Multiple Drafts Model Of Consciousness

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

I know it isn't much of an answer, but if you don't require that consciousness be created by physical 'stuff' but simply exist like electrons exist, you don't have a problem - you just have a new component to the universe. That does not, of course, mean that you couldn't have a science that studied mental 'stuff' - indeed the preliminary version is called psychology and maybe parapsychology, but you would get away from the impossibility of making a radio out of non-conducting plastic bricks! Another analogy would be the impossibility of explaining electrostatic attraction within Newtonian physics (i.e. without adding the new concept of electric charge).

Consciousness simply exists in all its full-blown glory? That's almost impossible to believe. But let's say it does. What is experiencing the consciousness? Where is the little man?

Why can't a little man exist inside a computer - well as I have argued before, all a computer really does is check equations of the form input+P=>output. If the program is conscious while it is doing the checking, why not the abstract equation - which delocalises the consciousness over all space-time!

Do you not think that a computer program could be sophisticated enough to make statements about its consciousness that would be indistinguishable from human statements? If so, then what is the difference between human and computer consciousness?

Delocalise what sort of consciousness? Full-blown human consciousness? Are you suggesting that if the vacuum could speak, it would say the same sort of things I do?

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Paul,

What I am saying is that a computer program simply checks a relationship:

input+P=>output

That is all it does! The relationship which it checks was true for all time, and will remain so - like a theorem. Thus, if you want to attach consciousness to the running of a program, you are really attaching it to a mathematical relationship - or theorem if you like.

To me, at least, this reduces the idea of a program being conscious to an absurdity.

I am not saying that the smallest components of consciousness are like human brains - just that they cannot (I suspect) be resolved to non-conscious sub-components.

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

What I am saying is that a computer program simply checks a relationship:

input+P=>output

That is all it does! The relationship which it checks was true for all time, and will remain so - like a theorem. Thus, if you want to attach consciousness to the running of a program, you are really attaching it to a mathematical relationship - or theorem if you like.

To me, at least, this reduces the idea of a program being conscious to an absurdity.

Nah, it just means that you are considering only simple computations. Anyway, even if consciousness is some sort of fundamental force of the universe, what's to prevent it from attaching itself to a computation? Especially if that computation simulates the brain down to every last detail?

It's a question of how your fundamental mindon thingie interacts with the rest of the universe.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Nah, it just means that you are considering only simple computations.
~~ Paul

Not really - what sort of complications do you want to add? For example, suppose you want to add parallel processes. If these are well structured so as not to mutually interfere with each other, then you could always get the same result with a serial calculation, if they do interfere with each other you can still substitute a serial calculation, but it will be one of many. Neural nets can be simulated on a computer, so they fall into the same category.

It seems to me that a lot of people try to waffle out of this problem without thinking very deeply. For example, at one time it was fashionable to claim that the real fix for AI was to give the thing a 'body'. Fine - but why not include the 'body' in the program (with routines like find_headache_status()).

Try to specify a computational elaboration that would really make a difference.

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Anyway, even if consciousness is some sort of fundamental force of the universe, what's to prevent it from attaching itself to a computation? Especially if that computation simulates the brain down to every last detail?

It's a question of how your fundamental mindon thingie interacts with the rest of the universe.

~~ Paul

Well, I guess the mindon's would not be capable of exact simulation. This concept would not be exactly new to physics, because a quantum process is not exactly simulatable - all you can do is compute a range of possible outcomes. However, the mindons would obviously not be equivalent to random number generators (at least not my type ).

Now for a 'mindon' to attach itself to a computation, you have to accept at least three things:

The computer must be able to respond to the mindon - if it is going to grind on as it would have done anyway, the midon has achieved nothing! I.e. it can't just be any old computer, it has to have some extra non-computational hardware attached.

The mindon absolutely can't be simulatable - or even be simulated in a statistical sense, I think - because otherwise you would be back with the old input+P+>output equation.

There has to be a mechanism by which the outcome of the program has to get fed back to the mindon - it has to care about what it is controlling.

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

Not really - what sort of complications do you want to add? For example, suppose you want to add parallel processes. If these are well structured so as not to mutually interfere with each other, then you could always get the same result with a serial calculation, if they do interfere with each other you can still substitute a serial calculation, but it will be one of many. Neural nets can be simulated on a computer, so they fall into the same category.

I'm not talking about additional processing methods. I'm talking about additional code. Millions of lines of it.

It seems to me that a lot of people try to waffle out of this problem without thinking very deeply. For example, at one time it was fashionable to claim that the real fix for AI was to give the thing a 'body'. Fine - but why not include the 'body' in the program (with routines like find_headache_status()).

Yes, why not?

Try to specify a computational elaboration that would really make a difference.

A total simulation of the brain. Then the computer would think all the thoughts, feel all the feelings, and talk about all the qualia that a human does.

We will spiral around in the conversation forever. You think consciousness is something the brain can't do, so therefore you think it is something a computer can't do. I see no evidence for this assumption.

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

We will spiral around in the conversation forever. You think consciousness is something the brain can't do, so therefore you think it is something a computer can't do. I see no evidence for this assumption.

~~ Paul

Well you are probably right - but you are rather avoiding the fundamental contradiction:

input+P=>output

is a theorem

This remains true however many lines of code go into P! Also remember that P could be a simulation of the brain and body!

Your conscious program simply checks a theorem which was already true, and always will be.

(You took so long to respond, I thought you were either going to come out with a brilliant counter-argument, or concede defeat )

David

[Larry Boy]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

input+P=>output

is a theorem

Sorry if I come in at a late point in the discussion, but I would really appreciate if you could give a simple layman's explanation of this.

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Larry Boy

Sorry if I come in at a late point in the discussion, but I would really appreciate if you could give a simple layman's explanation of this.

Well, all a program ever does is a sequence of logical steps - determined by the program P - and generates some output.

Let's take a really simple P

x=inputNumber();
k=3;
while(k>0)
{
x=x*2;
k=k-1;
}
output(x);

Hopefully the meaning of this program is clear, and because of the loop, which goes round 3 times, it takes its input, multiplies it by 8 and outputs the result, so one theorem would be

5+P=>40

Because this is so simple, you don't need a computer to check it, but if P were very complicated, the computer would still be just regurgitating a result that was true anyway, and always will be.

Obviously, the computer could do something time-dependant - like incorporating the clock into its calculations, but surely that is just a trivial complication.

(Paul and I had this discussion some time ago, so the above discussion probably seemed a bit cryptic )

David

[Larry Boy]

Is what you're saying that a computer program never can come up with something new that goes beyond its basic constituents? It can never "think outside the box," so to speak?

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Larry Boy

Is what you're saying that a computer program never can come up with something new that goes beyond its basic constituents? It can never "think outside the box," so to speak?

Not really - that is something of an old chestnut!

My point is that Paul accepts that any material system can in principle be simulated on a computer. Therefore, he accepts that a computer program can be conscious.

However, my point is that a computer program together with its input can be thought of as simply checking some mathematical relationship (albeit perhaps a very complex one) - a theorem if you like. Therefore it is reasonable to ask in the consciousness (together with qualia, of course) is associated with the checking program, or with the theorem itself! The theorem - like all theorems - is true for all time, which seems an odd place for consciousness to reside (remember this is the ultra-materialist model of consciousness).

There are various potential complications - such as the use of random number generators, parallel computation, etc. but a little thought shows that these do not change the above argument.

I contend that no purely material mechanism can be conscious because such a system can be simulated by a suitable computer program - which leads to the above paradox.

David