Rational, evidence-based, non-materialist model of mind-brain interaction

[Maaneli]

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Hi Maaneli,

I will reply in two separate posts to keep the issues clean. Here, I will comment on the QM part, leaving the philosophy part (i.e. Realism vs Idealism) to my next post.

OK.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Sure would be curious to look at the references.

OK. Below are some.

Since the only unified, mathematically precise and formally consistent formulations of the quantum description of natural processes are Bohmian mechanics and GRW-like theories, if one chooses the first alternative one has to accept the existence of a preferred reference frame, while in the second case one is not led to such a drastic change of position with respect to relativistic concepts but must accept that the ensuing theory—even though only in a presently non-testable manner—disagrees with the predictions of quantum mechanics and acquires the status of a rival theory with respect to it.
Collapse Theories (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

(See slide 9)
http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~tumulka...st/tumulka.pdf

[quant-ph/0506115] Generalizations of Quantum Mechanics

[1103.1236] Testing spontaneous localization theories with matter-wave interferometry

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Colbeck and Renner proved last year that no extension to pure QM can improve the accuracy of predictions. Here is the paper I have in mind: No extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power : Nature Communications : Nature Publishing Group
They basically claim to prove that QM really is complete (if you can chose measurement settings freely, which is a very reasonable assumption). Here is a passage that specifically deals with the de Broglie-Bohm approach you are taking in your post:

('Assumption FR' is the assumption that measurement settings can be chosen freely)

So, to what extent does the violation of the FR assumption reduce the relevance of your argument?

First, let me make clear that I am not just talking about dBB when I talk about nonlocal realist versions of QM. I am also talking about stochastic mechanics and dynamical collapse models (the latter of which doesn't require any hidden variables).

Second, the Colbeck-Renner work does not invalidate either dBB or stochastic mechanics, precisely because of the violation of FR, as they say. Nor does it invalidate dynamical collapse models (which explicitly modify the equations of QM).

Violation of FR also occurs in classical physics (because classical physics is fundamentally deterministic, e.g. particles and fields with deterministic trajectories). So violation of FR is certainly not something novel to nonlocal HV theories. Also, I should point out that Colbeck and Renner are taking FR as literally true, whereas in classical physics theories and nonlocal HV theories like dBB and stochastic mechanics, it is taken to be true *for all practical purposes*. The reason being simply that it's too difficult in practice to actually calculate future measurement settings from the N-particle deterministic equations of motion. In other words, FR is an effectively valid in the usage of dBB and stochastic mechanics to make empirical predictions.

In sum, the violation of FR implied by dBB and stochastic mechanics does not in any way reduce the relevance of my argument.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Same question of the Colbeck-Renner work.

See above.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

In addition, I thought Bohm himself has explicitly stated that his HV formulation of QM was deliberately made to make the exact same predictions as standard QM (see: David Bohm (1957), 'Causality and Chance in Modern Physics')...?

Yes, it was, but I'm not sure what you're trying to prove with this. That's what Bohm intended, but it turned out to allow for different predictions when P =/= |psi|^2. Bohm actually showed this first in 1952/1953, and it was later generalized by Valentini and others in the 1990's and 2000's.

(See the section "Quantum Randomness")
Bohmian Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Originally Posted by Bernardo

You say this very definitely and strongly, and I clearly understand it is your sincere view. But is it fair to say this represents the mainstream position in physics today? Your argument is based on the de Broglie-Bohm formulation.

Not among the mainstream physics community, but I don't think that's relevant, any more than is the mainstream psychology community's opinion of parapsychology research. Because in both cases, the mainstreamers are simply ignorant of the literature. However, if you talk to physicists who have expertise in quantum foundations (including opponents of HV theories), most of them will agree that "the empirical predictions of standard QM turn out to be a special case of the dynamics of these hidden variables" is completely correct *within the context of nonlocal contextual hidden variables theories*. In other words, if you analyze the empirical predictions of said hidden variable theories, the empirical predictions of standard QM come out as a special case. As someone who is part of this community, I don't think this is considered a controversial claim by any means within the quantum foundations community.

Also, my argument is not based just on dBB, but also stochastic mechanics (which can be considered a more fundamental theory than dBB, because it derives the Schroedinger equation which dBB takes as given).

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Yet here is what none less than David Deutsch said of it (de Broglie-Bohm entails hidden variables in the form of 'pilot waves'):

"pilot-wave theories are parallel-universe theories in a state of chronic denial." (David Deutsch, 'Comment on Lockwood,' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, 1996)

In other words, he is using Occam's razor against de Broglie-Bohm and implying the many-worlds interpretation of Everett is simpler and sufficient, without hidden variables. Hugh Everett himself made the same criticism of Bohm years earlier, in his own thesis.

Yes, I'm very familiar with Duetsch's comment. However, there are a few problems with it.

First, Occam's razor is arguably not a reliable dictum when constructing physical theories. In many cases in the history of physics, the mathematically simpler physical theories turned out to be empirically wrong (there are numerous examples of this both in classical physics and high energy particle physics).

