Multiple Drafts Model Of Consciousness

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

Ian,

I don't think consciousness can be separated from what consciousness does.

Then that makes you a behaviourist or functionalist. Clearly behaviourists and functionalists would hold that by definition an android is conscious.

However it is simply transparently false that the actual sensation of pain is precisely the same thing as saying ow and grimacing, or that it is precisely the same thing as some specific physical process. As I've said and argued many times before, if someone insists otherwise then they are denying the existence of consciousness. I won't bother repeating that argument again here.

It is not that I think your android would be conscious - I just think it is impossible!

You think it is impossible to create an android whose behaviour is effectively indistinguishable from a human being's? Functionalists/behaviourists can hold such a position as they can hold that computation cannot create consciousness. But since human beings are merely complex machines it must be in principle possible to create a machine which externally resembles us and whose behaviour would be indistinguishable from a human being's (not virtually indistinguishable as in my position). Presumably the physical processes occurring in this android's brain would be non-algorithmic (because if they are algorithmic why wouldn't normal computation suffice?)

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by David Bailey

Ian,

I think what you are saying stems from a misunderstanding of Chalmers' concept of 'hard and 'easy' problems. Making an android that behaves like a human is probably just as hard as making it experience qualia - it is just that we can't prove it is as hard.

David

Well if you're a reductive materialist then there is no distinction between the hard and easy problems. Moreover if we are functionalists then once we have creating an android then by definition it is just as conscious as a human being. So it experiences qualia if we suppose that we experience qualia.

Chalmers is a computational functionalist, but he holds that consciousness is not constituted by such functions. Rather once you have the appropriate computations occuring then consciousness naturally arises. In other words consciousness cannot be reduced to the functioning. It's just a natural fact about reality that when sufficiently complex computations are carried out, then consciousness will arise.

This is a much more reasonable position then saying some instruction, some program in and of itself, is conscious. Indeed that is absurd!

[David Bailey]

Ian,

From what I have read of Chalmers what he calls 'hard' might be better described as 'demonstrably hard', and what he describes as 'easy' might be better described as 'not so far demonstrably hard'. There is a huge difference between saying something is not provably hard, and saying that it is in fact easy.

My view is that physicalism can't explain the hard problems (qualia), but it can't explain the easy problems either - possibly because we think using qualia all the time. Quite abstract concepts - such as particular sorts of equations, or programming languages - have qualia associated with them - at least in my mind. I suspect the idea of a brain running without qualia - your android - is actually an absurdity.

David

[mcromer]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Consciousness simply exists in all its full-blown glory? That's almost impossible to believe. But let's say it does. What is experiencing the consciousness? Where is the little man?
~~ Paul

Actually this is what mystics from every tradition say.

That only consciousness exists, and all these other things are simply appearances unfolding within consciousness.

Certainly the sense of self can be seen through as just a particular pattern of ideas, often a meditation practice helps with this.

[mcromer]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Agreed. So let's consider an unborn fetus. Can you describe what he feels the first time he stubs his toe in the uterus? No, you cannot. It's quite likely he feels nothing, because he has not learned to hurt. How long do we have to run the simulator before we expect typical pain feelings?

Fetuses display aversive behavior towards negative stimuli, much like babies, animals, and even "primitive" organisms like paramecia.

Any attempt to deny qualia to them smacks of a Descartian insistance that vivisected dogs didn't perceive any pain, that their yelps and howls were simply reflex reactions.

[David Bailey]

Mcromer,

I agree very much with what you have said in the last two posts. An all-mental world that creates a physical simulation makes more sense than an all physical world that creates a mental world. I push the idea of dualism rather than idealism simply because it seems less extreme.

Consciousness seems to go all the way down, as you say, it is tempting to wonder if life would even exist without it.

David

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by mcromer

Actually this is what mystics from every tradition say.

That only consciousness exists, and all these other things are simply appearances unfolding within consciousness.

Sure, they say that, but what do they mean? What are the attributes of this fundamental consciousness?

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by mcromer

Fetuses display aversive behavior towards negative stimuli, much like babies, animals, and even "primitive" organisms like paramecia.

Any attempt to deny qualia to them smacks of a Descartian insistance that vivisected dogs didn't perceive any pain, that their yelps and howls were simply reflex reactions.

So fetuses and paramecia experience qualia? Cool! Next time someone asks me if a thermostat experiences qualia, I can say yes without hesitation.

Once again, we toss the word qualia around with abandon.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by David

I agree very much with what you have said in the last two posts. An all-mental world that creates a physical simulation makes more sense than an all physical world that creates a mental world. I push the idea of dualism rather than idealism simply because it seems less extreme.

Could you explain exactly why it makes more sense?

~~ Paul

[David Bailey]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Could you explain exactly why it makes more sense?

~~ Paul

Well because an all mental world could imagine a physical world if you want to put it like that - or think of the superficially physical world that we seem to inhabit in dreams.

The reverse process - creating a mental world by purely physical means - seems unlikely to be achieved. Since the dualist model of reality seems less extreme than a fully mental model, I tend to push that approach, but I realise that a totally mental reality - as suggested by some mystics - may be the ultimate explanation.

Qualia for paramecia only implies qualia for thermostats if you take the view that life is just complex chemistry. The fact that consciousness seems to go seamlessly right down to the most primitive life forms (I don't know about plants) rather suggests to me that the two are intimately connected.

David