Article on free will in Wired. Based on research.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

Well I'll be in the trader jacks in 35 mins in Stockton-on-Tees, England.

Lift a pint for us!

Can't believe you're all still going on about that checker board "illusion".

We are? I must be missing that delightful thread.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Yup, and that's a loaded word if I've ever heard one. Does compulsion include determinism?

If that's the best definition anyone can come up with, then there is no point to this conversation at all.

~~ Paul

Come on Paul, you criticise others for not having good/any definitions, so how do you define:

Free will
Consciousness
Pain experience

In particular, how do you avoid the problem of an infinite regress of definitions?

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

Come on Paul, you criticise others for not having good/any definitions, so how do you define:

Free will

I don't need to define this term, because I do not claim that I have it. Various compatibilist definitions are required in ethics and the law, but those would have to be defined based on a list of factors that were not present when the decision was made. These factors would be things like heavy coercion or brainwashing. This is a practical definition, not a philosophical one.

Consciousness

A name given to a set of brain processes.

Pain experience

A name given to a particular brain process.

In particular, how do you avoid the problem of an infinite regress of definitions?

I don't think it's avoidable with free will. The other two words are simply names for brain processes. They are not ontologically distinct entities.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Paul,

Yes, but you can't reasonably call everything we are discussing, "A name given to particular brain process" singular or plural! Besides, it second guesses the question as to whether these things are purely brain processes!

If you can't define your terms without assuming all you want to prove, why accuse Ian of the same thing?

Really, your definitions are useless - they don't even distinguish between pain and contentment or joy!

All of which seems to justify my view that we should just use these terms with their full normal meaning (without a definition) and invent extra terms for anything else (such as the word 'qualia').

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

Yes, but you can't reasonably call everything we are discussing, "A name given to particular brain process" singular or plural! Besides, it second guesses the question as to whether these things are purely brain processes!

Indeed, I was giving you the definitions I would use, since you asked "so how do you define ..." I have no idea how to come up with universal definitions that would be metaphysically neutral. That's why I keep asking you for your definition.

If you can't define your terms without assuming all you want to prove, why accuse Ian of the same thing?

I'm not presenting any proofs, am I? We could try to come up with metaphysically neutral definitions of consciousness and pain experience by enumerating a set of internal experiences that fall under those terms. That should be pretty safe, but incomplete.

Really, your definitions are useless - they don't even distinguish between pain and contentment or joy!

Sure they do. Pain is one set of brain processes, joy is another.

All of which seems to justify my view that we should just use these terms with their full normal meaning (without a definition) and invent extra terms for anything else (such as the word 'qualia').

The problem with the folk definitions is that they are metaphysically loaded (theory laden) and so we talk past one another because we assume different metaphysics.

For example, if someone says "Given my mental state ...", is he assuming a dualistic notion of mind, an idealistic one, or simply using the term as a name for a set of brain processes? Without knowing, you can't carry on a coherent philosophical conversation. You can certainly have an informal chit-chat about his mood, but that's not what we're doing here.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Paul,

OK - I tend to agree that formal proofs - as offered by Ian come unstuck for this reason. However, I might want to quibble as to who is to blame (so to speak) because I think this is another manifestation of the unreasonableness of the physicalist viewpoint.

I have said before that knock-down proofs in this area are always suspect because terms cannot be defined precisely enough.

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Sure they do. Pain is one set of brain processes, joy is another.


The problem with the folk definitions is that they are metaphysically loaded (theory laden) and so we talk past one another because we assume different metaphysics.
~~ Paul

Two different processes, one has the informational content "Pain is large", the other has the informational content "Joy is large". I just think the only reason that supporters of complete materialism are not just laughed out of court, is that their bizarre beliefs are well wrapped in obscurantist language.

The best way to debate here would be for you to say to Ian (say):

"Yes but I don't really think 'free will' as you conceive of it, exists - so your proof is meaningless. Free will is an illusion........"

That way, you stop arguing about semantics, and get your disagreements out into the open. Asking him for a definition that you know he cannot supply - because nobody can - just seems silly.

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

OK - I tend to agree that formal proofs - as offered by Ian come unstuck for this reason. However, I might want to quibble as to who is to blame (so to speak) because I think this is another manifestation of the unreasonableness of the physicalist viewpoint.

I believe Ian's proof has logical flaws. It has nothing to do with my viewpoint.