Second, Deustch doesn't tell you that his assumption that MWI is empirically adequate is actually highly controversial within the quantum foundations community. In fact, there is still no consensus yet on whether MWI even makes coherent sense of probabilities, whether in a frequentist or Bayesian framework, let alone make any empirically adequate predictions (Everett's own frequentist justification for probabilities in MWI has since been highly criticized). By contrast, there is a consensus that dBB and stochastic mechanics make sense of probabilities and make empirically adequate predictions.

Third, Deustch has never appreciated or recognized the arguable problems with the proposed ontology of MWI. In MWI, all that exists is the wavefunction. So the ontology of the world we experience is supposed to be derived from the wavefunction. However, the wavefunction doesn't live in 3-D space (which is the world we experience), but rather 3N-D space, where N is the number of particles. Moreover, there is no mathematical way to decompose the wavefunction into waves just living in 3D-space. This is arguable a serious problem, because by not being able to do this, the MWI ontology does not yet explain something as basic as the 3D world we experience around us (e.g. people, tables, chairs, etc., moving around in 3D space). BTW, this point was made originally not by me, but by the philosopher of physics Tim Maudlin and the quantum foundations physicists Sheldon Goldstein:

Can the world be only wave-function? Tim Maudlin on Vimeo

By contrast, it is generally agreed upon that the ontology of dBB and stochastic mechanics can account for the 3D world we experience. The reason is that the particles in these two theories (which are taken to be the fundamental constituents of tables, chairs, people, etc.) are taken to live in 3D space, even though the fields guiding these particles live in the high dimensional configuration space.

Fourth, Deustch doesn't tell you that dBB theory allow for nonequilbrium distributions (which MWI does not), and that nonequilibrium distributions imply new physics, e.g. 'sub-quantum' measurements and superluminal signaling. So it truly is a different physical theory from MWI and allows for new predictions. The same is also true of stochastic mechanics.

Fifth, Deustch's comments obviously have no relevance to dynamical collapse models, so what do you say about them?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

There is a lot more criticism of de Broglie-Bohm by many others, including a sharp attack by Brown & Wallace ('Solving the measurement problem: de Broglie-Bohm loses out to Everett,' Foundations of Physics 35, 2005). I know Valentini (who you referred to) denies that, but the point I want to establish is that there is nothing like consensus around the particular formulation you're presenting as the flag-carrier of Realism. Is it a fair assessment?

Yes, I know that paper very well. The points I made above are part of the rebuttals made to Brown & Wallace. Also, the views of Brown and Wallace about dBB are not the majority views in the quantum foundations community, as far as I know (and this is my field of specialty). As I said, many quantum foundationalists are skeptical that MWI even makes probabilistic sense on its own terms. Also, I should add that Brown and Wallace's arguments don't apply to stochastic mechanics, because in stochastic mechanics, the Schroedinger equation and wavefunction are derived and not fundamental. Brown and Wallace are not very familiar with stochastic mechanics (I know this from personal conversations with them), and it is noteworthy that they've never applied their arguments to stochastic mechanics.

Let me also stress again that I'm not presenting dBB as "the flag-carrier" of realism. I am also holding up stochastic mechanics and dynamical collapse models as equally valid (or in some cases more valid) examples of realist versions of quantum theory.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

If a non-local HV formulation makes different predictions than QM, as you argued, then yes.

As in, you would abandon Idealism?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

But that assertion contradicts several other mainstream references I am familiar with (including Bohm's own words). So I will wait for your comments on the above.

Yes, you can always find 'mainstreamers' (in the quantum foundations community to be exact) who will give minority contrarian views. But that doesn't prove anything IMO. It just means you can't evaluate who's actually right and who's actually wrong until you learn enough about the physics and philosophy to assess their arguments on your own.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Here you seem perhaps to contradict yourself. You're acknowledging my claim that HV extensions are unnecessary as far as empirical observations. But if they do make predictions that differ from classical QM, then naturally that should not be the case. Correct?

No, I think you're misunderstanding the logic of what I wrote. I'm saying that, *as far as existing empirical observations go*, these HV extensions make all the same predictions as standard QM. The new predictions suggested by these HV extensions involving nonequilibrium are just either very difficult to empirically test in practice (beyond our current technology at the moment) or very unlikely to be observed by accident on earth or in nearby regions of the universe.

To elaborate, making cosmological observations of the cosmic microwave background radiation that reveal what happened a few seconds or Planck seconds after the Big Bang (to see if there was nonequilibrium) is still well beyond our technological capabilities (though physicists are still working towards such observational precision with the COBE, WMAP, and PLANCK satellites). Doing a quantum interference experiment with an object with a mass equal to a virus or animal cell (to see self-gravitation effects from the hidden variables that differ from what you would predict to see in standard QM with self-gravitation) is also very far beyond current technology (the masses we can do quantum interference experiments with right now are around 10^4 AMU, which is 10 million times smaller than the mass of a virus). Seeing a random fluctuation of hidden variables out of the equilibrium state is also physically possible (and likely to have occurred somewhere at some point in the universe's history, under the assumptions of these HV theories), but an extremely rare event for statistical reasons (essentially as rare as watching a box of uniformly distributed gas molecules spontaneously cluster into a corner of the box).

