James Randi Challenges Skeptiko’s Telepathic Dog

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I think I'm using it in the sense of weak emergence. Strong emergence is some philosophical gobbledegook having to do with irreducibility that I don't understand. If you can explain it to me, I'd appreciate it.

Strong emergence is simply the opposite of reductionism. The basic idea of reductionism is very simple. It is the belief that all aspects of complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts. It is the motions of these parts and how they interact together which explain the phenomenon concerned. For example, consider a clockwork clock. By looking at the components of that clock - namely the cogs, the springs, and the wheels - and how they all interrelate together, we can actually understand how the minute and hour clock hands move.

But imagine that when the minute and hour hands move that consciousness is produced. This would be a genuine new phenomenon which could not be derived from the internal components of the clock.

It's exactly the same for the brain. If the brain produces consciousness it is not reducible to the ultimate particles the brain is composed of. Invariably someone's going to ask how do I know since the brain is so incredibly complex. The arrangements and properties of the ultimate constituents of the brain are so incredibly complex that perhaps the brain as a whole might produce very surprising effects. Well yes, possibly the physical activity in our brains might be able to ultimate explain the totality of our behaviour.

But it can't explain the miraculous. Whatever properties the ultimate constituent particles of an object might have, they must be quantifiable and entail quantifiable effects i.e measurable. This is not to say they could not produce consciousness, a qualitative effect, but if they did, then that would be a new phenomenon coming into existence at a certain degree of complexity not derivable from these ultimate constituent particles. Quantifiable effects can only entail quantifiable phenomena.

Presumably this is why reductive materialists declare that consciousness is identical to either the actual biological material of the brain (identity theory) or is identical to what the brain does i.e the causal chains of events performed by brains (functionalism). They have to say that consciousness is identical to something which is measurable because if they acknowledge the existence of consciousness in its own right, then necessarily it is not reducible and therefore reductive materialism is false.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Topher

Nope, I have no such philosophical opposition. It would, certainly have made my life irritating, though, at the various times in my life that I made my living developing computer language processing systems such as interpreters if I had. I do, however, have a philosophical opposition to someone thinking that the term is meant literally rather than metaphorically -- that the interpreters do in any real way "understand" the code that they process or associate real "meaning" with it. They just react mechanically to their inputs and respond in a way that hopefully we, their users, understand and find meaningful.

This just comes down to whether we include in the definition of interpret that it has to involve understanding. I don't see why we should, but if you insist, then I agree we're talking about metaphorical interpretation. On the other hand, I've written many interpreters myself, and I never thought of them as metaphorical. They are interpreting a code and performing actions based on that code. Is there a nonmetaphorical term for that process?

And no, I do not assume you think that -- but it is what you were saying.

You said "The literal meaning of "interpret" is to understand or take meaning from a symbolic representation or to translate language." I was pointing out that a ribosome translates a language and so falls under your literal definition. Does translation also necessarily imply understanding?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

Strong emergence is simply the opposite of reductionism. The basic idea of reductionism is very simple. It is the belief that all aspects of complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts. It is the motions of these parts and how they interact together which explain the phenomenon concerned. For example, consider a clockwork clock. By looking at the components of that clock - namely the cogs, the springs, and the wheels - and how they all interrelate together, we can actually understand how the minute and hour clock hands move.

If reductionism says that we can explain the principles of operation of a system by explaining the operation of its parts, that does not imply that we can understand a specific, existing system by analyzing its components. If the system includes random factors, for example, we would not be able to predict the system from its parts, even though we can describe the operation of a family of these systems in probabilistic terms.

But imagine that when the minute and hour hands move that consciousness is produced. This would be a genuine new phenomenon which could not be derived from the internal components of the clock.

Why not? It sounds like you are assuming some sort of dualistic notion of this consciousness that arises.

But it can't explain the miraculous. Whatever properties the ultimate constituent particles of an object might have, they must be quantifiable and entail quantifiable effects i.e measurable. This is not to say they could not produce consciousness, a qualitative effect, but if they did, then that would be a new phenomenon coming into existence at a certain degree of complexity not derivable from these ultimate constituent particles. Quantifiable effects can only entail quantifiable phenomena.

I have no idea why you think this.

Presumably this is why reductive materialists declare that consciousness is identical to either the actual biological material of the brain (identity theory) or is identical to what the brain does i.e the causal chains of events performed by brains (functionalism). They have to say that consciousness is identical to something which is measurable because if they acknowledge the existence of consciousness in its own right, then necessarily it is not reducible and therefore reductive materialism is false.