Two different processes, one has the informational content "Pain is large", the other has the informational content "Joy is large". I just think the only reason that supporters of complete materialism are not just laughed out of court, is that their bizarre beliefs are well wrapped in obscurantist language.

And yet you won't present a nonmaterialist definition of these terms. That certainly guarantees you won't be laughed out of court.

The best way to debate here would be for you to say to Ian (say):

"Yes but I don't really think 'free will' as you conceive of it, exists - so your proof is meaningless. Free will is an illusion........"

But that's not a flaw in his proof, it's just an opinion on my part. He is presenting a logical proof. Any refutation has to be in the form of flaws in the proof itself.

That way, you stop arguing about semantics, and get your disagreements out into the open. Asking him for a definition that you know he cannot supply - because nobody can - just seems silly.

We're arguing about a proof. A logical proof. How many times do I have to repeat this? If he cannot supply definitions of the terms used in his proof, then his proof is meaningless.

You want to avoid strict definitions of terms yet make assertions about those terms. It just doesn't work.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

And yet you won't present a nonmaterialist definition of these terms. That certainly guarantees you won't be laughed out of court.

I think the analogy is with fire - defining fire before you know about chemistry is meaningless and probably misleading. I suspect our knowledge of consciousness/spirit is at an equivalently rudimentary stage.

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

But that's not a flaw in his proof, it's just an opinion on my part. He is presenting a logical proof. Any refutation has to be in the form of flaws in the proof itself.

Well, if free will doesn't exist, a proof that depends on it goes up in smoke.

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

We're arguing about a proof. A logical proof. How many times do I have to repeat this? If he cannot supply definitions of the terms used in his proof, then his proof is meaningless.

As I say, you probably can't get a watertight proof because of the problem about definitions, which in turn boils down to the fact that you do not accept the normal meaning of 'free will'.

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

You want to avoid strict definitions of terms yet make assertions about those terms. It just doesn't work.
~~ Paul

Well, how did the ancients learn about fire (or almost any other phenomenon). They didn't start by requiring impossible (at that stage) definitions, which is exactly my point!

David

[Open Mind]

'.... The "freedom" of this choice is NOT determined to be an "illusion" by the quantum laws in the way that it is determined to be an illusion by the laws of classical theory. The two theoretical situations are fundamentally different in this respect! According to classical physics, the choice on the part of the experimenter about what he or she will do---about how he or she will act---is in principle fixed by the "known" (although now known to be false) physical laws, and we have causal closure of the physical. But this feature, Closure of Physical (CoP), does not carry over to quantum theory. Orthodox quantum theory, as it was created by the founders and was extended and rigorized by von Neumann, and as it is actually used and understood and empirically tested, DOES NOT ENTAIL CAUSAL CLOSURE OF THE PHYSICAL, EVEN MODULO STATISTICAL FACTORS. According to the orthodox principles there are interventions that are not controlled by any known laws, and thus CAN be, and in actual practice are treated as, determined by our conscious thoughts, feelings, and reasons.

This feature of quantum theory really should been brought out in this session, particularly because the philosophers and neuroscientists on the panel seemed not to appreciate that there is, with regard to this issue of the causal closure of the physical, a fundamental difference in principle between the causal psycho-physical structure of quantum mechanics and those intuitions and concepts that are in concordance with the notion of causal closure of physical illustrated by classical mechanics.....'

Physicist Henry Stapp
http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/Townes.txt

[Open Mind]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I don't need to define this term [free will] because I do not claim that I have it.

How sad, poor Paul doesn't have any free will ....... perhaps I can help you .....just use your free will to become a dualist. Paul it is not compulsory or written in the origin of the universe that Paul must be a materialist monist, you can use your free will and change opinion

Then most of the hard philosophical problems of free will dissolve.

Various compatibilist definitions are required in ethics and the law, but those would have to be defined based on a list of factors that were not present when the decision was made. These factors would be things like heavy coercion or brainwashing. This is a practical definition, not a philosophical one.

So you are saying we are Pinocchio puppets without control of our strings? How did a sense of 'conscience' evolve via natural selection? If, as you are suggesting, that actions are always based upon prior conditioning, what is the evolutionary advantage of 'conscience' unless we have a degree of free will?..... tell me how it evolved....or do I hear the sound of crickets?