But, I will stress that the fact that these predictions are difficult to test at the moment with our current technology does not invalidate those predictions, nor does it mean that these theories aren't physically different from standard QM.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Again, this seems to contradict what you said before. Here you say not only that non-local HV models (de Broglie-Bohm, I assume) make predictions that differ from QM, but that these different prediction have been confirmed by experiment?

No, that's not at all what I said. Saying that "HV models ... all make empirically testable predictions that have been confirmed by experiments thus far" is not the same as saying "HV models ... all make NEW empirically testable predictions that have been confirmed by experiments thus far". Let me say it this way - these nonlocal HV models (dBB and stochastic mechanics) make empirically testable predictions for well-known systems like the energy spectrum of the hydrogen atom, the average values of observables, the correlations between entangled photons and electrons, etc. These also happen to be systems that standard QM makes predictions for, and it happens that for P = |psi|^2 in the HV models the predictions for these systems are identical to those of standard QM and have all been experimentally confirmed. But these are obviously still predictions from the HV models, and they are not somehow secondary to the predictions derived from standard QM for these systems. In fact, these predictions are derived independently from the logic of standard QM.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Maaneli, don't get me wrong on the above. I am pretty confident you have good, coherent substantiation for the position you are taking. My goal in pushing back a bit was to show that, in physics today, there is no consensus around a Realist extension for pure QM (which is itself neither local nor realist).

I think you've misunderstood where I'm coming from. Yes, I am partial to realist and in particular hidden variable theories and have reasons for being so, but my point here isn't to defend any one nonlocal realist theory of QM as the correct theory, or to claim that there is a consensus around a particular realist extension (it doesn't matter if there is or isn't right now). My point right now is just to show you that there are self-consistent nonlocal realist versions of QM that are consistent with all existing empirical observations, and which make new empirical predictions, thereby showing that they are not merely 'mathematical philosophy' and that the jump to Idealism based on your assumptions about QM are, with all due respect, not valid (or at least highly premature).

Originally Posted by Bernardo

The layman's view of reality as something separate from his own mind, and in which causal influences propagate locally like billiard balls bouncing off the edges of a billiard table, has been consistently and systematically undermined by a series of experiments around quantum entanglement that began with Alan Aspect et. al. in 1981 (see: Bell test experiments - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). There are always questions, but these experiments have all been extremely consistent in progressively undermining key intuitions of locality and realism. I believe it's fair to say that Realism is in retreat for several years now.

I'm quite familiar with with all those experiments, and yes, they undermine key intuitions of locality and realism, but I don't think it's fair to say that realism is in 'retreat'. What these experiments are showing us simply is that our classical intuitions of reality are not generally valid. To use an analogy, before Galilei and Newton, the main physical intuition of reality that people had (academics as well as layman's) was Aristotelian. But I think it would be perverse to say that the experiments of Galilei and Newton which undermined people's Aristotelian intuitions about reality therefore also undermined realism or put realism 'in retreat'.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Realism is not dead, but it is legitimate, in my view, given the consistent direction of the experimental evidence, to entertain non-realist possibilities seriously. This is what I did in my paper and I think it was scientifically and philosophically sound and honest.

So I still think the 'non-realist' possibilities you consider are highly premature, but I'm willing to see what you've done with them because, hey, you never know.

[Maaneli]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

I got it from Stapp's articles and books. He takes a process philosophy perspective on QM and reality. So I believe Stapp also thinks there is a contextual version of QM without human consciousness.

That's not enough elaboration, Mark. You say that I'm misrepresenting the situation regarding what constitutes a measurer in standard QM (i.e. a CCD camera), so can you explain what specifically in Stapp's work supports your opinion?

[Bernardo]

Maaneli,

Thanks for the extensive and elaborate reply and references. I will certainly look into a lot of those going forward; there seems to be a lot of good stuff there to have fun with. Below, I will not comment on everything you said because I think we both already drew out most of what we wanted from each other; sufficiently to make our respective cases and understand where/why we may ultimately differ.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Not among the mainstream physics community, but I don't think that's relevant, any more than is the mainstream psychology community's opinion of parapsychology research. Because in both cases, the mainstreamers are simply ignorant of the literature.

I certainly don't disagree with this, as someone who holds a position that is not mainstream. So yes, I concur.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

"the empirical predictions of standard QM turn out to be a special case of the dynamics of these hidden variables" is completely correct *within the context of nonlocal contextual hidden variables theories*.

Got it. Under the premise that HV is correct, then QM can be shown to be a special case. I have no problems accepting that.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

In MWI, all that exists is the wavefunction. So the ontology of the world we experience is supposed to be derived from the wavefunction. However, the wavefunction doesn't live in 3-D space (which is the world we experience), but rather 3N-D space, where N is the number of particles. Moreover, there is no mathematical way to decompose the wavefunction into waves just living in 3D-space. This is arguable a serious problem, because by not being able to do this, the MWI ontology does not yet explain something as basic as the 3D world we experience around us (e.g. people, tables, chairs, etc., moving around in 3D space).

