Metaphysical Speculations: Comments on a Steven Novella's piece

[eveshi]

Bernardo Kastrup comments on an article by Steven Novella:

Metaphysical Speculations: Comments on a Steven Novella's piece

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'd still like to see transmission theorists give a list of hypotheses that could falsify transmission theory. Bernardo says:

"What he fails to realize is that this is entirely consistent with the idea that the brain is a localization mechanism for consciousness: By reducing neuronal firings in certain areas of the localization mechanism, consciousness de-localizes, which is the OBE."

What could we discover that would not be easy to dismiss this way? What stops Bernardo from saying:

"What he fails to realize is that this is entirely consistent with the idea that the brain is a focusing mechanism for consciousness: By increasing neuronal firings in certain areas of the focusing mechanism, consciousness refocuses, which is the OBE."

or:

"What he fails to realize is that this is entirely consistent with the idea that the brain is a filtering mechanism for consciousness: By changing neuronal firings in certain areas of the filtering mechanism, consciousness filters differently, which is the OBE."

~~ Paul

[Craig Weiler]

Originally Posted by eveshi

Bernardo Kastrup comments on an article by Steven Novella:

Metaphysical Speculations: Comments on a Steven Novella's piece

I long ago came to the conclusion that Novella is simply irrelevant to the psi debate. He parrots hardcore materialist dogma while ignoring all evidence that contradicts his worldview.

[eveshi]

Novella's response:
NeuroLogica Blog Another Blogger Jumps Into the Dualism Frey

And Bernardo's reply:
Metaphysical Speculations: Novella's reply

[robbiehouston]

Lol I think Bernardo really put him in his place! Such a pleasant read. I especially loved the following:

To infer that A causes B from a correlation between A and B is only possible when, for all observed cases, B occurs after A occurs. If B occurs without A, even in a single confirmed case, then, at the very least, there are more than one causes for B and B does not ontologically depend exclusively on A. So if mind states do not always correlate with brain states, one can infer, under Occam's razor, that mind is not ontologically dependent on the brain; i.e. the brain does not cause the mind. To repeat a point I made in my original post: There is strong scientific evidence for mind states that indeed do not correlate to brain states. So if anything is to be scientifically inferred from current observations, I'd say it is that mind states are not caused (but merely modulated) by brain states

Novella should be called Nutella, cause that man is nuts!

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't think Novella claims that we currently have all the correlations between brain states and mental states.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

There is strong scientific evidence for mind states that indeed do not correlate to brain states. So if anything is to be scientifically inferred from current observations, I'd say it is that mind states are not caused (but merely modulated) by brain states.

Well, possibly that some mental states are not caused by brain states, and I'm not sure why you can jump to modulation. If there is no correlation between a brain state and a mental state, then we simply don't understand what causes the mental state. If the brain state modulated the mental state, then there would be correlation.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

So if mind states do not always correlate with brain states, one can infer, under Occam's razor, that mind is not ontologically dependent on the brain; i.e. the brain does not cause the mind.

You can infer no such thing. All you can say is that you don't completely understand how mental states work.

~~ Paul

[Scott]

Originally Posted by robbiehouston

Lol I think Bernardo really put him in his place! Such a pleasant read. I especially loved the following:

To infer that A causes B from a correlation between A and B is only possible when, for all observed cases, B occurs after A occurs. If B occurs without A, even in a single confirmed case, then, at the very least, there are more than one causes for B and B does not ontologically depend exclusively on A. So if mind states do not always correlate with brain states, one can infer, under Occam's razor, that mind is not ontologically dependent on the brain; i.e. the brain does not cause the mind. To repeat a point I made in my original post: There is strong scientific evidence for mind states that indeed do not correlate to brain states. So if anything is to be scientifically inferred from current observations, I'd say it is that mind states are not caused (but merely modulated) by brain states

Novella should be called Nutella, cause that man is nuts!

Wouldn't saying 'modulated' just be guilty of the same thing - except for the evidence supporting modulation or what is being modulated?

