Chalmers: Consciousness and its Place in Nature

[anonymous]

Here's an interesting paper by Chalmers.

Consciousness and its Place in Nature
by David J. Chalmers

pdf:
http://consc.net/papers/nature.pdf

google quick view html:
http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...f+&hl=en&gl=us

This paper has been mentioned before in the forum but I couldn't find a thread about it and I think it merits one.

Chalmers gives philosophical arguments against materialist explanations of consciousness. He seems to prefer monism as an explanation of consciousness and considers substance dualism (that consciousness and matter are separate substances) viable. However Chalmers also discusses other viable forms of dualism where consciousness is produced by physical phenomena.

These forms of physicalist dualism include property dualism (emergentism) a form of interactionist dualism or epiphenomenalism.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism

All varieties of emergentism strive to be compatible with physicalism, the theory that the universe is composed exclusively of physical entities, and in particular with the evidence relating changes in the brain with changes in mental functioning.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism is the theory in philosophy of mind that mental phenomena are caused by physical processes in the brain or that both are effects of a common cause, as opposed to mental phenomena driving the physical mechanics of the brain. The impression that thoughts, feelings or sensations cause physical effects, is therefore to be understood as illusory to some extent.

In the paper Chalmers goes through possible objections and answers to both of these natural explanations for consciousness.


On interactionist dualism (which he labels type d dualism) Chalmers writes:

The most familiar version of this sort of view is Descartes’ substance dualism (hence D for Descartes), on which there are separate interacting mental and physical substances or entities. But this sort of view is also compatible with a property dualism, on which there is just one sort of substance or entity with both physical and phenomenal fundamental properties, such that the phenomenal properties play an irreducible role in affecting the physical properties. In particular, the view is compatible with an “emergentist” view such as Broad’s, on which phenomenal properties are ontologically novel properties of physical systems (not deducible from microphysical properties alone), and have novel effects on microphysical properties (not deducible from microphysical principles alone). Such a view would involve basic principles of “downward” causation of the mental on the microphysical (hence also D for downward causation).
...
All this suggests that there is at least room for a viable interactionism to be explored, and that the most common objection to interactionism has little force. Of course it does not entail that interactionism is true. There is much that is attractive about the view of the physical world as causally closed, and there is little direct evidence from cognitive science of the hypothesis that behavior cannot be wholly explained in terms of physical causes. Still, if we have independent reason to think that consciousness is irreducible, and if we wish to retain the intuitive view that consciousness plays a causal role, then this is a view to be taken very seriously.

On epiphenomenalism, which he labels type e dualsim Chalmers writes:

Overall, I think that epiphenomenalism is a coherent view without fatal problems. At the same time, it is an inelegant view, producing a fragmented picture of nature, on which physical and phenomenal properties are only very weakly integrated in the natural world. And of course it is a counterintuitive view that many people find difficult to accept. Inelegance and counterintuitiveness are better than incoherence; so if good arguments force us to epiphenomenalism as the most coherent view, then we should take it seriously. But at the same time, we have good reason to examine other views very carefully.

On monism Chalmers writes:

Overall, type-F monism promises a deeply integrated and elegant view of nature. No-one has yet developed any sort of detailed theory in this class, and it is not yet clear whether such a theory can be developed. But at the same time, there appear to be no strong reasons to reject the view. As such, type-F monism is likely to provide fertile grounds for further investigation, and it may ultimately provide the best integration of the physical and the phenomenal within the natural world.

Chalmers rejects various types of materialism

Type-A materialism sometimes takes the form of eliminativism, holding that consciousness does not exist, and that there are no phenomenal truths. It sometimes takes the form of analytic functionalism or logical behaviorism, holding that consciousness exists, where the concept of “consciousness” is defined in wholly functional or behavioral terms (e.g., where to be conscious might be to have certain sorts of access to information, and/or certain sorts of dispositions to make verbal reports).

...

