Evidence of Memory Formation

[davidsmith73]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Do you think that I have to provide a philosophical proof that my car follows Newtonian mechanics, or otherwise you're going to poo-poo my driving to the grocery store?

I don't understand what you are getting at here.

All we have is empiricism until you can come up with some other way to learn about the world, or until you can prove that empiricism can't solve the problem of consciousness.

I'd be happier if someone could prove that empiricism can provide evidence that consciousness is physical without invoking the following circularity:

1)The only way that empiricism can work is for explanandi and explanans to be decribed in physical terms (unless you disagree with that?).

2)So the only way that empiricism can claim to be in a position to solve the problem of consciousness is to assume that consciousness is physical.


Question - what basis is there for claiming consciousness if physical?


Answer A - it's just an assumption of an empirical approach to consciousness. Can't be helped. The assumption could be wrong of course, but empiricism cannot tell you whether its wrong or not. That's the job of the philosophy of mind.

Answer B - There is empirical evidence for consciousness being physical.

Answer B is circular. Empirical evidence relies on all of the things that empiricism requires, ie. that the explanandum and the explanans are all described in physical terms. So you have to define consciousness in physical terms in the first instance in order to claim empirical evidence for consciousness being physical. Hence, the circularity.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Ian

Yes it is. I've already provided a proof showing that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent.

I'm not promoting epiphenomenalism. Conscious cogitating about a decision may indeed affect the future decision. But the actual decision may then be nonconscious.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Lekatt

That I am my brain is ludicrous. I and millions of others have been absent from our bodies and feeling fine with all our consciousness intact.

I don't think so. But if you could show me a disembodied consciousness, that would go a long way toward convincing me.

Just think of the impact on society if we accepted your theory we are our brains. That makes our brains responsible for all our actions. How do you put a brain in jail. Sorry judge I couldn't stop my brain from doing it. Or it wasn't me, it was just my evil brain.

How do you put a brain in jail? By putting the entire body in jail. The real question is: How do you put an immaterial mind in jail?

Ok I just couldn't resist. No Paul, We are consciousness, not brain, and consciousness controls the brain. We are responsible for our own actions and deeds. That is the way our society works.

I didn't realize it was a societal thing.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by davidsmith

I don't understand what you are getting at here.

You said:

You have to provide a philosophical argument for an empirical approach to consciousness just as much as any other approach!

I don't think so, unless there is some other approach to learning about the world that we could use instead. Then perhaps we'd have to provide an argument for which approach to use. Since no other approach is forthcoming, I don't see why we need to argue about it.

I'd be happier if someone could prove that empiricism can provide evidence that consciousness is physical without invoking the following circularity:

1)The only way that empiricism can work is for explanandi and explanans to be decribed in physical terms (unless you disagree with that?).

2)So the only way that empiricism can claim to be in a position to solve the problem of consciousness is to assume that consciousness is physical.

If you can come up with an empirical approach to nonphysical questions, then I would be happy to disagree with (1). Until then, what choice have we got? Do you have a nonempirical approach to understanding the world that can't be immediately rejected as nothing more than people's feelings about how it works?

If the source of consciousness interacts with the physical world, then I think it can be studied as if it were physical. If the source does not interact with the physical world, then who cares about it?

I simply don't understand what all you empiricism rejectors have to offer in its place.

~~ Paul

[Open Mind]

The word 'empirical' means experienced ... without consciousness nothing is 'empirical' ... without consciousness science doesn't exist ...Objectivity is when peoples subjectivities match and agree measurement ....

[davidsmith73]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

I don't think so, unless there is some other approach to learning about the world that we could use instead.

I don't think the issue is learning about the world. Empiricism is fine for learning about physical things. The question is to ask whether consciousness is physical, and empiricism can't do that without first assuming it to be physical. So you can't claim empirical evidence for consciousness being physical without invoking circular reasoning.

If you can come up with an empirical approach to nonphysical questions, then I would be happy to disagree with (1).

I don't think that is possible, do you?

Until then, what choice have we got?

What about the huge body of literature on the philosophy of mind?!

Do you have a nonempirical approach to understanding the world that can't be immediately rejected as nothing more than people's feelings about how it works?

Asking how consciousness 'works' would be assuming that we are talking about something physical (just to clafiry, I'm using 'consciousness' to refer to qualia).

So in an attempt to answer your question, I would say yes, there exists direct knowledge that does not involve empiricism - we call it consciousness! But direct knowledge won't give you knowledge of physical things. For the latter you need empiricism.

If the source of consciousness interacts with the physical world, then I think it can be studied as if it were physical. If the source does not interact with the physical world, then who cares about it?

Mental monists would say that the physical world is contructed from consciousness, i.e., the physical world is dependent on consciousness rather than the other way round.

So we could make philosophical arguments (or proofs if you prefer) about whether consciousness is physical or not, but empiricism cannot provide evidence for it's own assupmtion that it is physical.

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

You said:

I don't think so, unless there is some other approach to learning about the world that we could use instead. Then perhaps we'd have to provide an argument for which approach to use. Since no other approach is forthcoming, I don't see why we need to argue about it.

An empirical approach to consciousness can only be justified if naturalism is true. But naturalism isn't true. Therefore an empirical approach to consciousness is not justified.

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by davidsmith

I don't think the issue is learning about the world. Empiricism is fine for learning about physical things. The question is to ask whether consciousness is physical, and empiricism can't do that without first assuming it to be physical. So you can't claim empirical evidence for consciousness being physical without invoking circular reasoning.

Empiricism says that knowledge is gained through experience. I'm not sure why it's limited to physicalism per se.

I don't think that is possible, do you?

Yes, as long as we can experience the nonphysical thing, then we can use empirical techniques to study it.

What about the huge body of literature on the philosophy of mind?!

After 3,000 years, still no conclusion about what the mind is. Do you think that another 1,000 years will decide between physicalism, idealism, dualism, etc., based on the chit-chat of philosophers?

Asking how consciousness 'works' would be assuming that we are talking about something physical (just to clafiry, I'm using 'consciousness' to refer to qualia).

So consciousness doesn't "work"? There are no laws that govern its operation? Then it's random. Or nonexistent. Or something like that.

So in an attempt to answer your question, I would say yes, there exists direct knowledge that does not involve empiricism - we call it consciousness! But direct knowledge won't give you knowledge of physical things. For the latter you need empiricism.

I see nothing in the definition of empiricism that justifies your rejection of it as a means of studying your inner experiences.

Mental monists would say that the physical world is contructed from consciousness, i.e., the physical world is dependent on consciousness rather than the other way round.

And so then you can rule out science and empiricism completely? Aren't you simply using the "nonphysicalness of consciousness" as an excuse to reject all common-sense means of studying it, just so it can remain a magical mystery? What are you actually suggesting?

So we could make philosophical arguments (or proofs if you prefer) about whether consciousness is physical or not, but empiricism cannot provide evidence for it's own assupmtion that it is physical.

I don't think empiricism makes that assumption. Science might have to make some sort of assumption like that, but not empiricism. And again, an argument is not sufficient to draw any conclusions. You need a proof.

~~ Paul

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian

An empirical approach to consciousness can only be justified if naturalism is true. But naturalism isn't true. Therefore an empirical approach to consciousness is not justified.

You've just said that an experiential approach to understanding consciousness is unjustified.

empiricism: 2 a : the practice of relying on observation and experiment especially in the natural sciences

Now you're left with nothing, including any reason to trust your feelings about your inner experiences.

~~ Paul