This is an excellent argument against MWI. I am on record disagreeing with MWI, so you've just given me an extremely simple and compelling new argument.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

As in, you would abandon Idealism?

No; as in conceding that there are non-local HV articulations that are more than mathematical philosophy, even though the different empirical predictions they make are currently not realizable in practice, as you mentioned.

I will preamble my reasoning for sticking to Idealism with your own words:

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Yes, you can always find 'mainstreamers' (in the quantum foundations community to be exact) who will give minority contrarian views. But that doesn't prove anything IMO. It just means you can't evaluate who's actually right and who's actually wrong until you learn enough about the physics and philosophy to assess their arguments on your own.

I fully agree. Therefore, based on my admittedly limited understanding of the bewildering variety of formulations and interpretations of QM today in physics, and all the polemic around them, particularly with regards to the measurement problem and entanglement, I cannot help but think to see a clear trend whereby many reasonable intuitions about realism are being progressively invalidated. I also cannot help but feel that, when all the noise dies down and the dust settles, the one thing that always seems to come out intact is classical QM a la Bohr.

I acknowledge the effort of many, yourself included, to carve out new theoretical ground wherein Realism can hypothetically find sanctuary. But I will side with actual empirical evidence, as opposed to a potential for future empirical evidence. In other words, I will side with the trend I see in palpable empirical results today, given that empirical tests that could potentially come out in favor of realism are currently not realizable, as you acknowledge below:

Originally Posted by Maaneli

The new predictions suggested by these HV extensions involving nonequilibrium are just either very difficult to empirically test in practice (beyond our current technology at the moment) or very unlikely to be observed by accident on earth or in nearby regions of the universe ... But, I will stress that the fact that these predictions are difficult to test at the moment with our current technology does not invalidate those predictions, nor does it mean that these theories aren't physically different from standard QM.

Having said the above, I applaud what you and your colleagues are doing. Because Realism is so ingrained, we absolutely need to exhaust it. So your work, in my view, will be successful either way: Either you will prove that Realism is true, or you will show through exhaustion that we must entertain a different possibility despite the intuitive abhorrence that many feel for it.

For now, I still feel that Idealism is the most natural, simplest, and most self-evident route to take, based not only on physics but philosophy and personal experience too, and in view of the relative contrivance I personally perceive in the alternatives.

Cheers, Bernardo.

[larry4444]

Originally Posted by eveshi

The idea that (illusory) individuality may be a side-effect of consciousness' endeavor to become self-aware is an interesting one. However, one thing I don't understand about philosophies that hold the view that there is some sort of ideal state of mind, and that it is the goal of existence to reach this state, is why this state has to be reached in the first place and isn't already present.

Why isn't the universal consciousness already self-aware? Why aren't people already in Nirvana? Why aren't people already aware of their oneness with Brahman etc.? Why does consciousness have to go through imperfect states (where it is deluded, suffering etc.) at all before it can reach the ideal state? Has it always been in an imperfect state and simply not yet reached its goal to break out of this state? Or was there a time where is was not in an imperfect state, but in the ideal state? If so, what could possibly have been its reason to abandon the ideal state in favor of an imperfect and deluded state?

Any ideas? (This is a question to all, not only to Bernardo.)

Btw: Great discussion, guys.

In the Soto zen school as well as some other schools, they come from a place of "already enlightened" and the practice is to realize/remember that - sort of a remedial education. In other words we are - already in nirvana.
Here's something I wrote in response to Bernardo but didn't send that may apply:
: I see the ego(complex) on a continuum with the Self. When I (my awareness) let go of my narcissistic identification with myself/ego and move along the continuum towards the Self I feel more “real, authentic, genuine, insightful, free . . . and not so concerned about protecting my limited identities/personas, like remembering something I had forgotten that puts everything in perspective - but the experience is not a loss of self but, like one of my Buddhists teacher says, “remembering who you really are”.

Of course this doesn't prove survival but it provides a view from which it seems plausable.

[Maaneli]

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Now the second and final part:



When you ask for a physical ontology, you mean something that makes the wave functional an objective phenomenon (psi-ontic), as opposed to a mere epistemic intrument of prediction, correct? I will assume this.

I mean something in the theory that corresponds to what fundamentally composes the stuff of the world (i.e. atoms, tables, chairs, people, clouds, planets, stars, etc.). One could use an ontic wavefunction as the physical ontology (i.e. atoms, tables, chairs, etc. would then just be pieces of wavefunction), but one could have other things instead (e.g. point particles or a continuous mass density in spacetime). My point about standard QM is that it doesn't have anything in its math that can serve as a comprehensible ontology for the world we experience (as I explained in my previous post, the wavefunction in configuration space doesn't really work). And the Heisenberg Copenhagen interpretation doesn't have ANY ontology! It's completely moot on the question of what actually exists and composes the world. Bohr's interpretation (which is different from Copenhagen, BTW) also lacks an ontology.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

My claim then is that you're begging the question. The ontological ground you're looking for assumes Realism, instead of requiring it. You're looking for something because you're assuming it must be there. What you'd have to show is why that something must be there in the first place; why the assumption. Under Idealism, there is no reason to even miss the ontological ground you seem to be referring to. The wave function just models the probabilities of which path the flow of experience will take.http://forum.mind-energy.net/newrepl...reply&p=110275

But in idealism there still seems to be an ontology (a mind ontology). You say that the wavefunction just models "the probabilities of which path the flow of experience will take", but I find this statement ambiguous on a few levels.