[sparky]

It seems to that me this definitely puts the psylocibin study argument to rest.

originally blogged by Dr. Novella:
Here we see that Kastrup’s clumsy and, dare I say, trite, superficial, and fallacious arguments about correlation not equaling causation are really cover for his true position and agenda – he believes that there is evidence for mental activity separate brain activity. He writes:

You can also watch the video embedded in his post for an explanation of his position. I will address his two main points, both of which are erroneous. He seems highly impressed by the fact that neuroscientific studies have shown that psilocybin decreases brain activity and causes a “mystical” experience, as if this contradicts the prediction that the brain correlates with the mind (so in reality he does not accept the correlation and that is the reason for his rejection of the brain-mind hypothesis, not his obvious straw man about correlation and causation). Kastrup’s conclusion, however, is hopelessly naive. There are many examples where inhibiting the activity in one part of the brain enhances the activity in another part of the brain through disinhibition. In fact the very study he cites for support concludes:

Unconstrained cognition is another way of saying disinhibition. The concept is simple – there are many brain areas all interacting and processing information. This allows for complex information processing but also slows down the whole process – slows down cognition. That is the price we pay for complexity. If, however, we inhibit one part of the brain we lose some functionality, but the other parts of the brain are unconstrained and free to process information and function more quickly.
The psilocybin study is a perfect example of this. The drug is inhibiting the reality testing parts of the brain, causing a psychadelic experience that is disinhibited and intense. This is similar to really intense dreams. You may have noticed that sometimes in dreams emotions and experiences can be more intense than anything experienced while awake. This is due to a decrease in brain activity in certain parts of the brain compared to the full waking state.
Kastrup seems to be completely unaware of the critical concept of disinhibition and therefore completely misinterprets the significance of the neuroscience research.

[sparky]

originally blogged by bernardo:
I am also somewhat surprised by the sheer amount of space he dedicates to ad homenen attacks on me, which dilutes his argument and the quality of the debate. While I agree that dancing on the edge of a personal attack does make a debate sharper and more interesting, Novella exaggerates on this to the point of making his position look desperate and weak, which was, in my view, unnecessary.

I really don't see where you get that?
OK, he reflects a few statements back at you, even uses the exact same language as you, so i do not see how this could be a problem.
Or maybe you are referring to the fact that he thinks your opinion of how the brain works is naive?
Well, from his pov. as a neurologist it almost must be so, right?

But i think it goes a bit further than that, your view of how brain activity should correlates with mental states is, in my opinion, so naive it shows its straw man nature.

[Bernardo]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I'd still like to see transmission theorists give a list of hypotheses that could falsify transmission theory. Bernardo says:

"What he fails to realize is that this is entirely consistent with the idea that the brain is a localization mechanism for consciousness: By reducing neuronal firings in certain areas of the localization mechanism, consciousness de-localizes, which is the OBE."

What could we discover that would not be easy to dismiss this way? What stops Bernardo from saying:

"What he fails to realize is that this is entirely consistent with the idea that the brain is a focusing mechanism for consciousness: By increasing neuronal firings in certain areas of the focusing mechanism, consciousness refocuses, which is the OBE."

or:

"What he fails to realize is that this is entirely consistent with the idea that the brain is a filtering mechanism for consciousness: By changing neuronal firings in certain areas of the filtering mechanism, consciousness filters differently, which is the OBE."

~~ Paul

I was on sabbatical from this forum but, hey, for you I decided to return, Paul!

The difficulty in falsifying the filter/transmission/localization hypotheses cannot be construe as evidence for their being false. Indeed, a correct hypothesis would be consistent with all correct empirical observations, wouldn't it? To address falsifiability, one could turn it around: What would be needed to falsify the brain-causes-consciousness hypothesis? If we falsify that, we increase the likelihood of the other hypotheses. So let me imagine a perfect scenario for falsifying materialism:

-- Stick volunteers in an fMRI where you measure at least two different signals (say, BOLD and ASL) correlated to brain metabolism;
-- Ask them to describe their conscious experiences as they lie in the scanner;
-- Inject them with some kind of chemical that shuts down parts of their brain;
-- Confirm through measurements that metabolism does not increase locally anywhere in the brain, only decreases;

If, then, they report conscious experiences rated as intense, complex, structured, and whose phenomenology cannot be attributed to any of their (ordinary) sense perceptions, while the fMRI confirms only decreases in brain activity, that would be pretty darn close to a perfect falsification of the brain-generates-the-mind hypothesis, wouldn't it?