Article on free will in Wired. Based on research.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

Even mathematical theories end up with axioms. If we can't accept the concepts such as personal free will, how can we accept any of maths or science - maybe our heads are filled with clockwork mechanisms that make logical falsehoods look like truth!

I'd be happy with a definition of free will that relied on carefully stated axioms.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

Let's take compatibilism first. It claims that determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. But this of course depends on what you mean by "determinism". If you mean that physical reality is governed by physical laws, or that all change in the world is brought about by the innate power of physical processes, then of course it is abundantly clear that free will is not compatible with determinism.

What is this free will of which you speak that is not compatible with determinism? You're still using the word in a particular way without defining it. You have an unstated definition in mind. I can certainly define a sort of free will that is compatible with determinism. In fact, I can define a whole family of free wills, depending on the field of inquiry. For example, the psychologist needs one definition while the law requires another.

If by "determinism" you mean that physical laws merely describe physical processes, and that causality is merely a conjunction of events like Hume argued, then free will is compatible with determinism.

I have no idea what Hume was talking about.

Libertarian? To quote mszlazak who in turn is quoting some anonymous author. "Imagine two parallel universes, identical in every detail, and imagine a man in each universe, identical in their character and knowledge and desires and everything else, standing in totally identical circumstances. Now imagine that one of these men chooses to kill his wife, but the other man chooses not to".

This author is claiming that those who subscribe to libertarian free will must agree that it is possible for one man to kill his wife but the other wouldn't. In that case I do not subscribe to libertarian free will.

But then what do you subscribe to? Either it is somehow possible for the two men to take different actions, or it is determined which action they will take. There is no logical room for anything else.

~~ Paul

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Where did I say we have "freewill"? Haven't I been asking for a definition?

Well I got the impression that you were opting for compatibilist 'free will'? (because you only seem to attack Libertarian freewill).

To solve any further confusion, using your preferred terminology (not mine) which one do you actually believe..

1. Compatibilism (soft determinism) - i.e. free will and determinism are compatible with each other

Or

2. Hard Determinism (Incompatiblism) - Determinism is true, freewill is an illusion

Choose one , so you can't move the goalposts from one to the other (Blackmore seems 2, at least in the above quote)

No, it doesn't. But apparently you are going to ignore everything I've proposed about the evolution of will, just so you can beat up on materialists.

What did you propose? The following?

'....I think there is an evolutionary advantage to having a feeling of will about performing actions, because then the results of the actions are "owned" by the individual and the individual will plan to improve future actions. I do not think this feeling of will has anything to do with libertarian free will. ...

Paul, it doesn't work IMHO...first you say 'feeling of will' (Hard Incompatibilism?) then you say 'will plan to improve future actions (Compatibilism?) .... it seems to me you are switching position as you please. I need to know which you believe.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Open Mind

Well I got the impression that you were opting for compatibilist 'free will'? (because you only seem to attack Libertarian freewill).

We could probably devise some coherent definition of a compatibilist form of free will, although it's pretty damn difficult. I don't need to subscribe to such a definition, however, because I really don't care. The concept of free will is just not that useful.

1. Compatibilism (soft determinism) - i.e. free will and determinism are compatible with each other

Or

2. Hard Determinism (Incompatiblism) - Determinism is true, freewill is an illusion

Choose one , so you can't move the goalposts from one to the other (Blackmore seems 2, at least in the above quote)

I can't choose between those two without knowing more. What sort of free will is meant in item (1)? A specific sort, or any old thing we care to define depending on the context? For example, a definition of free will in psychology would be different from one in the law.

Item (2) is really strange. What sort of free will is an illusion? Certainly not an informal one such as that required by the law. Or does it refer to some kind of specific, self-sustaining free will?

What did you propose? The following?

Yes.

Paul, it doesn't work IMHO...first you say 'feeling of will' (Hard Incompatibilism?) then you say 'will plan to improve future actions (Compatibilism?) .... it seems to me you are switching position as you please. I need to know which you believe.