First, what do you mean by a "path"? A path in spacetime? Or something else? If the latter, does this require any mathematical reformulation of the Born rule (i.e. P(x,t) = |psi(x,t)|^2)?

Second, why should the wavefunction (this abstract mathematical wave in configuration space) know anything about the probabilities about which 'path' the flow of experience will take, and why should it model it correctly? Are you simply taking this to be a postulate with no deeper explanation (as it is in standard QM)? Also, in what dimensional space does the flow of experience live in? 3D space or configuration space?

Third, what's happening to the 'flow of experience' in between measurement events? Is it in a superposition state of some kind?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

There is nothing vague in standard QM as far as its powers of prediction. It predicts everything observed with unheard-of accuracy. Isn't that correct?

Well, it runs into problems when dealing with the quantum mechanics of the Big Bang singularity, but aside from that, yes. However, that's not what I'm arguing against.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

There is nothing in logic, Aristotelian or otherwise, that requires the ontology you are asking for (an ontology outside experience). Only experience needs to be logically explained.

I didn't mean to say that logic requires a physicalist ontology. Rather, that logic requires that a fundamental theory of the world have SOME ontology. Your idealist version of QM doesn't seem to be clear about what the ontology is.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

When you say that "A fundamental physical theory of the world needs an ontology," the word physical seems to assume Realism, which is the point in dispute.

Right, take out the word 'physical', that was a slip. As I said, I would still insist that a fundamental physical theory of the world needs an ontology, if it is to make any sense.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Bohr once said: "There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature." (my emphasis) (See: Niels Bohr (2001), 'Reflections on Subject and Object,' page 291).

Yes, I know this quote. This is just Bohr making authoritative claims without any evidence (which he did quite often), so it holds no weight with me.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Oh, this may be causing us to talk past each other a bit. In philosophy, Idealism is the antithesis of Realism. A couple of links:

Realism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Idealism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For the specific theme of this thread, the difference is as such:

-- Under Realism, our subjective experiences are generated by our brains based on signals from an external reality that exists outside and independent of mind. So Realism acknowledges subjective experience and an external world that can never be directly accessed (to access it means to experience it);

-- Under Idealism, only subjective experience is acknowledged, not a forever-inaccessible external world.

I don't think it's accurate to say that idealism is the antithesis of realism in philosophy (at least that's not exactly true in philosophy of science), but OK, if that's all you mean by that, I'll go with it.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Let me put it this way: On what basis did you assume that minds are separate, thereby requiring a 'conspiracy' of mind to create a seemingly objective world?

Because that's how it appears to be, given all of our experiences with conscious minds, as I explained before.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Well, that is the whole point of the paper I wrote, and which initiated this thread. It systematically addresses each and every point you raised above. Have a look at it.

Alright, will take a look.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Depth psychology is the psychology of the unconscious, initiated by people like William James and Sigmund Freud in the late 19th Century, and further developed by Carl Jung in the early 20th century. There are many new developments in depth psychology today, and several different schools. The Jungian school is my favorite. All schools agree that our conscious minds (your mode of consciousness as you read this) are just the 'tips of the iceberg,' if you will, of broad mental dynamics of which we are not ordinarily conscious, but which influence our passions and behaviors. For instance, someone suffering from obsession does not know why he or she needs to act in this or that pointless way, but he or she cannot control it. The drive for the behavior is unconscious (the person doesn't know where the behavior is coming from, or why it is there), but it's manifestation is conscious (the person is well aware of his or her resulting behavior).

Ah, I see. To what extent is this school of thought scientifically supported though? My understanding was that Jung and Freud didn't not take a very scientific approach to their ideas.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

There is dispute regarding whether the unconscious is brain-based (which is the mainstream position) or non-local and trans-personal (which is Jung's and my position). Many people seek a physical basis for a non-local unconscious in QM and variations. As an Idealist, I don't: I see the unconscious as fundamental (an ontological primitive, similarly to the way super-strings are seen as ontological primitives), and QM as just a way to capture the regularities of its dynamics.

OK, but as I've expressed, I find your reasons for being idealist questionable so far.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

The necessary and sufficient change of perspective here is as follows: For the sake of the discussion, try to stop thinking in terms of what causes experience, but instead look at mind as the ground of existence. Let me give you an analogy: In string theory, super-strings are seen as the ground of existence (ontological primitives that cannot be reduced). The different ways they 'vibrate' then create the variety of objective entities. Now transpose the form of that thought to its Idealist version: Mind is the ontological primitive, and the different ways it 'vibrates' create the variety of experience. Note that to speak of 'vibrations' is a metaphor in both cases.

