You realise that that approach is wrong, but you still tend to drift in that direction.

We need to start by recognising that there is a problem here, and that all possible solutions should be on the table.

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

Equally, you cannot specify what configuration of matter is required to produce consciousness (and please don't say a human head!).

But at least I haven't jumped to an ontological (non)solution. Why do you think it requires one?

We are all blundering about in the dark (which is what makes the subject interesting), but one side - i.e. the physicalists - have persuaded themselves there is no real problem to solve.

No, I haven't.

Some academics on 'your' side go much further that you, and make out that consciousness is just an illusion. You realise that that approach is wrong, but you still tend to drift in that direction.

I don't think you understand what they mean by "illusion."

Dr. Susan Blackmore

We need to start by recognising that there is a problem here, and that all possible solutions should be on the table.

Oh, I agree. Now could you explain the solution offered by the ontological gambit here? Even just a glimpse of the solution?

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Oh, I agree. Now could you explain the solution offered by the ontological gambit here? Even just a glimpse of the solution?

~~ Paul

Well, we explore the idea that mental stuff is real, conserved (like charge) and has its own laws of interaction, both with itself and also with matter. Initially you start out without any laws, so yes, you fall into the empty explanation that you recognise. However, development would not end there.

It might be that seen in this new light, many phenomena and diseases would begin to constrain the properties of mental stuff.

This seems far more productive than inventing tortuous philosophies that try to side-step the puzzle of a purely physical basis for mental life.

The whole point is that in other areas of science, it is considered perfectly reasonable to pursue several alternative at the same time - string theory AND loop-quantum gravity - whereas non-physical explanations of consciousness never seem to be considered respectable enough to explore.

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

This seems far more productive than inventing tortuous philosophies that try to side-step the puzzle of a purely physical basis for mental life.

I guess tortuousness is in the eye of the beholder.

The whole point is that in other areas of science, it is considered perfectly reasonable to pursue several alternative at the same time - string theory AND loop-quantum gravity - whereas non-physical explanations of consciousness never seem to be considered respectable enough to explore.

That is because the explorers are not offering anything of substance! In what way is it anything more than an argument from personal incredulity?

Here's a great book:

Amazon.com: Lost Causes in and beyond Physics: R.F. Streater: Books


~~ Paul


~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Yes, but those "qualia as internally experienced" are simply a result of a physical process in the brain. Thus consciousness is part of the physically closed world.

You really need to stop flipping from one position to another. You said before that qualia is the very same thing as some appropriate physical process. Thus they cannot be a result of a physical process. X can cause Y, but X cannot cause X.

Why? The inner experience is just an inner behavior that is more difficult to quantify objectively. But this does make it immaterial, nor does it mean we won't be able to quantify it someday.

No! The "inner experience" is not a behaviour, that's what you would call the "outer experience" i.e the appropriate neurons firing. The "inner experience" is purely qualitative i.e it is not quantifiable or measurable.

If qualia/consciousness is the only thing/process in the Universe which is not quantifiable/measurable, then in what sense could it be said to be material?

For some reason, you have elevated the experiences going on in your head to a status that requires them to be ontologically different. I do not understand this.

If my consciousness and, say a table, are not ontologically different, then you understand something different by the word "ontology" then I do. A table is simply an object of consciousness. Consciousness itself is characterised by a mental life full of emotions, hopes frustrations, desires. It is in no way comparable to a table or any other physical thing.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

You really need to stop flipping from one position to another. You said before that qualia is the very same thing as some appropriate physical process. Thus they cannot be a result of a physical process. X can cause Y, but X cannot cause X.

I don't know what the difference is. The only thing that is "the very same thing as" a process is that process, but that tells us nothing about the effects of the process. Is a hailstone the very same thing as meteorology?

No! The "inner experience" is not a behaviour, that's what you would call the "outer experience" i.e the appropriate neurons firing. The "inner experience" is purely qualitative i.e it is not quantifiable or measurable.

What does it mean for something to be "purely qualitative" and how does one talk about such a thing?

If qualia/consciousness is the only thing/process in the Universe which is not quantifiable/measurable, then in what sense could it be said to be material?

I disagree that it is not measurable. In particular, you measure your own inner experiences.

If my consciousness and, say a table, are not ontologically different, then you understand something different by the word "ontology" then I do. A table is simply an object of consciousness. Consciousness itself is characterised by a mental life full of emotions, hopes frustrations, desires. It is in no way comparable to a table or any other physical thing.

So is it a different basic ontological existent? If so, then you must be a dualist. If not, then we agree.

~~ Paul