No one knows what it means to "acknowledge the existence of consciousness in its own right," so that is why scientists are unlikely to do it. What are the properties of the existent that we would acknowledge?

~~ Paul

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

If reductionism says that we can explain the principles of operation of a system by explaining the operation of its parts, that does not imply that we can understand a specific, existing system by analyzing its components. If the system includes random factors, for example, we would not be able to predict the system from its parts, even though we can describe the operation of a family of these systems in probabilistic terms.

The whole of physical reality is random. Randomness need not imply unpredictability. On the other hand chaos theory will entail that many things are completely unpredictable -- but that's just not interesting. Anyway I explained what reductionism means. I thought you might have found it easier to understand than something like my proof for mental causation. My mistake!

Why not? It sounds like you are assuming some sort of dualistic notion of this consciousness that arises.

I don't think I'm assuming anything apart from the notion that consciousness i.e phenomenological consciousness, exists. I don't know if you think such an assumption entails dualism.

I have no idea why you think this.

{shrugs}

No one ever seems to understand what I'm talking about when I discuss such things -- or at least materialists don't. But you asked me to explain. I have tried to do so to the best of my ability. I can do no more.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

The whole of physical reality is random. Randomness need not imply unpredictability. On the other hand chaos theory will entail that many things are completely unpredictable -- but that's just not interesting. Anyway I explained what reductionism means. I thought you might have found it easier to understand than something like my proof for mental causation. My mistake!

Chaos theory says that systems may be unpredictable by any conceivable computer. They are predictable in principle, unless there are random factors. You are right that randomness is unescapable in reality, which means that we cannot predict the behavior of a system from its components nor the exact components from the behavior. So what does this leave for reductionism to mean? Only that we can describe a system, in principle, by building a model from its components.

So you're not going to make another effort to explain reductionism to me?

For example, consider a clockwork clock. By looking at the components of that clock - namely the cogs, the springs, and the wheels - and how they all interrelate together, we can actually understand how the minute and hour clock hands move.

Now consider the weather. Can we understand it by looking at all the atoms in the atmosphere?

I don't think I'm assuming anything apart from the notion that consciousness i.e phenomenological consciousness, exists. I don't know if you think such an assumption entails dualism.

Exists as a concept, as a complex behavior, or as a separate existent?

~~ Paul

[Psibeliever]

I came across this forum while surfing, so I'd like to jump in with my criticisms of Randi's challenge.

First of all, the prize is NOT a million dollars; it's a bond, but, as far as I know, Randi has never said who issued it. If it's a defunct company like Enron, then the bond will be worthless.

Second, and in line with what many people say, he has a biased agenda, and this will color any analysis.

The second point leads to the third, namely, that the rules don't make sense and are prejudicial to the applicant. The rules say that no scientific judging is necessary, the Foundation gets to use the data freely, and the applicant gives up all legal rights - even if the Foundation has done him wrong. IOW, he will always have the upper hand in debunking any applicant's claim.

Last, but certainly not least, consider how Randi responds to those who raise uncomfortable questions or disagree with him. From just a brief perusal of this page, it seems that Randi wants to show that, even if dowsers can find water, it doesn't matter because there's lots of water underground. IOW, if they succeed, they still fail.

[Venom]

More lame excuses for people like Alex Tsakiris NOT to take the MDC.

Cognitive dissonance and post-hoc rationnalisations are always fascinating reads. People can make up so many stuff in other to justify failure, even failure to apply.

Amazing.

[Psibeliever]

Well, is it a million dollars or is it a bond? If it's a bond, as seems to be the case, who issued it? Randi & the JREF never disclosed that.

This is something people should apply for???

[Venom]

Originally Posted by Psibeliever

Well, is it a million dollars or is it a bond? If it's a bond, as seems to be the case, who issued it? Randi & the JREF never disclosed that.

This is something people should apply for???

I don't know about this bond story (and frankly I don't care), but anyway , the parapsychologists like Alex Tsakiris (science philanthropist ) should apply for the greater good of science.

So what? Next point please...

[Psibeliever]

Well, if the bond is worthless, why would anyone apply?

In any case, applying for it proves or disproves nothing. As the JREF says, Randi will remain the sole judge and juror. Even fellow skeptic like Ray Hyman says the challenge makes no sense from a scientific point of view.

So, in the end, the challenge is meaningless - even to skeptics.