OK, so you want to say that mind has 'eternally' existed? Or that mind precedes the notions of space and time? If the latter, how does one derive space and time from mind and how can one even say that it has 'eternally' existed? And if the former, doesn't this imply that something else exists in addition to mind? Also, is this universal mind stuff continuous or discrete?

BTW, in string theory, the idea of the strings vibrating isn't exactly a metaphor. The strings actually do oscillate at different frequencies. Just a side note.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

As such, you can look upon the 'data stream' from the unconscious in the following way: It creates the experience of a shared reality, including the experience of history and consistency across time, in an exactly analogous way that the expansion of energy from the Big Bang singularity does the same thing.

So you want to say the data stream is fixed with some info about how things in the world will appear to everyone. OK, but I don't think this address my question of "why does it contain info about things like the big bang and biological evolution and solar system formation and things like that, as opposed to other logically possible pre-human events (e.g. Hoyle's static universe cosmology)?" Also, is there any way we can empirically observe or falsify this data stream model?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Both the Big bang and the origin of the unconscious 'data stream' are singularities beyond modeling.

Not true about the Big Bang singularity. There are a number of pre-Big Bang models out there, some of which make empirically testable predictions. How does your idealism reconcile with that?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

The whole thing is isomorphic across both interpretations, all empirical observations still holding. Only the ontological interpretation is different: One talks only of experience; the other talks of an inaccessible universe outside experience which, in turn, creates experience.

To my mind, the notion of an experience requires an experiencer. So, in the case of idealism, who/what does the experiencing before human minds were around? Or let me put it this way - have 'individual' human minds existed eternally in the data stream, or did they have a beginning? And if they had a beginning, who/what was the experiencer of this data stream? Or was there even one?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

In a sense, you are asking me to tell you ALL about Idealism in a forum post . This isn't realistic in a similar way (saved for the proportions) that it isn't realistic for you to explain QM in a forum post. Have a look at the paper that started this thread; it's a good begin. After that, you could look for relevant articles in my blog (Metaphysical Speculations) or, if you like, check out my latest book, which goes more into it (though it's written for a broader audience). To be more specific, I'd recommend the following articles, which address parts of what you specifically ask above:

Metaphysical Speculations: The brain as a knot of consciousness
Metaphysical Speculations: Categories of consciousness
Metaphysical Speculations: Subject, object, and instincts

Thanks, I'll take a look at some point, but I can't promise to get through all of it right away. Let me ask you this in the mean time - would you claim that idealism has complete answers to all those questions I asked? And if not, can you list the questions which it does and doesn't yet have answers to?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

My second book has some mathematical fantasies, with stress on the word fantasies. But you see, Idealism does not deny empirical observation or the corresponding models. So all QM mathematics, and all modeling that is empirically confirmed, remains valid if it is valid.

It's still not clear how all the QM formalism maps into idealism, but I understand that that's what you're claiming.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Well, QM is coherent anyway, so my original choice of words was not accurate.

Standard QM is not logically coherent. It doesn't have an ontology and it suffers from the measurement problem.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

But QM is intuitive under Idealism, in the sense that what is not intuitive about QM (non-locality, contextuality, etc.) is only non-intuitive because of Realist assumptions.

For all the reasons I've discussed, it's not at all clear to me that QM is intuitive under idealism.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Under Idealism, there is ultimately only one mind, our egos being localized points-of-view of that mind (see the articles I linked above).

Right, but localized where? In spacetime? If not, then what do you mean by 'localized'? And how do those minds get localized? Are these questions addressed in your articles?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

You could make an analogy with Bohm's ideas: The ontological assumptions are contradictory, but there is an isomorphism of sorts between the one mind idea, and the implicate order.

Yes, I see the intended isomorphism.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

It would entail that Wigner's interpretation holds. But other Idealists may have a different opinion here; MWI may be OK under Idealism too.

Wigner's interpretation never explained how to derive the classical appearance of objects living in 3D space from the wavefunction description in configuration space, and nor does MWI as I've already explained. So that doesn't seem to me a satisfactory answer.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

This is the best and deepest question. I will be frank about it with you: I don't have a firm opinion on this part yet. It's been keeping me busy. It comes down to whether there is collapse or not, I guess. In other words, do all points of the configuration space actually get experienced? Or are they just experiences in potentiality? I don't have an answer yet; not even for myself. I tend to think the latter... but I could change my mind.

Fair enough. I should say though that I don't think collapse will help because collapse of the wavefunction mathematically still occurs in configuration space. I think you would need to posit some kind of primitive mind ontology in 3-space, whose dynamics in 3-space get governed somehow by the dynamics of the wavefunction in configuration space. But once you do that, you deviate from standard QM, and it begins to make the wavefunction look like an ontic thing (which doesn't seem to be what you want).

[mszlazak]

Originally Posted by Maaneli

That's not enough elaboration, Mark. You say that I'm misrepresenting the situation regarding what constitutes a measurer in standard QM (i.e. a CCD camera), so can you explain what specifically in Stapp's work supports your opinion?

I will attempt to get a response from Henry Stapp to clarify what his view really is.