At a certain point, the debate between type-A materialists and their opponents usually comes down to intuition: most centrally, the intuition that consciousness (in a nonfunctionally defined sense) exists, or that there is something that needs to be explained (over and above explaining the functions). This claim does not gain its support from argument, but from a sort of observation, along with rebuttal of counterarguments. The intuition appears to be shared by the large majority of philosophers, scientists, and others; and it is so strong that to deny it, a type-A materialist needs exceptionally powerful arguments. The result is that even among materialists, type-A materialists are a distinct minority.
...
The most common form of type-B materialism holds that phenomenal states can be identified with certain physical or functional states. This identity is held to be analogous in certain respects (although perhaps not in all respects) with the identity between water and H2O, or between genes and DNA.15
...
By labeling these principles identities or necessities rather than laws, the view may preserve the letter of materialism; but by requiring primitive bridging principles, it sacrifices much of materialism’s spirit.

...
According to type-C materialism, there is a deep epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenal domains, but it is closable in principle. ... Nagel (1974) has suggested that just as the pre-Socratics could not have understood how matter could be energy, we cannot understand how consciousness could be physical, but a conceptual revolution might allow the relevant understanding. Churchland (1997) suggests that even if we cannot now imagine how consciousness could be a physical process, that is simply a psychological limitation on our part that further progress in science will overcome.

...
Ultimately, it seems that any type-C strategy is doomed for familiar reasons. Once we accept that the concept of consciousness is not itself a functional concept, and that physical descriptions of the world are structural-dynamic descriptions, there is simply no conceptual room for it to be implied by a physical description.

In the Conclusions section he explains the advantages of monism...

This view has elements in common with both materialism and dualism. From one perspective, it can be seen as a sort of materialism. If one holds that physical terms refer not to dispositional properties but the underlying intrinsic properties, then the protophenomenal properties can be seen as physical properties, thus preserving a sort of materialism. From another perspective, it can be seen as a sort of dualism. The view acknowledges phenomenal or protophenomenal properties as ontologically fundamental, and it retains an underlying duality between structural-dispositional properties (those directly characterized in physical theory) and intrinsic protophenomenal properties (those responsible for consciousness). One might suggest that while the view arguably fits the letter of materialism, it shares the spirit of antimaterialism.

... and he also writes that monism and two types of dualism are viable explanations of consciousness and are compatible with naturalism but not materialism.

As I see it, there are at least three prima facie acceptable alternatives to materialism on the table, each of which is compatible with a broadly naturalistic (even if not materialistic) worldview, and none of which has fatal problems.

I've tried to summarize the article to provide information on the subject of the article that will help readers decide if it might interest them and if they want to read it. But the article has much more depth than I can describe without pasting the entire article here so my summary is necessarily an incomplete explanation of Chalmer's article. Therefore, if you want to dispute something I've written in this post, please read the article and say if you dispute Chalmer's arguments and why, or if you think I've misrepresented Chalmers arguments please say what you think he is really saying.

Thanks

[eveshi]

Chalmers at his best. Highly recommendable.

[anonymous]

This paper helps me to make some sense of all the interest in self-directed neuroplasticity. Self-directed neuroplasticity is significant because it contradicts epiphenomenalism.

[sparky]

Originally Posted by anonymous

This paper helps me to make some sense of all the interest in self-directed neuroplasticity. Self-directed neuroplasticity is significant because it contradicts epiphenomenalism.

What is , in your opinion , the difference between neuroplasticity and self-directed neuroplasticity ?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by anonymous

This paper helps me to make some sense of all the interest in self-directed neuroplasticity. Self-directed neuroplasticity is significant because it contradicts epiphenomenalism.

How so?

Originally Posted by sparky

What is , in your opinion , the difference between neuroplasticity and self-directed neuroplasticity ?

That's the question, all right.

And sparky, what's up with spaces before punctuation?

~~ Paul

[sparky]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

How so?


That's the question, all right.

And sparky, what's up with spaces before punctuation?

~~ Paul

I am a member of the punctuation liberation front, we fight against the semi-oppression of punctuation marks.
No, seriously, i never had a formal training in typing and probably learned myself some bad habits.