I'm distinguishing between a feeling of will and free will. And you know why: Because I don't know what the definition of free will is. So reread my statement without tainting it with metaphysical baggage.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I'd be happy with a definition of free will that relied on carefully stated axioms.

~~ Paul

Maybe free will, and certain other characteristics of consciousness (appreciation of qualia, etc.) are equivalent to axioms!

In other words, unless a theory contains these 'axioms' (I know I am using the term a bit loosely) it describes a zombie universe in which nothing conscious can exist.

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

Maybe free will, and certain other characteristics of consciousness (appreciation of qualia, etc.) are equivalent to axioms!

In other words, unless a theory contains these 'axioms' (I know I am using the term a bit loosely) it describes a zombie universe in which nothing conscious can exist.

Well, it's pretty unsatisfying to consider them axioms. And in the case of libertarian free will, it's incoherent, so axiomatizing it doesn't help.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Well, it's pretty unsatisfying to consider them axioms. And in the case of libertarian free will, it's incoherent, so axiomatizing it doesn't help.

~~ Paul

Maybe they won't end up as 'axioms', but I think it is easy to start weakening the meaning of terms like free will. Perhaps we should refer to free will when we mean full free will as you grandma means it, and pseudo-free will for the watered down "organisms feel better if they think they have free will" type!

If libertarian free will is the common sense type (which I think it is) lets call it that. It is a shame to let these discussions descend into mere semantics.

In any case, constantly asking for definitions gets you nowhere. Here is a typical GOOGLE definition:

"the partial freedom of the agent, in acts of conscious choice, from the determining compulsion of heredity, environment and circumstance."

Clearly this definition gets you nowhere because it contains lots of words that also need (re)defining from a materialist point of view

David

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

What is this free will of which you speak that is not compatible with determinism?

I only mean mental causation. That is it is consciousness itself which is responsible for voluntary bodily movements. Thus if you mean by determinism that all change in the world is brought about by the innate power of physical processes, then by definition free will doesn't exist.

I have no idea what Hume was talking about.

He denied the existence of innate causal powers. When one snooker ball moves due to being hit by another, we tend to think it does this because of the power of the impact. The physical world makes things happen. But strictly speaking we do not see any innate causal powers. We simply see one ball hit another and the 2nd ball starts moving. Arguably we project this innate physical causality into the world.

But if there are no innate causal powers what makes the 2nd ball move? The answer is there need be nothing whatsoever. It's just the way the world is.

But then what do you subscribe to? Either it is somehow possible for the two men to take different actions, or it is determined which action they will take. There is no logical room for anything else.

It is determined by what?? I deny the physical world makes me choose. It is my psychological state which dictates what I choose to do.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

If libertarian free will is the common sense type (which I think it is) lets call it that. It is a shame to let these discussions descend into mere semantics.

Mere semantics? What is philosophy if not semantics?

Anyhoo, libertarian free will is an incoherent concept, so if that's the one we're going to use in this discussion, we're finished.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

I only mean mental causation. That is it is consciousness itself which is responsible for voluntary bodily movements. Thus if you mean by determinism that all change in the world is brought about by the innate power of physical processes, then by definition free will doesn't exist.

Yes, I agree that libertarian free will does not exist.

He denied the existence of innate causal powers. When one snooker ball moves due to being hit by another, we tend to think it does this because of the power of the impact. The physical world makes things happen. But strictly speaking we do not see any innate causal powers. We simply see one ball hit another and the 2nd ball starts moving. Arguably we project this innate physical causality into the world.

What an "innate" causal power?

It is determined by what?? I deny the physical world makes me choose. It is my psychological state which dictates what I choose to do.

How does this help? We're supposed to imagine two parallel universes, identical in every detail, including your psychological state. You would then make the same decision.

~~ Paul