[Maaneli]

Originally Posted by mszlazak

I will attempt to get a response from Henry Stapp to clarify what his view really is.

Thanks, looking forward.

[Maaneli]

Originally Posted by Bernardo

This is an excellent argument against MWI. I am on record disagreeing with MWI, so you've just given me an extremely simple and compelling new argument.

Cool. You would be one of the very few to use this argument against MWI, outside of a handful of professional philosophers of physics and foundations physicists.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

I fully agree. Therefore, based on my admittedly limited understanding of the bewildering variety of formulations and interpretations of QM today in physics, and all the polemic around them, particularly with regards to the measurement problem and entanglement, I cannot help but think to see a clear trend whereby many reasonable intuitions about realism are being progressively invalidated. I also cannot help but feel that, when all the noise dies down and the dust settles, the one thing that always seems to come out intact is classical QM a la Bohr.

But I gave a counterargument to this involving an analogy with Aristotelian intuitions. What did you think of that counterargument? Also, please note that Bohm's version of QM (as well as stochastic mechanics) has survived all these experiments without modification as much as Bohr's version of QM has. Does that have any effect?

Originally Posted by Bernardo

I acknowledge the effort of many, yourself included, to carve out new theoretical ground wherein Realism can hypothetically find sanctuary. But I will side with actual empirical evidence, as opposed to a potential for future empirical evidence.

But this is a non-sequitur! Siding with the empirical evidence doesn't at all entail rejecting realism!

Originally Posted by Bernardo

In other words, I will side with the trend I see in palpable empirical results today, given that empirical tests that could potentially come out in favor of realism are currently not realizable, as you acknowledge below:

Actually, all the existing empirical tests so far could equally be taken as evidence for nonlocal contextual realism, as much so as "nonlocal, contextual" non-realism. In fact, perhaps moreso, given that theories of the former type can at least recover most of the classical appearances of the world, whereas theories of the latter type don't seem to do so at all.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

Having said the above, I applaud what you and your colleagues are doing. Because Realism is so ingrained, we absolutely need to exhaust it. So your work, in my view, will be successful either way: Either you will prove that Realism is true, or you will show through exhaustion that we must entertain a different possibility despite the intuitive abhorrence that many feel for it.

Thanks.

Originally Posted by Bernardo

For now, I still feel that Idealism is the most natural, simplest, and most self-evident route to take, based not only on physics but philosophy and personal experience too, and in view of the relative contrivance I personally perceive in the alternatives.

Well, that's a bit disappointing.

I would encourage you to let my arguments and references sink in for a bit longer, and then reconsider your position.

[Bernardo]

This is perhaps the best exchange I've had in this forum.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

My point about standard QM is that it doesn't have anything in its math that can serve as a comprehensible ontology for the world we experience (as I explained in my previous post, the wavefunction in configuration space doesn't really work). And the Heisenberg Copenhagen interpretation doesn't have ANY ontology! It's completely moot on the question of what actually exists and composes the world. Bohr's interpretation (which is different from Copenhagen, BTW) also lacks an ontology.

Having read the rest of your post, I already know this answer won't be satisfying to you; but it's my thinking. So, for what it's worth: It is collapse, according to Wigner's interpretation, that creates the ontology. The ontology under Idealism is a phenomenology: What exists is what is perceived. Collapse creates what is perceived out of a probability distribution given by Born rule. Psi is epistemic, not ontic. The wave function captures the statistical regularities of the phenomenology of mind, but does not have independent existence.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

First, what do you mean by a "path"? A path in spacetime? Or something else

A path in the configuration space; the space of possible experiences. Space-time is created by collapse. (all others: sorry, I am relapsing into jargon again... these posts are getting very long, I'm having a tough time spelling things out).

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Second, why should the wavefunction (this abstract mathematical wave in configuration space) know anything about the probabilities about which 'path' the flow of experience will take, and why should it model it correctly?

Why are the laws of nature the way they are? Why do the fundamental physical constants have the values they have? The wave function is not an invention of mankind; it's an observation of a pattern in nature. It's derived correctly based on empirical observation.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Also, in what dimensional space does the flow of experience live in? 3D space or configuration space?

(egoic) Experience naturally takes place in 3D space. Configuration space is an abstraction of modelling.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Third, what's happening to the 'flow of experience' in between measurement events? Is it in a superposition state of some kind?

Replacing 'measurement' with 'subjective experience' (remember, I am adopting Wigner's interpretation), whatever is not subjectively experienced by anyone has never existed. Psi is epistemic.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Well, it runs into problems when dealing with the quantum mechanics of the Big Bang singularity

Nobody experienced that... We cannot discard the possibility, even probability, that that too, is epistemic (An abstraction of mind. The experience of the abstraction is real, though, in the sense that it is phenomenology).

Originally Posted by Maaneli

I don't think it's accurate to say that idealism is the antithesis of realism in philosophy (at least that's not exactly true in philosophy of science), but OK, if that's all you mean by that, I'll go with it.

Anti-realism isn't quite an antithesis for realism, is it...

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Because that's how it appears to be, given all of our experiences with conscious minds, as I explained before.

Some of the links I sent you in the post you are replying to articulate how this illusion could have arisen.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Ah, I see. To what extent is this school of thought scientifically supported though? My understanding was that Jung and Freud didn't not take a very scientific approach to their ideas.

Jung's views are not supported by the mainstream because many of his ideas violate the notion that mind=brain. Freud's views are largely mainstream, though not his therapeutic methods. The existence of the unconscious is completely mainstream; actually, there is no dispute on that. See Eagleman's recent book "Incognito" for an overview.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

OK, so you want to say that mind has 'eternally' existed? Or that mind precedes the notions of space and time?

It precedes the notion of space-time.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

If the latter, how does one derive space and time from mind

The same way the experience of matter is derived from mind. They are co-dependent, after all.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

doesn't this imply that something else exists in addition to mind?

The difficulties here, I think, are exactly analogous to those of standard cosmology.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Also, is this universal mind stuff continuous or discrete?

Oh, here are the realist assumptions creeping in...

Originally Posted by Maaneli

BTW, in string theory, the idea of the strings vibrating isn't exactly a metaphor. The strings actually do oscillate at different frequencies.

Well, it's a metaphor in the sense that we cannot say what the superstrings are 'made of' (they are ontological primitives), so we basically have to speak of the 'vibrations' of an undefined thing; an abstraction.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

So you want to say the data stream is fixed with some info about how things in the world will appear to everyone. OK, but I don't think this address my question of "why does it contain info about things like the big bang and biological evolution and solar system formation and things like that, as opposed to other logically possible pre-human events (e.g. Hoyle's static universe cosmology)?"

Why did the Big Bang happen? Why were there enough quantum-level irregularities that matter formed clumps that eventually became stars, planets, you, and me?

There are two possible scenarios.

Scenario 1: Our cosmological past is just a model. The only thing that exists is the experience of such abstract model.

Scenario 2: Our cosmological past actually happened. In that case, consciousness existed from the get-go in some 'form' that is not the self-reflective, egoic human form. The universal history has been (at least partly) an experiment to transform that original 'form' (or rather, that 'topology') of consciousness into this self-reflective form we embody. I talk about it in the articles I sent you before (with topological metaphors about consciousness folding in on itself).

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Also, is there any way we can empirically observe or falsify this data stream model?

I don't know.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

To my mind, the notion of an experience requires an experiencer. So, in the case of idealism, who/what does the experiencing before human minds were around?

Realism assumptions creeping in again. Under Idealism, humans are in the mind, not minds in humans. Mind was there all along because it's supposedly the ground of all existence. Humans embody a localized and particular topology of mind, according to my own hypothesis.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Or let me put it this way - have 'individual' human minds existed eternally in the data stream, or did they have a beginning?

'Individual minds' (i.e. localized parts of the fabric of mind) might have had a beginning. Mind itself is outside space-time.

Originally Posted by Maaneli

Right, but localized where? In spacetime? If not, then what do you mean by 'localized'? And how do those minds get localized? Are these questions addressed in your articles?

Localized in whatever the topology of mind is; some kind of hyper-geometry, perhaps fractal (no, I haven't done the math; this won't happen until many more people take Idealism more seriously). Space-time is within mind.

The localization, in my view, is a partial folding of mind within this hyper-geometry.

It's superficially addressed in the articles I linked. I've just started working on a book that will spell this out more. But will take a while, and there is very little in the way of help with formalisms...

Originally Posted by Maaneli

I should say though that I don't think collapse will help because collapse of the wavefunction mathematically still occurs in configuration space. I think you would need to posit some kind of primitive mind ontology in 3-space, whose dynamics in 3-space get governed somehow by the dynamics of the wavefunction in configuration space.

I see what you mean, but I am not really sure... you want to have a formalized rule to translate configuration space into 3D space... but every point in configuration space already fully-specifies all qualities of the phenomenology...

What you're describing is a real problem/need for MWI because it's psi-ontic, but in my hypothesis psi is merely epistemic, so....

Maybe this is something we could talk about a bit more sometime?

-----
Final comment: A big motivation for Idealism, in my mind, is that it eliminates the hard problem of consciousness, and the explanatory gap, automatically. By taking mind as an ontological primitive, it no longer needs to be reduced. Philosophically speaking, this is by far the most self-evident and natural choice, since mind is all we can ever know for sure to exist. Anything outside of mind is, by definition, an abstraction of mind. Jung used to say that "mind is the only carrier of reality man can ever know." To me, this is much cleaner than the postulation of non-observable entities, states, and intricate models to link them, in order to safeguard Realism and still be left with the hard problem of consciousness.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Bernardo

QM can know what happens in between two observed states, so long as the 'in-between' are observed states. If you want, you can observe continuously during the 'in between' time; nothing prevents you from doing that. Either way, the math behind QM does not require the hidden variables Maaneli is talking about in order to make any prediction.

Oh, you're talking about the hidden variables not being necessary. Got it.

No, and I have no idea where this question came from!

Nothing was observed between the Big Bang and the first conscious observer. Or perhaps you're not assuming conscious observers are required. I can't tell.

~~ Paul